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1Abstract
This thesis is a theory-proposing and theory-testing study that examines the conditions
of state survival in the Middle East. In contrast to the predominant Political Culture and
Political Economy approaches, which focus on domestic factors to account for state
survival in the Middle East, this thesis suggests that, more than the individual
characteristics of states themselves, state survival in that region is a function of the
anarchic state system.
This thesis examines states as a ‘process’ situating them in time and place. It
shows that Middle Eastern states are at once in the early phases of state formation as
well as late comers to the international state system. This ontological status contributes
to the vulnerability of these states to systematic forces, which in turn shapes their
internal development. A major dilemma facing the late-forming state is between regime
survival and political incorporation.
The first part of this thesis examines the literatures on the state, the Middle East
state, and state survival. The second part proposes a Historical Structuralism model and
then examines the ontology of the state in the Middle East, specifying the conditions
and variables of state survival. The third part presents an empirical examination of the
cases of Saudi Arabia and Iraq.
2Thesis Declaration
I, Adham Saouli hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 80, 000 words in length,
has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been
submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.
I was admitted as a research student in September 2005 and as a candidate for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in May 2006; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out
in the University of St Andrews between 2005 and 2008.
date …………. signature of candidate ……… ……….
I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations
appropriate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of St Andrews and that the
candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree.
date …… signature of supervisor ………
In submitting this thesis to the University of St Andrews we understand that we are giving
permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the regulations of the
University Library for the time being in force, subject to any copyright vested in the work not
being affected thereby. We also understand that the title and the abstract will be published, and
that a copy of the work may be made and supplied to any bona fide library or research worker,
that my thesis will be electronically accessible for personal or research use unless exempt by
award of an embargo as requested below, and that the library has the right to migrate my thesis
into new electronic forms as required to ensure continued access to the thesis. We have obtained
any third-party copyright permissions that may be required in order to allow such access and
migration, or have requested the appropriate embargo below.
The following is an agreed request by candidate and supervisor regarding the electronic
publication of this thesis:
Embargo on both of all or part of printed copy and electronic copy for the same fixed period of
4 years on the following ground:
Publication would preclude future publication
date …………. signature of candidate …… …………..
signature of supervisor ..………………..
3Acknowledgments
I began to think about state formation when I was an undergraduate student in Beirut
back in 1998. I then decided to pursue a doctoral degree. As a doctoral student, I have
discovered that a PhD is not something one ‘does’, but rather something one lives. I
have incurred many debts, both personal and academic. The valuable support of the
many people I have met, lived and worked with made this thesis possible. The list is
long.
I would first like to thank my greatest friend Achraf with whom I tried (at a
rather early age) to unravel questions on religion, philosophy and politics. I would also
like to thank my friends Nizar, Mazen, Bassel, Ziad, Tamam, Gina, Rami, Rana, Abdo,
Valerie, Sally, and Danka for their support through the years. Special thanks go to
Milena for her patience and love. In Exeter, the support of my friends Aida, Giti, Amer,
Ahmad, Veronica, Greta, Daniel, Ajal, Andrea, and Shahira was invaluable. I owe
special thanks and gratitude to my great friend Khalid Almezaini. Khalid’s generosity,
encouragement and friendship has seen me through tough times and continues to be
precious to me.
My gratitude goes to my teachers Naim Salem, Ghaith Chahine, Judith Harik,
Hassan Krayem and Hilal Khashan at both Notre Dame University and the American
University of Beirut. Special gratitude goes to Professor Yahya Sadowski. I was very
fortunate to work under Yahya’s supervision at AUB; his guidance, knowledge and
continued support made my search for the state and state survival possible.
I spent my best and most intense PhD years in the University of St Andrews. I
was very privileged to work under the supervision of Professor Raymond Hinnebusch.
Ray is the kind of supervisor any doctoral student hopes to have. I have admired his
professionalism, honesty, meticulousness, and knowledge in Political Science and
Middle East Studies; I have also learned from it. His invaluable feedback on and
supervision of this thesis made it better in every way. Any weaknesses remain mine
alone.
I am also grateful to Fiona Oviatt , Frederic Volpi, and Michael Boyle for their
generous support. From my St Andrews PhD family, I would like to thank Faye for her
kindness, Trudy, Torsten, John, Sean, Aleco, Sarah, and Kate for their great friendship.
I would also like to thank Tim for the interesting discussions on America and the world
(and the great barbeques!), Wojciech for his intriguing insights on the state in Central
4Asia and beyond and Khaled Fatah - with whom I endlessly discussed (and mourned)
the state in the Middle East - for his intellect and friendship. A special thank you goes to
my housemate Hafiz whose maturity, understanding and great company made my stay
in Albany Park feel like home. Last but not least, a special thanks go to Hannah, whom
I met in the last summer in St Andrews, for enduring (and trying to understand!) my
fluctuating moods.
As the PhD process is coming to a close, I also want to recall the universities,
institutes, scholarship bodies, employers, department heads and journals that sent me
rejection letters on several occasions. These rejections taught me to work harder and so
I thank them here.
This thesis would not have been possible without the support, love, patience,
encouragement and care of my family. My family was my first school: with lots of love,
I dedicate this work to them.
5Table of Contents
Abstract ............................................................................................................................1
Thesis Declaration ...........................................................................................................2
Acknowledgments............................................................................................................3
List of Figures ..................................................................................................................9
Introduction ...................................................................................................................10
Research Problem and Purpose .................................................................................. 10
State Survival in the Middle East: The Literature ...................................................... 12
State Survival in the Middle East: The Argument Stated........................................... 15
Research Design and Case Selection.......................................................................... 16
Thesis Outline............................................................................................................. 18
Chapter One...................................................................................................................20
State Formation and the Arab State............................................................................20
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 20
1.1. States and State Formation .................................................................................. 20
1.1.1. What is a state? ............................................................................................. 20
1.1.2. What is State Formation and State Collapse?............................................... 23
1.2. The State in the Middle East: Literature Streams............................................... 26
1.2.1. Political Culture and State Formation .......................................................... 26
1.2.2. Political Economy and State Formation ....................................................... 35
Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 45
Chapter Two ..................................................................................................................47
Why do States Survive? ................................................................................................47
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 47
2.1. International Conditions of State Survival .......................................................... 48
2. 2. Domestic Explanations of State Survival ........................................................... 56
2.2.1. Besides Coercion .......................................................................................... 56
2.2.3. Cultural Frames and the Political ................................................................. 60
6Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 63
Chapter Three................................................................................................................64
Historical Structuralism ...............................................................................................64
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 64
3.1. Structures and the study of Politics ..................................................................... 65
3.2. Structures as Social Fields and the Arenas of Politics ........................................ 68
3.2.1. Regional Social Field.................................................................................... 71
3.2.2. International Social Field.............................................................................. 72
3.3. The Constitution of a Social Field and the Origins of Political Behaviour......... 74
3.3.1. Cultural Structures........................................................................................ 74
3.3.2. Material Structures ....................................................................................... 76
3.3.3. Political Structure ......................................................................................... 78
3.4. Social Fields: History, Memory, and Distinctive Interactions ............................ 87
Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 90
Chapter Four .................................................................................................................91
The Middle East State:..................................................................................................91
Ontology, Formation and Survival ..............................................................................91
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 91
4.1. Initial Conditions of State Formation: Theory and History................................. 92
4.2. Dynamics of European State formation and Peculiarity of the State in the Middle
East ............................................................................................................................. 94
4.3. State Ontology in the Middle East: Explaining State Weakness......................... 99
4.4. State Survival in the Middle East: Conditions and Variation............................ 111
4.4.1. Power Monopolisation: Variables .............................................................. 112
4.4.2 Geo-political Position and External Neutralisation..................................... 115
Conclusion................................................................................................................ 117
Chapter Five.................................................................................................................119
Saudi Arabia: A case of Continued State Survival...................................................119
7State Survival in Saudi Arabia: The Literature ........................................................ 119
5.1. Geographical Position and Origins of the Saudi State .................................. 121
5.1.1. Formation and Deformation of the first Saudi States ................................. 126
5.1.2. External Neutralisation and the Emergence of the contemporary Saudi State
.............................................................................................................................. 128
5.2. Constituting the Saudi Social Field: Political Monopolisation and Regime
Formation ................................................................................................................. 132
5.2.1. Political Structure, Regime Nature and the Saudi State ............................. 135
5.2.2 The Monarchy, Social Forces and State Institutions: Power Reproduction in
Saudi Arabia ......................................................................................................... 137
5.3. External Factors of State Survival: Reproducing the External Neutralisation .. 151
5.3.1. Foreign Policy in Pre-Cold War Period..................................................... 152
5.3.2. Saudi Behaviour in the Cold War.............................................................. 155
5.3.3. Saudi External Behaviour in the Post-Cold War....................................... 160
Conclusion: Theoretical Implications of the Saudi Case.......................................... 163
Chapter Six...................................................................................................................168
Iraq: State Formation and Deformation ...................................................................168
State Survival in Iraq: The Literature ....................................................................... 168
6.1. Geographical Position and the Origins of Iraqi State........................................ 170
6.2. Constituting the Iraqi Social Field..................................................................... 175
6.2.1. External Regime formation and Indigenous Resistance............................. 180
6.2.2. Revolution and Republican Iraq ................................................................. 189
6.2.3. Political Contraction and State Deformation: The Qassim Regime ........... 194
6.2.4. Political Contraction and State Deformation: The Saddam Regime .......... 199
6.3. External Factors of State Survival and Collapse ............................................... 209
6.3.1. Foreign Policy in Pre-Cold Period ............................................................. 210
6.3.2. Iraq Foreign Policy during the Cold War ................................................... 212
6.3.3. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period .............................................. 216
86.4. Military Occupation and State Collapse: The Internal-External Nexus ............ 216
Conclusion: Theoretical Implications of the Iraqi Case ........................................... 223
Conclusion....................................................................................................................227
This Thesis................................................................................................................ 227
A Bounded Theory of State Survival in the Middle East ......................................... 230
Widening the Scope: Theory, Method, and Further Research ................................. 234
Bibliography.................................................................................................................236
Books, Academic Articles, and Theses ..................................................................... 236
Newspaper Articles and Electronic Sources ............................................................ 252
9.
List of Figures
3.1. The Social Field………………………………………………………….…..80
4.1. Conditions of State Emergence in Late Formation………………..………...92
4.2. State Formation Continuum…………………………….………….………..102
4.3. State Weakness in the Middle East………………………………………...106
4.4. State (de-) Formation and State Behaviour………………………………..110
10
Introduction
Too much scholarly attention to the facts
makes one blind; too much listening to the
rhythms of theory and world history makes
one deaf.
—Michael Mann, The Sources of Power
Research Problem and Purpose
This thesis is about state formation and state collapse in the Middle East. The major
question it addresses is: Under what conditions do states stay intact during late
formation? I examine the state here as both a territorial entity and a regime of power. In
studying the conditions of state survival in the Middle East, a few more questions arise:
How and why do states emerge in late formation? Does the timing of their formation
inform us of the factors of their survival? More importantly, what does a ‘state’ mean in
the context of late formation? Are the conditions of state survival to be found in the
internal dynamics of states or in the international system where these states are
embedded?
The main purpose of this thesis is to answer the above questions by proposing a
model to study the state in the Middle East. I have named the model Historical
Structuralism. This model seeks to bridge two divisions that are salient in the social
sciences in general and political science in particular. The first involves the dichotomy
between theory and practice and the second, which is more peculiar to the discipline of
political science, includes the division between domestic and international dynamics.
This work is a theory-proposing and theory-testing doctoral thesis (Van Evera 1997,
89). The Middle East, which for a long time has been treated as an ‘area study’, remains
largely under-theorised. In answering the above questions, I hope to bridge this gap.
The Historical Structuralism model bridges this gap by proposing a framework
to examine state ontology during late formation. This is done by: (1) examining the
peculiarity of the state in the Middle East in light of generic theories of state formation;
(2) exploring factors of variation in Middle East cases and (3) providing a detailed
analysis on the two cases of Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Since there are few studies, if any,
that provide a theoretical framework for examining state survival and collapse in the
Middle East and testing hypotheses in multiple cases, this project is an exercise in
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theory generation and development (for attempts see Ayubi 1995; Bromley 1994). In
short, it seeks to theorise state formation and survival in the Middle East.
To avoid statist approaches and their critics, I argue here that what emerged in
the Middle East with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire are social fields not states as
understood in Weberian lenses. It is within these social fields, or boundaries, that states
form, develop or collapse. The theoretical framework examines the dynamics of these
social fields looking at the cultural, material, and political structures that constitute them
and how they shape and are shaped by the interrelations of social actors. This
examination sets the background to visit state formation processes in the Middle East.
As opposed to European states, which through their expansion have structured world
politics, these emerging states share two generic characteristics. First, these states came
late to a pre-existing state system and second, these states are in their early stage of state
formation (Ayoob 1995). It is within these structural forces that states survive.
In examining processes of state formation, the making and sustaining of borders,
this thesis naturally resists the current division in the fields of comparative politics and
international relations. The vulnerability of the state in the Middle East, as I argue here,
the fragility of its institutions, and the role it performs in regional and international
structures of power dictates the bridging of theories from both fields. The framework
presented here theorises the interrelations between domestic and systemic forces to
explain state survival. I show how the security dilemmas of rulers in the domestic arena
intermingle with the anarchy of the international system to weaken the state in the
Middle East.
In theorising the domestic-international nexus, this thesis is neither quick to
abhor Neo-realism’s main assumptions on the ontology of the international system (for
alternative views see Salloukh 2000; Mufti 1995), nor is it in a haste to unreservedly
greet constructivist approaches to state behaviour in the Middle East (Barnett 1998).
The main contention here is that states in their early formation allow for the presence of
numerous power ‘sites’ competing for power monopoly. In the absence of legitimate
state, ‘domestic’ powers enter into security dilemmas as each power attempts to
legitimise and institutionalise its own power within the social field. These security
dilemmas lead either to authoritarian regimes or to civil wars. Authoritarian regimes and
civil wars in turn contribute to weakening the state as a polity exacerbating external
penetration. Given that they are embedded in an anarchic system, these states respond to
systemic forces in multiple ways as opposed to Waltzian expectations of a ‘uniform’
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response by strong states (Waltz 1979). This depends on the degree of power
monopolisation in a particular social field, which in turn determines the nature of
response to systemic forces.
Building on this theoretical framework, I then examine state formation processes
in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Looking at the initial stages of formation, social
field composition, and state behaviour in each of the cases, I propose a ‘Bounded
Theory’ on state survival in the Middle East. While the theoretical framework is broad
and examines generic dynamics, a Bounded Theory is limited in scope and attempts to
provide a general explanation to a population of cases forming parts of a system. State
survival or collapse in the Middle East, the theory proposes, is partly a function of
state’s geopolitical position. As a result, a state’s internal dynamics are necessary to
explain survival but not sufficient. A fuller examination of state survival in the Middle
East would attempt to unlock its position within the system to understand its chances of
survival or collapse. The more strategically located a state is, the more systemic forces
would determine its survival. If this theory is sound, it would challenge cultural and
political economy approaches that are predominant in Middle East studies and that
focus on domestic factors for state survival.
State Survival in the Middle East: The Literature
The literature on the state and state survival in Middle East studies reflects theoretical
developments taking place in Political Science and Sociology. We can identify two
phases representing two variables in the development of this literature. The first phase is
the explorative/descriptive phase that takes culture as its analytical tool while the second
takes an explanatory dimension and focuses on political economy.
The body of literature representing the first phase aimed to explore the Middle
East as a geographical area and as an area of study. The conceptual tool used to examine
the region is political culture. Examining the region’s culture, value and religious
systems, it is believed, can inform us of its political characteristics. One of the main
conclusions of this school is that the state is an alien notion to the region. Islam has no
concept of the state and is incompatible with the modern notions of nationalism
(Vatikiotis, p.44) or (popular) sovereignty (Kelidar 1993, 319-321). As an ‘imported
entity’, the state did not figure high in Arab thought of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries (Ayubi 1995, 21). As a European concept and social organisation, the state, it
is argued, is not analogous with Middle East realities (Khoury and Kostiner 1991, 2;
Lewis 1988).
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Utilising the variable of political cultural, this body of literature made sweeping
conclusion on the region’s political systems and state survival. Political stagnation and
the prevalence of authoritarian regimes in the region are attributed to Islam’s rigid code
(Tibi 1990), which have facilitated the domination and durability of “oriental
despotism” (Kedourie 1992, 12). Islam, and people’s submission to it, have constrained
the emergence of civil society (for the debate, see Sadowski 1993) to act as a motor of
change. The Arab state, as a foreign invention “superimposed on fragmented and hostile
infrastructures” (Kelidar 1993, 318), is “all body and muscle..with no theory of liberty”
(Ayubi 1995, 22).
For other variants of the political culture school, authoritarian persistence in the
Arab world corresponds to the cultural traditions of these countries, where, as in the
Arab Peninsula, it is maintained by a strong tribal leader (Hudson 1977, 167). The
presence of a central man with absolute power is due to factors found in Arab political
culture, which is “neopatriarchal” (Sharabi 1988).
With the political economy approach we realise a shift in the independent
variable moving away from cultural factors towards material ones. The ability of Islam
to explain varying outcomes in different contexts raised scepticism regarding its power
as independent variable (Bromley 1994, 29). As an alternative, scholars working in the
political economy school looked at class as a factor to explain politics in the region
(Richards and Waterbury 1996; Ayubi 1995; Hinnebusch 1989; Anderson 1986). The
main corrective this school proposed is that the Middle East is far from being ‘peculiar’
and, using a political economy approach, the region can be integrated into debates in
Political Science and Political Theory (Anderson 1990).
This development reflected a Marxist resurgence in comparative politics and a
return to the state in political sociology (Evans et.al. 1985). Focusing on state structures
and social classes, the political economy approach was able to provide more specific
explanation, not only of state survival, but also of political change in the Middle East
(Waterbury 1983; Batatu 1978). A main outcome of this research agenda was Rentier
State Theory (RST). RST provided a lucid argument on state survival in the Middle
East. Oil income, it argues, increases state autonomy in the Middle East. This is because
states do not resort to extracting taxes from their populations. Rather, by allocating
funds for their societies’ welfare, societies do not demand representation. This
autonomy consolidates states in the Middle East and maintains their authoritarian
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structures (Beblawi and Luciani 1987). What emerges is an ‘allocation state’ as opposed
to an extractive state (Luciani 1990).
This thesis will show that these two schools, although advancing our knowledge
of the state in the Middle East, have three main deficiencies. First, the state is not
treated as a process rather it is either taken as an ideal that does not correspond with
Middle East culture or is conflated with regimes. Second, both approaches focus on
domestic factors neglecting regional and international structures of power. Finally, in
focusing on culture and socio-economics these underplay the role of politics and
political actors.
In taking the state to be an imported notion, as in the case of the political culture
approaches, an idealisation of the state takes place. The state is seen to be—as the
European state in its advanced stage—associated with liberal notions of governance and
hence it conflicts with what we observe in the Middle East. Below, I will argue that the
state is not a mere concept rather it is a process that both progresses and regresses as it
develops.
In searching for the causes of state survival, the political economy approach
conflates between regime survival as a domestic factor and the territorial state as a
geographical entity. This conflation weakens their overall argument. The conflation
leads to theoretical shortcomings. Although oil income is an important factor in
explaining a regime’s survival, this doesn’t explain how an oil-poor country such as
Jordan survives or how Saudi Arabia and Iraq survived before oil came into the picture.
This thesis will show that oil in fact reinforced authoritarian powers but did not cause
them, as the Saudi case will show. On the other hand, in its reinforcing of authoritarian
power, the case of Iraq will reveal that oil actually weakened the state rather than
consolidating it.
Further, as the state is vulnerable in the Middle East, domestic factors cannot
solely explain survival. For instance, in Beyond Coercion: The Durability of the Arab,
Dawisha and Zaartman (1988) provide six factors to account for state survival in the
Middle East. All of these factors are domestic without accounting for geopolitical
factors. What is also missing in both approaches is an analysis of the political level and,
particularly, the role of political entrepreneurs in shaping material and cultural
structures in the course of political struggles. This thesis is an intervention in this
direction. It seeks not to refute political culture and economy approaches but to
15
incorporate them into a model that situates the state in the Middle East at the cross-
roads of domestic and international arenas.
State Survival in the Middle East: The Argument Stated
The central argument of this thesis centres around four clusters: (1) Conditions of state
formation; (2) Social Fields; (3) State ontology during late formation; and (4) State
Survival and Collapse.
Conditions of State formation in the Middle East
1. State formation in the Middle East came as a result of two processes; one macro
and one micro. The macro process involved the collapse of the Ottoman Empire
and the emergence of competitive European states aiming to re-order the new
Middle East. The micro process involved indigenous attempts by local powers
to create their own proto-states. Macro processes determined the emerging state
borders;
2. The emerging state-like polities were neither purely colonial nor indigenous but
came as a result of the interaction between domestic and external forces;
3. What emerged in the Middle East are not fully developed ‘states’ as understood
in Weberian terms but social fields on which states form, deform, and reform;
Social Fields
4. Social fields are the territorial social arenas that structure relations among
several social powers who interact in cycles of domination and resistance in
attempts to establish hierarchical power as the first phase of state making;
5. Interactions within a social field generate path-dependent trajectories,
memories, histories and identities that separate it from other social fields and
give meaning to it;
State Ontology in Late Formation
6. The state in the Middle East has two generic characteristics that it shares with
other late forming states: first this state is in its early stage of formation and
second it came late to pre-existing state system;
7. This ontological status imposes a dilemma on the late forming state between the
security of the ruling regime (against its internal and external enemies) and
political incorporation of dissenting forces. Increased political incorporation
(third phase of state formation) requires power sharing by the existing regime;
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8. The intensity of the security dilemma is determined by the nature of the social
field and its location in regional state system;
State Survival and Collapse
9. The more strategic the location of a state in a regional system, the less will
domestic factors explain its survival or development;
10. The more late forming states are influenced by the anarchic state system, the
higher the pressure on them to monopolise power domestically to respond
unitarily to the systemic forces. This pressure generates different responses
emanating from a social field;
11. The way a late forming state responds to systemic forces depends on the level of
power monopolisation in a social field. Low domestic power monopolisation
and institutionalisation will involve a multiplicity of fragmented responses
emanating from a social field making it harder to achieve autonomy and easier
for external powers to ‘divide and rule’;
12. Survival and collapse of states in the Middle East is determined by the level of
domestic power monopolisation and the structure of regional order;
13. While the international state system provides opportunities and constraints for
regime change in the Middle East, the territorial survival of the state in that
region is a function of the anarchic nature of the international (and by extension
the regional) state system, more than the domestic characteristics of individual
states.
Research Design and Case Selection
Methodology
In tune with the theoretical framework proposed here, the methodology of this
thesis falls within the Comparative Historical Method (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer
2003). This tradition has three distinctive characteristics. Studies in this school depart
from an outcome—revolution, war or economic growth—that is concrete in having
“real time, places, and people” and “historical” in that it is limited in its scope and time
(Tilly 1984, 14). This process tracing resists a synchronic analysis “which effectively
freezes the object of analysis in time” preferring a “diachronic analysis [that] proceeds
historically, emphasising the process of change over time” (Hay 2002, p.149). The point
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is to delineate ‘causal configurations’ that may help in explaining specific outcomes.1
Finally, Comparative Historical Analysis is interested in systemic and contextualized
comparisons (see also Collier 1993). This in turn stems from the aim of causal
explanation. The testing of specific causal arguments in different contexts improves the
usefulness of the arguments, by revealing their strengths and limitations and hence
permitting a bridge between theory and history.2
The Historical Comparative Method resists both ‘Grand Theorizing’, which is
ahistorical on the one hand, and Behaviouralist approaches that shun theories on the
other hand. The aim is to produce ‘middle range theories’ that act as a bridge between
theory and history. The research design for this thesis develops in two phases.
First, a generic theoretical framework is presented, which acts as a meta-theory
and suggests the “orienting concepts, targets certain kinds of variables as important, and
point of styles of research and explanation” without “specification of any set of directly
testable propositions” (Mahoney 2003, 136). The main aim of the framework is to
theoretically tackle the research problem suggested here and to devise a “fruitful
intellectual framework for the investigation” (Rueschemeyer 2003, 329).
The second phase involves a detailed historical investigation of the cases in light
of insights deduced from the framework aiming to establish a “theoretically informed
historical narrative” (Hay 2002, 47). Just as the cases are informed by the framework,
they in turn improve on that framework by inducing specific and contextualised
arguments. The aim of this exercise is to propose a Bounded Theory on state survival
and collapse in the Middle East. A Bounded Theory, like all theories, is ambitious in its
search for general explanation but restrained in its inclination to historical processes,
change, and, above all, the research problem that bounds it. The structured historical
comparison between the cases will contribute to the production of a bounded theory and
to what Theda Skcopol defines as “doubly engaged social science”: a social science
whose practitioners aim to understand real-world transformations and to engage in, and
formulate, theoretical frameworks and methods appropriate to handle such questions
(2003, 409).
1 “Causal propositions are carefully selected and tested rather than introduced ad hod as incidental parts
of overall narrative” (Mahoney and Ruechemeyer 2002, 11)
2 “By employing a small number of cases, comparative historical researchers can comfortably move back
and forth between theory and history in many iterations of analysis as they formulate new concepts,
discover novel explanations, and refine preexisting theoretical expectations in light of detailed case
evidence” (Mahoney and Ruechemeyer, 2002, 13)
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Why the Middle East?
Studying the Middle East can be important for the obvious reason of its strategic
importance for major powers in the international system. However, there are other
reasons as to why the Middle East is important to examine. Not only do state formation
and behaviour, the power of identity to challenge state configuration, the
imperviousness of the region to political change taking place elsewhere, and, not least,
its vulnerability to external penetration challenge our existing models but their study
also contributes to these frameworks.
Middle East studies continue to be under-theorised, historical, and descriptive.
Although we have achieved a leap forward in considering the region to be different but
not necessarily peculiar (Ayubi 1995), there is much more to be done on how, why, and
in what sense the Middle East is different.
Although the empirical focus here is on the cases of Saudi Arabia and Iraq, these
are treated as illustrations of the general framework and as contributors to its
components. While the generic framework reaches to a wider audience of social
theorists and area specialists in, for example, Central Asia, Africa or Southeast Asia, the
cases and main conclusion of this thesis are aimed at students of the Middle East. The
examination of the case study of Saudi Arabia aims to examine a puzzle, which students
of this case have tried to tackle for more than five decades: how do we explain state
survival in Saudi Arabia a seemingly weak state? The Iraqi case represents other
challenges. The deformation and eventual collapse of the state in the last six decades
raises questions on the power of oil income to sustain states, on the limits of indigenous
forms of state formation, and, most importantly its geopolitical position. The two cases
represent two different outcomes—formation and collapse. The dilemmas of state
formation in Iraq, this thesis will show, are not different from Saudi Arabia but more
acute. The thesis will conclude by suggesting the broadening of the theory to examine
other cases such as Lebanon, Syria, or Yemen.
Thesis Outline
This thesis divides into three parts and six chapters. In Part One, the first chapter aims
to examine and define the ‘State’ as a concept and will review the literature on state
debate in the context of Middle East Studies. Chapter Two will visit the literature on
state survival looking at both domestic—cultural and organisational approaches—and
international approaches to explain state survival. Then I will examine the literature on
state survival in the Middle East
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In Part Two, I present the main argument of this thesis. Chapter Three defines
the Historical Structuralism model proposed here looking in particular at social fields
and their composition. Chapter Four examines state ontology in late formation and how
it pertains to the state in the Middle East. In this chapter, I examine the main dilemmas
facing these states, their domestic vulnerabilities and their international behaviour.
Finally, in Part Three, the two cases are examined. Chapter Five looks at the
case of Saudi Arabia and Chapter Six examines the case of Iraq. I conclude this thesis
by proposing theoretical, methodological, and empirical insights on the study of the
state in the Middle East.
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Chapter One
State Formation and the Arab State
If no social institutions existed which knew
the use of violence, then the concept of 'state'
would be eliminated, and a condition would
emerge that could be designated as 'anarchy,'
in the specific sense of this word.
—Max Weber, Politics as a
Vocation
For the most part, that experience [European]
does not show us modernizing elites
articulating the demands and needs of the
masses..far from it. We discover a world in
which small groups of power hungry men
fought off numerous rivals and great in the
pursuit of their own ends and inadvertently
promoted the formation of national states and
wide spread popular involvement in them.
—Charles Tilly, The Formation
of National States in Western Europe
Introduction
This chapter has two principal aims. First, it will examine the main concepts of this
study, which include the state, state formation and state collapse, while introducing
other variables such as social fields. And second, it will provide a critical review of the
literature on the state in the Middle East. I start by analysing the concepts.
1.1. States and State Formation
1.1.1. What is a state?
As this study’s main aim is to examine the state and state survival in the Middle East,
the state as a concept will be visited. Although the theoretical framework will focus on
the process of its formation and deformation, an introductory definition of the state is
vital for the following analysis.
Defining the state, nevertheless, is not a theoretically innocent enterprise. As a
multifarious social organisation, state definition cannot escape the student’s theoretical
assumptions, his or her research aims, or, in some cases, their ideological biases. The
state, accordingly, is seen to be the “most problematic concept in politics” (Vincent
1987). Before I examine some of the problems of studying the state, I will start by
defining the state on Weberian terms. Max Weber’s definition represents an ideal state,
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which, and specifically for the purposes of this study, helps us not only contrast it with
historical realities but also to theoretically problematise it to understand state in late
formation.
For Max Weber the state is “compulsory political organizations” whose
“administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate
use of physical forces in the enforcement of its order…within a given territory” (1968,
54, emphasis original). This definition provides an idealised description of what a state
is with several important components that require elaboration. As an authoritative
political organisation, the state is a social entity made up of different governmental
institutions such as the security and intelligence agencies, the court system or the
executive and legislative branches of government.
This organisation is authoritative in the sense that its policies, rules, and identity
are recognised by those that it seeks to govern. Deviation from these rules involves the
state exercising compulsion—or coercion—over the law breakers. This ability requires,
however, the presence of the condition of monopoly of physical force, which Weber’s
definition highlights. For the state to be able to exercise its power to impose order, it
alone should hold the instruments of coercion. But Weber is clear in tying this
monopoly over coercive forces to legitimate use and, by implication, rule.
The final element in Weber’s definition is that state activities take place within a
specific territory. Its power, legitimacy, and monopolisation over coercion, at least in
theory, are delimited to a particular territory. It is only the state that has a sovereign
power over its territory. This power, as with its internal identification, is recognised by
other states as sovereign. The delimitation of state territory places the organisation of
the state at the cross-roads of two set of relationships. The first involves the relation of
this state with other organisations within its territory and, second, it includes the state’s
relations with other fellow states forming the ‘international’ system.
Although those elements provide us with an important characterisation of the
state, in themselves, however, they constitute the difficulty of studying it. The student of
state formation will immediately raise questions such as: how does this political
organisation come about? How is the monopoly of coercion formed? Further, how does
this monopoly acquire and maintain its legitimacy? Finally, how is a state’s territory
demarcated?
It is these questions, among others, that have troubled state theorists for many
centuries. Depending on the story they want to tell or the political world they want to
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see, scholars have treated the state as a source of change or an effect coming about as a
result of societal changes. Several political philosophers from Hobbes to Lenin looked
at the state as a motor for change towards order, as in the former, or revolution as in the
latter. Post-philosophical treatments of the state were largely indirect as in the case of
Karl Marx, whose sophisticated class struggle analysis, saw his thought fluctuate
between treating the state as ‘epiphenomenon’ of class struggle, instrument of class
hegemony, or political structure having a ‘relative autonomy’. It was his students from
Antonio Gramsci (1971) to Poulantzas (1978) who sought to examine these questions.
In the fields of politics and sociology the state, as a conceptual variable,
remained largely absent until Nettle’s pioneering article of 1968. Both structural-
functional approaches and modernisation theory, forming part of the Behavioural
Revolution, perceived the state as being shaped by societal factors. The project to ‘bring
the state back in’ (Evans et.al 1985) starting with a re-examination of European state
making, which raised questions about modernisation theory, (Tilly 1975) attempted to
give the state an ‘autonomous’ dimension, and hence analytical independence.
East Asian economic development contributed to the state debate and theory.
The literature shifted to deal with the state not as a mere ‘arena’ but also as an ‘actor’—
“Developmental State” (Woo-Cummings 1999), or as a state that has the “capacity” to
affect changes in society, particularly economic development. Moreover, these cases
invited curiosity about the success of the state in one part of the world and its failure in
others. The conditions for variation between the “weak” and “strong” became an area of
interest for several scholars (Bates 2005; Waldner 1999; Migdal 1988).
One main difficulty remained in our understanding of the state, which still traps
many students of the state, is a supposed separation of the state from society. In the
context of state formation in the developing world, Joel S. Migdal et.al sought to
propose an approach that takes the state to be one organisation among many and is
situated in society (1994, 2). Trying to cope with the difficulties that the Weberian
definition affords when contrasted to empirical cases, Migdal proposed a new definition
of the state, which pertains to his research interests.
Migdal defines the state as “field of power marked by the use and threat of
violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a
territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and (2) the
actual practices of its multiple parts” (Ibid., 16, emphasis original). What Migdal seeks
to distinguish is the ‘image’ of a state—a dominant, autonomous, integrated entity—
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from its actual practices. Symbolic power of the state and how it is perceived by its
population and other states is crucial for maintaining its power. This definition forms a
reaction to previous studies that have exaggerated state capacity but also reflects the
reality of politics in many parts of the developing world, where, as Migdal emphasises,
the “state is constructed and reconstructed, invented and reinvented, through its
interaction as a whole and of its parts with others” (Ibid., 22).
Migdal’s definition is inclined to treat the state as a process. It was Philip
Abrams, and before him Engels3, who sought to unmask the state. When studying the
state—that is its parts—he realised it would cease to exist. He argued that the “state,
conceived as a substantial entity separate from society has proved a remarkably elusive
object of analysis” (1977, 61). Michael Mann has further observed that “states are not as
distinct from the rest of social life” (1993, 23). On perception and image, Abrams
observed that the “state is the unified symbol of an actual disunity” (1977, 79). He
suggests that instead of focusing on the state we should study “the actualities of social
subordination” (Ibid., 63). What the state conceals is “the actual disunity of political
power” (Ibid., 79).
The main contention of this section is that it is pivotal to distinguish between a
definition of a state on the one hand and the process of state formation on the other
hand. An examination of state formation will bring us closer to the realities of states,
their main components, and the political struggles that shape their formation.
1.1.2. What is State Formation and State Collapse?
Max Weber understood the distinction between state definition and the process through
which states come about. “Like the political institutions historically preceding it,” first
and above all he argued, “the state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation
supported by means of legitimate (i.e. considered to be legitimate) violence” (Weber
1946, 2). State formation is a process where individualised forms of power
institutionalise over time. This process involves the incorporation of different social
forces in institutions that take a public form within a particular territory.
Studying European state formation (see Chapter Four), Norbert Elias observes
three phases of state formation:
First, the phase of the free competition or elimination contests, with
a tendency for resources to be accumulated in fewer and fewer and
finally in one pair of hands, the phase of monopoly formation;
3 Engels, long before Gramsci forwarded his theory of ‘Hegemony’, observed that “the state presents itself to us as
the first ideological power over man” (quoted in Abrams 1977, 64)
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secondly, the phase in which control over the centralized and
monopolized resources tend to pass from the hands of an individual
to those of ever greater numbers, and finally to become a function of
the interdependent human web as a whole, the phase in which a
relatively “private” monopoly becomes a public one (Elias 2000,
276).
Studying the state as a process requires understanding these three generic phases
of state formation. The first phase involves a situation in where many social forces are
competing for power within an unspecified territory. Power is here understood as “the
probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out
his own will despite resistance” (Mann 1986, 6). The phase of political struggle ends in
the phase of monopoly formation (Midgal 2001, 22).
The monopolisation of power—resources, coercion, religious interpretation—on
a particular territory triggers the need to design institutions for its sustainability.
Institutions are “humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North
1990, 3). Institutional design “takes place in the context of powerful actors attempting
to produce rules of interaction to stabilize their situation vis-à-vis other powerful and
less powerful actors” (Flingstein 2003, 108). The more interdependent the relations
become between a ruler and his population, the higher the need to institutionalise
power.
In the course of the political struggles which continue to take place; institutions
become not only a target of resistance but also an arena of struggle to change the rules
of interaction. The higher the ability of many different actors to shape the rules and
principles of these institutions, the more these institutions begin to take a public, and
therefore independent, form and the less they are driven by one actor. “The privately
owned monopoly in the hands of a single individual or family” observes Elias “comes
under the control of broader social strata, and transforms itself as the central organ of a
state into a public monopoly” (Elias, 270-1, emphasis added). We now call this process
democratisation. It is here when the monopoly of physical forces becomes legitimate.
The state is not only increasing in size, scope and bureaucracy but also in representation
(Mann 1993, 358).
This process, as I suggest above, is generic; it presents us with a broad map of
the phases of state emergence. The conditions of state formation, it needs to be noted
here, vary among cases. Although European states crystallised around the turn of the
century, many developing countries still fluctuate between one phase and the other.
State formation, accordingly, is not a uni-linear process. The process can reverse, states
can deform or collapse. In search for the state we need to examine the political
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struggles—including the main political actors and the cultural and economic factors that
shape their behaviour—and the institutions that arise as part of this struggle.
As opposed to state formation, state deformation and collapse “refers to a
situation where the structure of authority (legitimate power), law, and political order
have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new” (Zaartman 1995,
1). It is here when the monopoly of coercive forces becomes ‘privatised’ as different
factions aim to protect themselves in the absence of an authority especially when
criminality increases and the authority loses control over different sections of the
population in a particular territory (Rotberg 2003, 5-6). When states deform, power
disperses to local groups and sources of legitimacy fragments accordingly. Just as the
process of state formation varies from one case to another, so also conditions for state
collapse differ. One main point to emphasise here is that state collapse is, as a
“degenerative disease”, not a short-term crisis. Rather, it is a process, which develops as
regimes ‘wear out’ (Zaartman 1995, 8).
A regime can be defined in two ways; either as a type of governance or political
system—democratic, authoritarian, or totalitarian. This regime constitutes “the
prevailing relations among political actors, including the government” (Tilly 2006, 19).
Or, as this study will use the concept, a regime is the institutionalisation of power by
one or more competing forces in a social field. In this sense, a regime is “an alliance of
dominant ideological, economical, and military power actors coordinated by the rulers
of the state” (Mann 1993, 18). It is this force or forces that shape and drive state
institutions in particular ways as it competes with its rivals. For example, when we say
the ‘Saudi regime’, we mean the Saudi family and its ideological (Islamic
establishment), economic (clients), and military (princes in security forces) allies.
In the developing world, the strength of a regime depends on its position in
relation to its rivals. While, as I will elaborate in some detail below, in Europe the
process of state formation continued to shape and carve political boundaries, in the
developing world the expansion of European power led to the establishment of
boundaries that accommodated political struggles. In this thesis, I call these boundaries
social fields. Chapter Three below will examine this concept, for now it suffices to
suggest that “fields refer to situations where organized groups of actors gather and
frame their actions vis-à-vis one another” (Flingstein 2003, 108) within a territory.
Social fields form the context which we need to demarcate to understand processes of
state formation and collapse. In studying state survival, this thesis will examine the
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internal and external factors that determine how and why regimes and boundaries are
preserved over time.
1.2. The State in the Middle East: Literature Streams
This section aims to examine in some detail the major frameworks that have contributed
to our understanding of the state in the Middle East, with particular focus on the Arab
state. In reviewing this literature, several shortcomings will emerge.
First, some approaches conflate between state emergence on one hand and state
development towards ‘liberal’ forms of governance on the other hand. This confusion
obscures our understanding of what the state is in the Middle East. Second, in search for
the primary factor—the independent variables— to examine the region’s peculiarity,
scholars have looked at broad ideational (culture) or material (surplus appropriation;
mode of production) factors to understand political phenomena. In particular,
negligence of the role of the ‘political’ is observed. Third, the concept of the state
remains very vague, making it hard both to delineate it empirically as well as
analytically, namely the literature on the Middle East does not contribute to our
understanding of the concept of the state; the state is taken for granted leaving the
student wondering ‘what is the state?’. Fourth, although state formation in the region
was highly dependent on the international state system and the region remains highly
penetrated, few studies actually examine the interaction of international state system and
domestic structures of power.
One implication I draw from this review is that the literature on the state in the
Middle East need not be redirected but has to be remodelled. More attention needs to be
placed on the formulation of questions that ought to be answered, on the specification of
hypothesis, on methods of testing the hypothesis and finally on the careful selection of
cases. It is only through such remodelling that we can speak of rigorous and systemic
research that is able to attend to the region’s problems and through which we can
accumulate knowledge.
1.2.1. Political Culture and State Formation
The correlation between culture—beliefs, norms, tradition, attitudes—and political
development has been central for many scholars in the study of political backwardness
in the developing world (Chabal and Daloze 2006; Lane and Ersson 2005; Huntington
and Harrison 2000; Almond and Verba 1963). A society’s culture, it is argued,
constitutes a strong basis to examine its political characteristic.
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In trying to explain authoritarian persistence in the Middle East, scholars
working in the culturalist tradition sought to look at Islam as a cultural value system to
‘explain’ political stasis in the region. In this literature the state is indirectly examined
with no attempt to conceptualise or theorise its nature. Three general theses are
presented. The first is that Islamic political culture is resistant to western notions of
democracy and secularism and second Islam offers no accommodation to the notion of
the state which was ‘imported’ from the west. Both theses focus on ideational factors to
explain politics in the Middle East. Thirdly, it is argued that tribal societies conflict with
the notion and dynamics of the modern state.
Incorporating all aspects of life including its political dimension, Islam, which is
based on the Koran—Islam’s holy book—and the sayings of the prophet Mohammad, is
seen to form a major constraint on political development in Muslim societies.
According to Bassam Tibi, Islam, as a cultural system, constitutes a major constraint to
social change. It is a rigid system of thought that has been reactive, particularly to
western attempts at domination of the Middle East, and not a proactive religion (Tibi
1990). Islam, which calls for ‘submission’ and its advocacy of life as a transient phase,
contributes to ‘political quietism’—a major reason to explain ‘Oriental despotism’ (Bill
and Springborg 1990).
Reflecting on theories of state capacity, scholars in this tradition perceived
Middle Eastern societies as ‘weak’ and states are strong, where the societies’ obedience
to the rulers was a religious duty this despotism for Elie Kedourie resulted in the
absence of any “representative bodies being set up to carry on a dialogue between ruler
and subject” (Kedourie 1992). It is the absence of what came to be known as ‘civil
society’ that is responsible for the state of political backwardness in the region
(Sadowski 1993).
Islam’s belief in al umma transcends the territorial and national basis of states.
However, Islam doesn’t only reject the nation-state but also rejects other ingredients of
this polity namely, secularism, democracy and nationalism. For P.J. Vatikiotis, “Islam
and nationalism are mutually exclusive terms”. As a “constructive loyalty to a
territorially defined group, nationalism” he adds “has been incompatible with Islam in
which the state is not ethnically or territorially defined” (Vatikiotis 1991, 44). Kedourie
further maintains that Arab Muslim leaders developed a “tribal polity into one of the
most sophisticated and most durable kinds of rule that of oriental despotism, the
methods and traditions of which have survived in the Muslim world to the present day.”
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This is a result of Muslim jurists’ attempts “to articulate and theorize the conditions of
political life in oriental despotism, and to teach that it was compatible with a Muslim
way of life” (Kedourie 1992, 12). Focusing on ‘Dar Islam’ and umma, Islam has no
concept of sovereignty (Kelidar 1993, 319-321).
James P. Piscatori argues that Muslim theorists and politicians do not share a
unitary view on the state. Piscatori divides Muslims into political conformists and non-
conformists (1986, 40). This division reflects Muslims’ acceptance or rejection of the
existing international political order, which is centred on the state. In contrast to the
views presented by Lewis, Kedouri and others (ibid., 42-44), Piscatori observes that,
first, the Islamic theory that these scholars build on is not cear-cut in Islamic discourse
and debates; secondly, the political practice of Muslims polities and empires reveals a
strong acceptance of “territorial pluralism”; and thirdly several Islamic thinkers starting
with Ibn Khaldoun treat the state as “natural” and as a fact of life (Ibid., 82-84). To
make his argument, Piscatori relies on both the Quran, which includes verses revealing
God’s will in the creation of different races to get “to know each other”, and on actual
Islamic practice. In Islamic history, he shows how the Ottoman and Persian Empires
related to other states accepting both their limit and the territorial diversity within Islam.
He extends his argument to show how with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the
end of colonisation (Ibid., 69-73; see Chapter Four ) states within the Muslim world
became a fact of political life accepted by both leaders and Islamic thinkers (Ibid., 82-
4).
Beyond Islam’s incompatibility with the notion of the state, Nazih Ayubi asserts
that “Arab thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has concerned itself with
various concepts of unity and integration except for that of the state” (Ayubi 1994, 21).
Islamic scholars rejected the state in favour of the supra-state umma. Although the
Arabs adopted European state structures “they were rather slow in internalizing the
concept of the state itself, or the ‘ethics’ of public service and the attitudes of collective
action (Ibid, 22).
Is the state weak in the Arab world because Islam and Arab thought are unable
to internalise or accept it? Before I examine the relation between ideas and processes of
state formation, I want to point out that Arab thought was concerned with the issue of
the state and the observations made by the scholars above are not accurate. As we saw
in the previous section, the concept of the state was not clear neither for European
philosophers of the 19th century nor sociologists of the 20th. How different are Arab and
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Muslim scholars? Ahmad Mahmoud Wald Mohammad, observes that Arab renaissance
thought—extending from 1830s to 1920s—from Rafaat Tahtawi to Rachid Rida “was
not concerned with Caliphate or Imamate systems but its obsession was the construction
of a national state based on the European model” (2008, 24).
Although Mohammad agrees that Arab renaissance thought did not deal directly
with the concept of the state, he shows how its scholars, who aimed to account for the
decadence of the Islamic civilisation and the Ottoman state, dealt indirectly with the
state. For Tahtawi he shows that the state is based on the power of the ruler which
secures order and social relations and the power of the ruled. The relationship between
the two powers would be regulated by a ‘dustur’ or constitution. Khair Aldin al-Tounsi
theorised about ‘Tanzimat’, which he meant public institutions. For al-Tounsi, the
weakness of the Islamic state is caused by the lack of laws, which constitute the basis
for state strength. As for Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, the state should come to service the
Muslim society. Two pillars form this state: military and Islam as a religion. Religion is
a uniting factor substituting citizenship. Finally for Abd al-Rahman Kawakibi, who
believed Arab decadence is due to despotism of the rulers, the state was ‘alhoukouma’
or simply government (Ibid., 25-34).
Political theories in Islamic thought, similar to philosophical treatments in
European thought (Hegel, Kant, Rousseau), were normative and in search of a political
order that would bring peace, stability, prosperity or bring about an ideal Islamic state
as in the thought of Ibn Khaldoun4. Although I give the above examples to make the
point that the ‘state’, and the questions of rule in general, has dominated Arab political
thought, I don’t believe these in themselves can tell us a lot about the state in the Middle
East. The state is not only a concept, it is a process and this needs to be examined
historically.
What about territoriality? Here, we need to note the variety of theories among
Islamic and Arab scholars. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and other Islamic states,
raised a question of the way politics can be ordered. Although several scholars
continued to talk about ‘Dar al-Islam’—which in essence is a social/geographical
boundary—others had different propositions including Egyptian nationalism (Loutfi al-
Sayid), Pharaonic state (Salama Youssef), Mediterranean Nationalism (Taha Hussein)
4 Noting, however, that Ibn Khaldoun used a ‘realist’ and sociological method to analyse politics in tribal
society, nevertheless his description of regime types—Natural king, political king, and Caliphate—sees
him going beyond sociological analysis to a more normative dimension (for a comparison with
Machiavelli see Alrawi, 2006, 123).
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Syrian5 Nationalism—based on Geography—(Antoine Saade), Arab Nationalism
(Michel Aflac) (Wald Mohammad, 22-26), and Lebanese Nationalism (Michel Shiha)
(Traboulsi 1999). The main issue here is that these ideological questions were solved,
once again I stress, not by coming up with a solution to a conceptual problem but
through political struggles that shaped and were shaped by these ideologies.
A further problem of the culturalist school involves the fusion of the process of
state emergence with the development of the state towards liberal forms of authority.
Ayubi adds that in addition to the Arabs’ inability to accommodate the notion of the
state, they weren’t “particularly impressed by the concept of ‘freedom’ (which Western
thinkers closely relate to the development of the modern state), when they learned of it
in the European literature. Building on Abdullah al -Arawi (2006), Ayubi shows the
diversion in the conceptual understanding of the state in the Arab world from that in the
West; “the Arab state is all body and muscle but with little spirit and mind and with no
theory of Liberty” (Ayubi 1994) while for al-Arawi, this contrasts with the European
concept of the state—“as a totality of instruments aimed at the rationalization of
society—a rationalization (the Marxists further maintain) that was historically tied to
the practices of the bourgeoisie” (Ibid, 23).6 Once again, it takes a reading of the Arab
scholars mentioned above to see the limits of this suggestion as most scholars were
obsessed with curbing the powers of the despot. Whether it is al-Afghani or Abdo, both
saw European parliamentary systems as potential institutions to establish in the Arab
east (Wald Mohammad, 32).
This line of reasoning continues with the democratisation debate. Some scholars
have held that Islam is incompatible with democracy (Karatnycky 2002; Kramer 1993).
Islamic values, it is argued, constraines the ability of predominantly Muslim countries
to make the transition towards Democracy. Others link it to the subordination of women
in the Muslim world, where differentials in the sex ratio and male-female gap in literacy
rates contribute to consolidating authoritarianism (Fish 2002). Similar to the Islam and
state debate, these studies have been countered with explanations on the compatibility
of Islam and Democracy (Abootalebi 1999; Esposito and Voll 1996). Eva Bellin argues
that, far from being exceptional, Middle East states are locked in authoritarian rule
“because the coercive apparatus…has been exceptionally willing to crush reform from
below” (2004, 144). The four variables she examines, indirectly dovetail with the
5 ‘Syrian’ is understood here as Greater Syria—modern Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan.
6 Although al-Arawi differentiates between normative and sociological treatments of the state looking at
European as well as Islamic students of the state, his analysis of the difference between theory and
practice of the state in the Arab world lacks any contextual or historical substance (2006, 143-158).
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arguments presented in this thesis. Bellin argues that the robustness of the coercive
apparatus is linked to the fiscal powers of the regime, which, particularly in the Middle
East, is shaped by the “international support network” that a regime enjoys. In addition
to these two variables, the institutionalisation of the security apparatuses and the degree
of popular mobilisation a regime faces all determine the chances of transition to
democracy (Ibid., 144-5). By highlighting these factors, Bellin problematises the not
only cultural explanations linking Islam to authoritarianism, but also domestic
treatments of regime survival in the Middle East.
The problem of state formation in tribal societies has ignited debates on the
nature, role and relations of the state with tribal organisations. Khoury and Kostiner, for
instance, pose one of the “difficulties” in studying state formation as “the term state is
associated with modern European conceptions and institutions that do not necessarily
correspond to Middle East realities, even in the late twentieth century” (1991, 2; italics
original). In studying state formation, however, we are thinking of a process, which
demands an analytical separation between the process and its outcome. Hence, we shall
not find a ‘state’ if we are studying the process of its birth, not least in its early stages. If
we define a state as an institution that monopolises coercion on a particular territory, in
studying state formation, the question that arises is how this monopolising process takes
place and who is the driving forced behind it. Khoury and Kostiner define three
approaches to examining state-tribe relations. The first is the ‘evolutionary approach’,
this examines the relations between states and tribes over long periods by looking at
how tribes transform into states. The second approach takes an anthropological
perspective focusing on state-tribal coexistence states. And finally, the political science
approach examines different identities of states and tribes and studies how one
infiltrates the other (Khoury and Kostiner 1991). Two points should be noted regarding
these perspectives. The first relates to the relation amongst them and the second
involves a problem these three perspectives share.
First, there is no contradiction among the three approaches. The difference does
not lie in the approach taken—evolutionary, coexistence, or state identity—rather in the
degree of stateness. The degree to which tribes evolve and transform to become states or
continue to coexist is determined by the degree of political centralisation and socio-
economic change and integration. Therefore, different cases offer different degrees of
political centralisation and integration: the weaker the state, the more it will have to
coexist with pre-existing social organisations, such as tribes. A comparison between the
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Yemeni and Saudi states and their respective relations with their tribes would show that
the differences between the approaches are narrower than it seems. The problem of
tribal infiltration in states brings us to the second point.
The three approaches take the state to be a neutral organisation. States are not
neutral. As argued above, states become neutral arenas as they develop but are not born
this way. Speaking in terms of states versus tribes misses the point. States are people: a
tribe, a family, a highly-organised party that seeks domination over other organisations.
It should not be surprising that in the modern Saudi state, as we shall see later, “family
networks have...permeated state structures” (Champion 2003, 72).
So what does the political culture school tell us about the state in the Middle
East? Given the flaws it presents on ontological, epistemological and methodological
levels, it tells us very little. However, any critique of this school should take two things
into consideration. First, and to my knowledge, this school does not present us with a
particular study intended to theorise state formation or a culturalist theory of that
outcome. And second, the emergence of the state in the Middle East is a recent
phenomenon without much history to provide us with the foundations for a systemic
analysis of its development. Hence the descriptive nature of this school is a natural
starting point before we can build better explanations on different political and social
processes in the region. But to move beyond this school we need to be clear about its
limitations.
Taking Islam, or any religion for that matter, as an independent variable to
explain political outcomes is problematic for three reasons. First, religions provide us
with no precise political and economic strategies, which can be refuted theoretically or
altered empirically, particularly when they fail to satisfy the objectives they have
defined. As broad bodies of thought, religions are very elastic providing us with the
opportunity to offer different interpretations to a single thought. When such
interpretations are implemented in different contexts, we end up having different Islams
in motion, as other intervening variables enter into the scene. Second, in searching in
religious texts for answers on the real world, we tend to fuse two processes, one
theoretical—theological in the case of Islam—and the second actual. However, any
general examination of Islamic teaching and thought would show dynamism in
interpretation and tells us that religious interpretations vary, hence any thesis about the
relation between a text and a social outcome could simply be refuted by indicating the
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availability of a different textual interpretation. This ends up being a philosophical
debate void of any reference to history or to the examination of empirical cases.
Given the presence of different interpretations, no amount of empirical evidence
could refute any thesis based on a general body of thought. Hence, taking Islam as an
independent variable could service any argument a scholar wants to test. One example is
classical Orientalists’ notion of Islam as promoting a quietist political culture; this thesis
was advanced to explain lack of development in the Middle East (Lewis 1988). With the
Islamic resurgence in the 1980s, the ‘neo-Orientalists’ began to speak about strong
societies in the Islamic world where according to John Hall, building on Patricia Crone,
Islam has been a “monotheism with a tribal face” (Hall quoted in Sadowski 1993, 18).
States in Islamic history had weak roots in society, where societies’ strength has not
only made states unstable but also retarded the emergence of a ‘civil society’ necessary
for democracy. Now Islam with a “tribal face” has created strong Islamic societies.
Commenting on such shifts in explanation, Sadowski observes that:
The irony of this conjuncture needs to be savored. When the
consensus of social scientists held that democracy and development
depended upon the actions of strong, assertive social groups,
Orientalists held that such associations were absent in Islam. When
the consensus evolved and social scientists thought a quiescent,
undemanding society was essential to progress the neo Orientalists
portrayed Islam as beaming with pushy, anarchic solidarities (Ibid,
19).
The availability of different political outcomes in Islamic societies—namely, a
variation in the dependent variable—tells us from the outset that Islamic political
culture can not be a cause for different effects; this brings us to the third point. How can
we explain Islam as a cause in states as diverse as secular Turkey, religious Iran,
monarchical Saudi Arabia, Baathist Syria, or multi-ethnic Malaysia? In entering into
such an examination of these Muslim countries who differ on various aspects from their
colonial power, to their political economy, to their geo-strategic position in the
international system of states, etc.. the picture begins to look more complex. In looking
at these factors, a new dimension emerges as we shift the explanation from the
outcomes to be explained to the explanatory variable—Islam. What explains its
variability? Here, Islam becomes the dependent variable, the variable that needs to be
explained. Why is Islam rigid in the first place? What material factors contribute to its
rigidity? Do political structures in those countries help advance this body of thought or
retard its development? Is the presence of a multi-ethnic society a factor promoting a
moderate understanding of Islam or constraining one? What does the formation of state
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tell us about state and religion relations? Do external factors influence the power
structures that promote certain interpretations of religion over others? The list of
questions could go on further. As we see, such culturalist approaches add more
questions than they solve.
In his attempt to analyze Ernest Gellner’s (1981) treatment of Islamic
societies—particularly those in Northern Africa—Simon Bromley shows that although
Gellner starts with culture as the defining moment—“Islam is the blueprint of a social
order” (quoted in Bromley 1994, 26)—to explain how Islam is resistant to further
development in its doctrine, Gellner relies on the “materialist aspect of the account”
(Ibid.) particularly that the classical world of Islam is a “fusion of scripturalism and
pastoralism” (quoted in Bromley 1994, 26). Brombley concludes that the “specific
features of Islam..are no longer centre-stage”. The same faith can issue in three different
outcomes: Islamic modernism, secular nationalism (Kemalism) or social conflict and
violence (Bromley 1994, 29; emphasis original).
Should we abandon culture as an analytical tool? Culture could provide a fruitful
explanation to political phenomena when the scholar sets a specific research agenda
with a specific set of questions and arguments and aim to propose a causal chain linking
culture to political outcomes. The Islamic Revolution in Iran can not be explained solely
by utilizing class analysis. There is a cultural reason as to why the Islamists in Iran
emerged triumphant and not their Communist or Nationalist counterparts. But this is
debatable and it is only through rigorous analysis that we can position culture among
other variables to see the major driving force for change. Chapter Three will attempt to
do this.
However, what about the theory that Muslim countries can not accommodate the
notion of the state because the state was ‘imported’ by the West? Scholars building on
the culturalist approach, although providing a more sophisticated analysis than the
earlier school(Ayubi 1994, 22-24), argue that the Arab state is weak and go on to show
that Arabs, particularly Muslim scholars, have no such notion. This project takes
scholars into a search in Islamic scripts about a possible compatibility to the Western
notion of the state. But where does this takes us? Does reading and writing about
Islamic and Arab concepts of the state help us understand the state in the Middle East?
Such inquiries may be of interest to students of Islamic political thought or philosophy,
but what is its utility for state weakness in the region? From the outset, the student
reading such a text may find a correlation between the fact that Arab resistance to the
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notion of the state is causing state weakness. Or, maybe believe that if the Arabs were
equipped conceptually to accept the notion of the state, then states in the region would
be stronger.
Even if such arguments existed, they actually tell us little. It is simply natural for
Muslim societies not to be able to accommodate the notion of the state, particularly
because the state, as territory, people and government, is a new phenomenon for them.
Without a history of a western style state, there is no concept of such a state. But one
may ask, what about the Islamists, Arab and Syrian Nationalists resistance to the post-
Ottoman state system in the Middle East? Well, this resistance is not a resistance of a
concept but a resistance to a political project, which in the eyes of these forces, is
seeking to divide their territories and hence weakening them vis-à-vis the European
colonial power. The state is not a concept exclusive to European civilization, but a
political structure which emerged first in Europe, due to specific factors of that region,
and spread first in Europe before extending to the rest of the world, which had proto
types of states (Tilly 1990; Elias 1990).
The problem has been to deal with the state as a Western concept being sold in a
market unable to digest its meaning. The second problem is to link the concept of the
state to ‘liberty’. This misconception shows not only a misreading of European state
formation but also a misreading of state formation in the Middle East. Another futile
problem is to compare the current Arab states, which are new political entities, with
developed European ones. It is normal to see a liberal European state now; however
without appreciating how it came to be liberal, we can not understand the dilemmas of
state development in the Middle East. I will elaborate on these points below; it suffices
to say now that the process of state formation in Europe did not go hand in hand with
rosy notions of liberty, but was a bloody process (Bates 2001; Tilly 1985). Before states
became liberal, states had to exist. This is because states are not mere institutions with
liberal norms, but forms of domination, which are unbalanced in early state formation.
1.2.2. Political Economy and State Formation
As we can see, the analysis of the state in the Middle East did not take centre stage in
culturalist approaches; its examination was peripheral and was treated as given, while
the main object was to explain political authoritarianism by highlighting peculiarities of
the Middle East, namely its dominant religion Islam. Disenchanted with this approach,
scholars working on the region began to search for new theoretical frameworks to assist
them in attending to the region’s problems. Two aims were defined: first was the need
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to resituate Middle East politics within general political and social theory and second to
move beyond vague culturalist explanations to establish more substantive work on the
region, namely an examination of the political economy of the region particularly state
formation. The sum of these efforts aimed at advancing one thesis: the Middle East is
not peculiar. These efforts coincided well with ‘bringing the state back in’ (Evans et.al
1985). In this section I will first provide a general review of this school and then will
consider some of its limitations.
Attending to the first objective, Lisa Anderson was “concerned with attempts to
integrate the Middle East into the broader concerns of contemporary Political Science
and Political Theory rather than with policy-relevant commentary as such” ( 1990, 54).
The way forward towards a more serious and systemic analysis of the Middle East, is to
“return to institutions as those of the state” and the method should use history as an
alternative to culture (Ibid., 66-73; see also Bromley 1994, 2).
Alan Richards and John Waterbury raised scepticism as to the explanatory
power of culture (1996, 2). In their model, they define the state and social class as two
important variables in their modular axis, while ‘structural transformation’ is the third
corner in this model. With the political economy approach, we observe a shift from
culture to a more substantive analysis of the state and social classes in different cases
within the Middle East. The authors advise that we look at different characteristics of
each state such as its natural resources and their utility, its social class composition, and
state behaviour (Ibid., 6).
Other country case studies contributed to our understanding of state-society
relations in Iraq (Batatu 1978), Egypt (Waterbury 1983), Syria (Hinnebusch 1989),
Tunisia and Libya (Anderson 1986) or Saudi Arabia (Chaudry 1997). The main
conclusion was that the Middle East is “far from being exceptional” (Hinnebusch 1989,
319). Another important contribution, which I will elaborate on below, is the Rentier
state theory (Luciani 1990; Beblawi and Luciani 1987). Rentier theory examined the
role of oil in consolidating states in the Middle East and in preserving authoritarian
structures. This is the case not only for oil-rich Arab states but also poorer ones such as
Syria, Jordan, or Yemen who receive labour remittance and aid as a result of oil.
Therefore, an important shift has taken place in the political study of the Middle
East. What can we extract about the state from this literature? What has the literature
added to our knowledge of it? And where are its shortcomings? To answer these
questions I will examine three works that aimed to understand the state: Arab State an
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edited volume by Giacomo Luciani (1990), Simon Brombley’s Rethinking Middle East
Politics,(1994) and Nazih Ayubi’s Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in
the Middle East (1994). Although I will present a specific critique for each of these
works, it is important to note that these works share a set of general problems.7
The question that Luciani’s work aims to answer is whether “the Arab state [is]
a solid creation? And why?” It seeks to explain “the stability and persistence of the state
in the Arab World”. By “persistence” and “stability”, Luciani highlights the fact that
Arab states “have at least the appearance of stability in the Arab world, and have
persisted into the 1980s without fusion, secession, reconstitution, or dissolution into a
larger pan-Arab entity” (1990, xvii). As we see the dependent variable is “the
appearance of stability”; this refers to a stable situation within Arab states, maybe due to
authoritarian forms of power there. While the latter part of the statement on the
persistence of the Arab state—“without fusion, secession, reconstitution, or dissolution
into a larger pan-Arab entity”—refers to the territorial state. This forms a conceptual
confusion that affects the explanation. What is it that they want to explain? Is it internal
stability of the Arab state or its survival? Although there is a relation between internal
stability and state survival, we need to analytically separate them, because different sets
of answers may be provided to each of these questions. An internally unstable state
could survive territorially, while a stable entity could decide to dissolve into a larger
one.
Then Luciani turns to Arab regimes, there he observes that “we find that for over
a decade and a half they have remained solidly in power and have created a stable
organizational structure around them” (Ibid., xvii - xviii ). Here the reference is on
political consolidation in the Arab world, which takes an authoritarian form. Now,
against those who claim that “the state [in the Arab world] is a house of cards, its
stability more apparent than real,”—here the apparent “stability” is the dependent
variable, and against those who contend that “the Arab nation continues to be the
dominant reality”—and hence the Arab territorial states are artificial (dependent
variable), Luciani argues that these arguments have “a difficult time explaining away
the evident fact of stability even if that stability may only prove to be transient.”
“Stability” is used as to explain both internal stability and the survival of the territorial
Arab states. He continues that “this volume finds that the state has been stable in the last
decade and a half, and the durability is not simply an artificial vision” (Ibid., xviii ).
7 Another work is Roger Owen’s State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East
(2000) however the book does not, nor aims to, conceptualise the state.
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Here the confusion becomes clearer. Now again, I am not contesting a possible relation
between internal stability and state survival—in fact this will be part of the argument I
present in Chapter Four—but I am trying to reveal a confusion in this study’s dependent
variable which, as I will show below, confuses the analysis and explanation. Where
does this confusion lead?
First, the confusion between internal stability and state survival leads us to
search for factors of state survival inside the state, namely we will search for factors that
explain both stability and territorial state survival. Actually, this is what the authors of
the volume search into: in describing the Arab state and factors of its survivability, they
define six characteristics: (1) The availability of “central strongman, leader and
orchestrator”, (2) continuing reshuffling of state elites, (3) political accommodation, (4)
ruling elite as a “broad urban middle class”, (5) Large administrative organization, and
(6) Arab state operates as an organization of control and regulation (Dawisha and
Zartman 1987, 1-4). The chapters in the volume elaborate on these points. Although
these factors are necessary to explain political consolidation or authoritarianism in the
Middle East, they are not sufficient to explain the durability of the state in the Middle
East.
Another implication of this confusion is the effect of oil on state stability. For
Luciani, “it is a fact that oil production appears to have a strong and decisive role on the
nature of the state” (1990, 70). The reason for is that foreign revenues obtained from oil
frees the state from taxing its people, hence it is more autonomous vis-à-vis social
forces and is not held accountable before them. Oil, according to Luciani, “has provided
the weaker state structures with abundant financial resources” and “thus today it is very
rarely the case that the very existence of a state structure is endangered by the lack of
resources” (Ibid., 66-7). The implication of this is that “access to oil rents thus
contributes to the explanation of stability, and of the persistence in many Arab states of
regimes based on a strong central figure…”As a result, rentier states “will display little
tendency to evolve towards democratic institutions” (Luciani 1990a, xxiv).
Although this analysis is influential to understand authoritarianism and to
understand prospects of democracy in oil-rich states, it need not explain the survival
states of the Middle East. Why? First, oil is not a cause of these authoritarian forms of
power it is a contributing factor (an intervening variable). As the Saudi and Iraqi cases
will suggest, authoritarian forms of power were in place before the arrival of oil. Oil
came to reinforce existing power structures and did not cause them. Second, what does
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this tell us about state survival, which is a different outcome? If we situate the state in
its international context, as the Iraqi case will reveal, oil actually weakens the territorial
state, how? By reinforcing existing power structures, oil increases regime autonomy vis-
à-vis other social forces, and hence the state remains weak as a whole vis-à-vis external
powers, particularly as social and cultural groups within the state are not engaged in the
state but also have their autonomies, making it easier for outsiders to activate them by
penetrating the state.
Another work that sought to present a “broadly defined ‘political economy’
approach is Nazih Ayubi’s Over-stating the Arab State. The main argument of the book,
according to Ayubi, is “that although most Arab states are ‘hard’ states, and indeed
many of them are ‘fierce’ states, few of them are really ‘strong’ states.” Although they
have huge armies and bulky bureaucracies, Arab states are weak when it comes to tax
collection or winning wars (1994, xi). The study seeks answers on different questions
including the causes of state weakness in the Arab world, failure of Arab unity, and
Arab state flexibility in its international alliances (Ibid., 1).
Examining the state debate in the Middle East, the analysis stresses the
incompatibility of the state with Muslim societies “due to the weakness of individualist
and secularist traditions within them” (Ibid., 15). The debate largely takes a normative
framework making it more prescriptive than analytical or substantive. Hence, it is
difficult to depict if the author is trying to analyze state formation in the Arab world or
is trying to prescribe an alternative Arab or Islamic notion of the state (see the debate in
Ibid, 10-24). As mentioned above, and although Ayubi aims at showing that the Middle
East is not ‘unique’, he ends up revealing the distinctive nature of the region and by
doing so he implies a uniform European path of state formation.
What is the argument presented by Ayubi? For Ayubi, “The Middle East has
historically possessed modes of production that were mainly tributary in nature”, in
modern times:
The tributary modes of production have been articulated with the
encroaching capitalist mode of production (especially in its
‘exchange’ manifestations). With few exceptions, the outcome has
often been the emergence of a basically ‘circulationist’ type of
system whereby the ruling caste is fairly autonomous from the
production process and the social classes, but often excessively
dependent on the outside world.
The class nature of such society manifests a dispersed, fluid class
map with classes excessively dependent on the state (or on the
outside world) and with many intermediate strata, couches
moyennes, in existence. Several of these contend with each other for
social and economic prominence but without any of them being
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structurally capable of assuming class hegemony with the society
(Ibid., 24-5).
The focus is clearly on the role of material forces in shaping social and political
dynamics in the region. Given the complexity of the concept of ‘class’, it is hard to
depict a relationship between the mode of production and political outcomes in Ayubi’s
analysis. We realise in the first paragraph above that European capitalist advancement
to the Middle East combined with existing tributary modes of production to form what
Ayubi calls “articulation”—meaning “two or more modes [or production] can often
coexist and interlink” (Ibid., 26). This, politically, led (or contributed?) to the
emergence of a “ruling caste [that] is fairly autonomous from the production process
and the social classes, but often excessively dependent on the outside world.” This
echoes theories of dependency but remains unclear. The question that arises is that if the
Middle East economy is tributary in nature how can we speak of a “class map”? If it is a
tributary economy, I understand an agrarian economic structure, where we find a feudal
strata and peasant class. Here, one can suggest that in this economy the ruling class
extracts surplus to export it to the “core” and hence there is a dependence on the core.
The ruling stratum hence, acts as a medium, but can we suggest that this class is
“autonomous” from “social classes”? It is not clear on what form of dependence Ayubi
is suggesting. If he is suggesting economic dependence, then the ruling elite can not be
autonomous from peasantry class, because it is dependent on this class for labour. If he
is suggesting political dependence (let us assume for geo-strategic reasons), then the
“tributary” mode of production as an independent variable can not hold. Without
making it clear, different analytical implications may be supposed.
In the second paragraph, Ayubi describes the class structure and social classes as
“dispersed, fluid”, and “excessively dependent on the state (or on the outside world)”.
This makes the confusion clearer. Here, we have classes dependent on the state. This
may suggest the first possibility referred to above where the state depends on social
classes and hence there is a mutual dependence aiming at extracting surplus, but where
does the autonomous “ruling caste” fit?
What is the political implication of this class analysis to understanding the state in
the Middle East? In the second paragraph, Ayubi claims that the struggle among these
classes does not lead to any of them “being structurally capable of assuming class
hegemony within the society.” Although, Ayubi does not tell us why this is the case, he
continues that “owing to the lack of class hegemony, politics in such a society is not
characterized by an orderly process of aggregating demands but by acts of capturing the
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state and acts of resisting the state. Once in power the ruling caste usually has no
intention of giving it up, but the techniques of maintaining power vary from case to case
” (Ibid., 25) Now, who is the “ruling caste”? Is it a class? If yes, then there is class
hegemony, this contradicts the first statement. If no, then class struggle analysis is not
relevant to explain politics in this region, hence the absence of class hegemony has
nothing to do with this outcome. This is also not clearly identified.
Because the mode of production is ‘articulated’, Ayubi suggests that there is
‘non-correspondence’: in “many social formations there is little correspondence among
various ‘instances’ or manifestations of structural power in society” (Ibid., 27). Here
power refers to three types, modes of production, modes of coercion, and modes of
persuasion. Simply stated these mean economic, coercive, and cultural powers in
society. Now, Ayubi’s idea is that different economic modes of production need not
correspond to specific culture or coercive instances. Where these ‘instances’ have
corresponded well previously (in European cases), in the Middle East there is no
correspondence. Hence, “articulation may therefore take the form of linkages not only
among various modes of production, but also among (non-corresponding) ‘instances’ of
structural power…thus it would be possible to imagine in a particular society an
articulation between, for example, certain economic and technical elements of the
capitalist mode of production and certain social and cultural elements of pre-capitalist
(eg.feudal, even slavery) modes of coercion and persuasion” (Ayubi 1994, 27).
One main problem is that class analysis is assumed a priori and it is taken to
explain state formation and development—especially in European experience—and
therefore its absence in the Middle East contributes to why the state is weak there. The
implication of this analysis is that we search for what is missing in the Middle East
instead of what is there. “The predominance of the ‘political’ and the cruciality of the
state” observes Ayubi “is in some ways a function of the lack of class hegemony in
society, which is, in turn, closely related to the articulated nature of the modes of
production. The state here comes to fulfil a compensatory function and to enforce a
certain kind of formal unity on a body that is not socially homogeneous or balanced”
(Ibid., 172-3; emphasis added). But what is this state we are talking about? Who leads
its? How and why does it ‘enforce a certain kind of formal unity’? Ayubi’s analysis
assumes a separation between the state and society. What is missing in this analysis is a
definition of the ‘men dominating men’ and the institutions they build to consolidate
their power. These men need not be representing a class but simply social forces who
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construct strategies—economic, coercive, and cultural—to manage their conflict with
their rivals.
Why is the Arab national territorial state weak in the Middle East? Ayubi
examines this question by asking if the Arab state is territorial or Pan-Arabist. Because
of the influence of the concept of Umma, the Arabs, according to Ayubi, “have not been
conventionally sympathetic to any concept of the body-politic that bases itself on land
or territory”(Ibid., 135). Although Ayubi partially accepts that Islamism and Arabism
have “limited the evolution of the national territorial state in the Arab world”, he
believes the “the quest for a nation-state tends to correspond with the emergence of an
‘industrial revolution’ and the organisation of a working-class movement”. In the Arab
world these have not taken place or if they did they were “directed by the state and not,
as in the familiar European cases, by the bourgeoisie” (Ibid., 136).
Once again the state is analysed based on what’s missing and not what is there.
Islamic and Pan-Arab ideologies are primarily political projects that, without
sophisticated concepts of the state, intend on uniting specific territories against others.
But these projects are not the natural state of affairs in which the current territorial states
are the deviation. Rather, these frameworks are projects that required, and continue to
require, political struggles with other projects (and identities) representing leaders of the
current states. It is not only the absence of a “‘historic bloc’” (Ibid.) that is capable of
uniting the Arabs that is missing, but rulers who aim to sustain their power domestically
and regionally (Walt 1987) and who are able to manipulate identities (Davis 1991) and
sustain ‘historic blocs’ (for a definition, see Cox 1981). As we see above, Ayubi’s work
is a reflection of Middle East complexity more than a systemic attempt at capturing and
explaining such a complexity.
In a similar fashion, Simon Bromley in his Rethinking Middle East Politics,
attempts to analyse “how do we theorize the linked process of state formation and
capitalist development in the modern world?” (1994, 1). However, from the outset we
realize that the question, again, inherently and a priori sets a link between capitalist
development and state formation in the modern world. Bromley’s major message is that
against those who take Islam to explain lack of economic and political development, we
should look at the mode of production of a country or a time period to explain the
corresponding cultural value. It is worthwhile to note at this stage that Bromley’s work
has two major differences from the works discussed above. First involves the serious
attention to the process of state formation, namely the periods before states emerged in
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the Middle East. And, second his attention to the role that colonial powers play in
shaping Middle East state formation.
According to Bromley, “if we are to make sense of the social formations of the
Middle East we must attend to the particular forms by which the material production of
these societies was organized, and thence the ways these structured other social
arrangements”. Hence, Bromley carefully distinguishes between modes of production in
“Ottoman heartlands, the areas dominated by tribal nomadism and the Safavid empire”
(Ibid., 38). Each of these had a corresponding Islam. For Brombley, “state formation
cannot be understood by isolating it from changes going on elsewhere in society,
specifically from changes in the dominant forms of surplus appropriation” (Ibid., 101).
The problem here is similar to the problems discussed above on Ayubi’s work, the
forms of ‘surplus appropriation’ are taken to explain both the formation of states and
their (lack of) development towards liberal polities.
The emergence (simultaneously) of states in authoritarian forms of power in the
region is, according to Brombley, due to the lack of a liberal capitalist form of surplus
appropriation—recall here Ayubi’s lack of a “class hegemony”. This shaped both the
internal dynamics of state formation and state behaviour in the region. The integration
of the Middle East in the world market, led many states to take the role previously taken
by indigenous minority groups, who under tributary forms of appropriation contributed
to establishing state-led models of late industrialization. “By these means, then,
dependent state formation assisted in imbricating the state directly in the appropriation
of surpluses” (Ibid., 104; emphasis original). This further went along with the
persecution of minority groups. However, “such projects varied in their relation to
imperialist interests”, in regions where states escaped colonial rule or where their
development is based on exporting oil to the West such as Turkey, Iran, and Saudi
Arabia “then dependent state formation need not take an anti-imperialist form.” Western
imperialism, according to this argument created “sub-imperialisms” in those states, who
repressed national forces. On the other hand in states such Egypt or Iraq, where colonial
influence was marked “state-formation and industrial development were more likely to
take an anti-imperialist, if not anti-capitalist, form” as the landed and mercantile classes
were perceived as ‘imperial agents’. In all cases, political authoritarianism ensued.
Though the argument presents us with an interesting causal chain between
modes of production and state formation, there is danger that the analysis becomes
reduced to economic factors. Below I raise a few questions. First, what is the relation
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between the absence of a colonial past with the nature of relations with imperial
powers? It is understandable that “a degree of independent development might be
encouraged by the imperialist power in order to create sub-imperialisms which could
then manage the regional system under broad constraints dictated by the West.” But
how do we delineate the mode of production factor here? How do we know whether
Turkey’s “anti-imperialist” formation is due to a specific mode of production or due to
geo-strategic reasons.
Second, such analysis misses major regional and world shifts in the balance of
power and their relation to the Middle East. Although world powers are attracted to the
Middle East due to, in the final analysis, economic interests, the management and
preservation of such interests takes a political dimension. Hence, world powers may
back or repress a state in the region not necessarily for its potential as a surplus
appropriator, but maybe for its potential as geo-strategic asset or threat. What is meant
by the general term of ‘imperialism’? Can we speak of imperialism in the singular?
Although imperial powers share the same interests, we must not forget, that the ‘core’
does not share similar strategies, but usually contradictory ones. Hence, state formation
in the Middle East has to be seen in the context of such structural power balances. For
example to understand military coups in Syria of the 1950s, we can not only look at the
mode of production there and its political expression in army officers seeking change.
We have to examine the British and American struggle for the country during that time
and how this reflects on the political environment there. The Middle East state was born
within such structural limitations.
Third, modes of production on their own can not explain why Egypt sought an
“anti-imperialist” industrial development. Actually, a close examination of Egyptian
industrial policy of the early years after the revolution, would show a policy not anti-
imperialist (see Waterbury 1983, 63). Egypt became anti-imperialist, but then this also
was possible only with the emergence of another power in the international system,
namely the Soviet Union. Moreover, such analysis can not on its own explain, as we
shall see below, the arrival to power in Iraq of ‘progressive’ forces. Interestingly, in
Bromley’s analysis of the selected cases, all other factors such as ethnic composition of
the country, its geo-strategic position, the timing of its formation and others are
discussed but it remains very difficult to distinguish the economic factor and set causal
chain of it as an explanatory variable. Bromley concludes that “we should turn first to
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political economy of the Middle East in order to explain the current political scene”
(Ibid., 169).
A political economy approach can be very useful to examine political dynamics
only if, like with political culture, it is situated as one variable among many. There is a
danger that the three works above overstretch their analysis to explain other political
phenomena in the Middle East. Luciani believes that “an allocation state does not need
to refer to a national myth and, as a matter of fact, will usually avoid doing so” (Ibid.
,78). Eric Davis and Nicolas Gurvreidies actually show how oil-rich states established
government programs to promote ‘national’ folklore and manipulate historical memory.
Further, they show how these programs vary according to a regime’s interests (Davis
and Gavirielides 1991). Ayubi extends the concept of articulation to explain “why a
discourse like that of the Islamists does not seem to carry much by way of clear class
content.” Again, it is assumed that political agendas of Islamists ought to have a class
ingredient although the priorities of their political agenda may include national
liberation or Islamic revival, where the economic objectives (which eventually may
include as class ingredient) may take secondary aims.
Conclusion
This chapter sought to examine the state as a concept and the state debate in the Middle
East. The first part aimed to define the state and state formation. We realised that
scholars differed in their understanding of the state. I argued that it is important to treat
the state as a process taking place in social fields and therefore I defined state formation
and collapse differentiating between states as a territorial entity and as a regime of
power.
In the second part, I examined the state debate in the Middle East. I argued that
both the political culture and political economy approaches have reduced politics to a
single variable. The two main shortcomings of this literature include their conception of
the state and its formation and their (with the exception of Bromley) domestic treatment
of state development. What is missing in the role of the ‘political’ structure and
particularly the role of political actors as managers of different cultural and material
structures.
In chapters Three and Four below I will argue that any theoretical understanding
of the state in Middle East will have to start with the ontology of that region before we
can come up with epistemological positions. Second, we can not escape a three-level
analysis, including domestic, regional, and international, especially that the state was
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born and continues to develop in such a highly interconnected system. And third,
methodologically, we need clear questions, precise concepts, and testable hypotheses to
be able to form a basis on which knowledge could be accumulated. Before that I will
examine general theories of state survival in the next chapter.
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Chapter Two
Why do States Survive?
To understand social structures and
processes, it is never enough to study a single
functional stratum within a social field. To be
really understood, these structures and
processes demand a study of the relationships
between the different functional strata which
bound together within a social field.
—Norbert Elias, The Civilising
Process
Introduction
In the previous chapter I discussed the state as a concept and theory and reviewed
theories of the state in the Middle East. This chapter will focus on the literature that
aims to answer the main question of this research: why and how do states survive?
Similar to the literature visited in the previous chapter, the following analysis will
show a divide between two approaches. First are theories that stress material factors
over ideational ones and, second, theories that emphasise agent over structure or
vice-versa.
Most social science research, one could argue, revolve around one or more
of these factors or the interaction among them. One of the arguments I present in
this work is that the hard question that faces social scientists is not which factor is to
be demarcated as influential but when and under what conditions. However, in
addition to the above dichotomies, in International Relations we have the domestic-
international divide. In other words do we focus on internal dynamics of states or
systemic forces. In the following review, I will visit arguments that emphasize
international or domestic (or both) sources of change and within each analysis I will
discuss the material versus normative approaches to the problem.
One way to study why states stay intact is to understand why some collapse.
However, with the exception of a few, most of the studies on state collapse in, for
example, the former Yugoslavia, Soviet Union, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Lebanon
provide all of the above factors as causes of collapse making it hard to know which
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factor matters and when particularly if—as in the case of this study—the object is to
understand why certain weak states survive. In examining state survival, as
mentioned earlier, we look at how power is reproduced, not only how monopoly
over coercion is sustained and challenged but also, how regimes produce cultural
strategies to legitimate their power, and finally how they establish internal and
external alliances to maintain that power. Accordingly, state survival is not only
about institutional survival. I say this here for two reasons. First, because a few of
the studies I review here conflate between the territorial state and the state as an
institution or bureaucracy or political regime. Second, another body of literature
aims at understanding state weakness or erosion—particularly in the industrialized
world—in the face of global forces such as multi-national corporations, monetary
unions, non-governmental organizations and others (Strange 1996; Camilleri and
Falk 1992; for the Middle East see Atrissi 2005).This body of literature is interesting
in understanding the state power vis-à-vis these global changes, but not in the
survival of the territorial states in new polities. Hence, this body of literature will not
be covered below as its aims differ from those in this study.
2.1. International Conditions of State Survival
The collapse of empires such as the Austro-Hungarian or the Ottoman, the
emergence of two global powers and the establishment of the United Nations after
1945, and later the collapse of the Soviet Union brought numerous new states to the
international system. Politics within these new states, the relations between them
and with the established ones tended generally towards two aims: either to maintain
the existing configuration (status quo) or to alter it. This was historically contingent
on several factors such as the internal cultural composition of the state, its socio-
economic foundations, or geo-strategic position within the international state
system. The international state system in post-1945 was largely shaped by the two
competing powers—U.S. and the Soviet Union—which in turn shaped domestic
struggles for power in the new polities.
The structure of world politics—it is argued—kept established state borders
intact. States as such were taken by International Relations theories—particularly
Structural Realism—as givens without a thorough examination of the internal
dynamics of survival. As Joel Migdal argues, International Relations “models
emphasized its [state] rationality, thereby assuming its integrity and coherence”
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(1988, 138). International structures of powers defined the role states could assume;
weak states are more likely to seek support from powerful ones who, in search for
spheres of influence, seek to deprive competing powers from such influence or
potential domination (Krasner 1999; Waltz 1979).
Another way through which states survive involves their choices in the
making of foreign alliances. One of the questions Stephen Walt’s (1987) study
raises on the origins of alliances regards the causes that lead a state to support
another state’s territorial integrity or foreign policy. Examining the external
alliances of Middle Eastern states, he finds that most alliances involved Arab
regimes’ choosing allies to balance against ‘threats’—as opposed to ‘power’ as
realism argues (ibid., 5). The level of threat is assessed based on geographical
proximity, offensive capability of threatening state, and the perception of threats.
Although balancing is more common, the weaker the state, argues Walt, the more
likely it would bandwagon rather than balance. Through these alliance strategies,
regimes can consolidate their power and sustain their states.
Do ideologies play a role in the way a state chooses its alliances? Although
“security considerations are likely to take precedence over ideological preferences”,
Walt (1987), studying a region that continues to be shaped by norms of Arabism and
Islamist, observes that “when weak or unstable regimes rely on ideological
arguments to bolster their legitimacy this reliance may affect their alliance
choices…weak states may enter in alliance to bolster the state”. Pre-empting a
constructivist critique (see Barnett 1998), Walt expects that “regimes where
legitimacy is precarious may enter ideologically based alliances” (Ibid., 38-39).
However, he cautions against taking the rhetoric of regimes seriously.
A major shortcoming of Walt’s theory is that by not demarcating the process
of state formation the theory focuses solely on systemic factors. States form
alliances primarily to balance against threats emanating from the regional system in
which they exist (Ibid., 264). Although, this may be true, threats that regimes face,
as the cases of this thesis will show, start in the domestic arena, which Walt
acknowledges may determine the foreign policy options and alliance of a particular
regime. Another consequence of not examining state formation is that although
regimes in the Middle East attempt to balance against threats and not power, this is
because the Middle East state system is “mediated” (Heydemann 2000) or its
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development, as I will show below, did not involve a traditional accumulation of
power by competing states but rather it was structured by international competition.
Against Realist approaches to state survival are schools that emphasised the
role of norms to explain state survival. These approaches examined how norms
emanating from the United Nations such as, sovereignty, self determination, and
international law contribute to maintaining existing state boundaries. These
approaches view the international state system more as an ‘international society’
(Bull 1977) rather than a system that is inherently conflictual or—solely—based on
the balance of power; “as always with theorists of international society, it is the
normative basis of the relationship that is crucial” (Brown 2001). In their study of
African states, Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosenberg observe a dilemma that
although central government in Africa may lose its control over its population or
territory, the territorial state continues to persist (1982, 1). According to them a
Weberian conception of the state—as a sole claimant over coercive forces —would
mean that most African states would not qualify as states. We have to view states as
legal persons with specific components of a defined territory, population,
government, and international recognition. To understand state persistence in Africa
we need to examine the juridical quality of states that “is not only a normative but
essentially an international attribute” (Ibid., 12-13). The authors conclude that
“juridical statehood is more important than empirical statehood in accounting for the
persistence of states in Black Africa” (Ibid., 21).
From that analysis, it is hard to be clear on whether this conclusion indicates
a causal relation between international law and state survival in Africa. In other
words is survival due to international recognition or is it a contributing factor, a
legal guarantee. The authors indicate that Africa is not a mere geographical entity
but also a “political idea.” They go further to note that the internal weakness of and
external vulnerability of African states made their statesmen more conservative vis-
à-vis the existing boundaries. It has been clear to the leaders of the Organization of
African Union that “a reciprocal respect for boundaries and abstention from
demands for their immediate revision, would be to their general advantage” (Ibid.,
17). The problem here is that there is no variation in the dependent variable (state
survival) and at the same time there is no clear position on what the independent
variable is (elite survival or international recognition). Both positions could be right,
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but examining only Africa would not give us a clear answer to the question of why
states survive.
This work has been further developed in Robert H. Jackson’s more recent
study in Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World
(1990). The aim is to examine “the international normative framework that upholds
sovereign statehood in the Third World” (Ibid., 1). The object is to examine moral
and legal norms which sociological and political economy approaches have not
given enough attention. Jackson defines ‘Quasi-states’ as “consisting not of self-
standing structures with domestic foundation—like separate buildings—but of
territorial jurisdiction supported from above by international law and material aid—
a kind of international safety net. In short, they often appear to be juridical more
than empirical entities: hence quasi-states” (Ibid., 5). The major characteristic of
these states is their “negative sovereignty” as opposed to the “positive sovereignty”
of European states where empirical statehood came before juridical one. Negative
sovereignty is a “formal legal condition” that secures “freedom from the outside
world” (Ibid., 27). Jackson argues that “empirical characteristics of quasi-states are
not new”, the history of the modern state formation is also of a history of “rulers
who are illegitimate, governments that are disorganized or incompetent, and subjects
who are indifferent, isolated, alienated, cowed, or in rebellion.” Nevertheless, what
has changed are the “rules and institutions concerning those conditions” (Ibid., 22-
3). Hence, juridical states can not cease to exist. “Quasi-states are therefore
disclosed by a new positive international society which fostered the independence of
such states and caters for their survival and development” (Ibid., 25).
What implications does this work offer us in terms of understanding state
survival? Jackson defines the objective of his work as an examination of the
“international normative framework that upholds sovereign statehood in the third
world.” Does this mean that he will dismiss other factors such as the role of the
international state system in keeping states intact, domestic elites urge for survival
and how this is linked to state survival, cultural aspects that may keep states intact
(see below) and focus solely on legal or normative structures that foster state
survival? This is not entirely clear, though the conclusions of the work show that
international normative structures explain state survival. Jackson concludes that:
“Up to a point quasi-states are however reversions to the early
sixteenth century. But only up to a point, however, and that point is
the late-twentieth-century society of states which underwrites their
survival. The Third World prince must worry about losing his head
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but he need not be concerned about losing his principality”. (Ibid.,
167).
Against Hobbesian realist analysis, Jackson believes that the “quasi-state
cannot logically collapse into a state of nature because its sovereignty is derived not
internally from empirical statehood but externally from the states-system whose
members have evidently decided and are resolved that these jurisdiction shall not
disappear” (Ibid., 169).It is more likely that Jackson finds a causal link between the
legal foundations of the state and its survival. This is problematic however for
several reasons.
This would require a general observation of states that have actually both
disappeared, both as juridical and real constructs. These include but are not limited
to the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan, division of Czechoslovakia, collapse
of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, Palestine/Israel or the United Arab Republic (a
union between Egypt and Syria). If we look at de facto collapse the list is even
longer, this may include Lebanon, Somalia, Afghanistan, Sudan, Nigeria, and Iraq.
In the case of Yugoslavia or Iraq, the survival of the state was potentially linked to
the survival of its leader. In the case of Yugoslavia, Tito played an important role in
keeping the state intact at least temporarily (Dyker and Vejvoda 1996), in the case
of Soviet Union the communist party played a similar role in consolidating the
soviet regime (Beissinger 2002), while in Iraq, as I will argue below, Saddam
Hussein’s coercive measures led to a similar outcome until he was ousted by force.
In all these cases the international legal norms did not suffice to explain either their
survival when they survived or their collapse when they collapsed because, put
simply, principalities are built whether consciously or unconsciously, by princes.
When they succeed, those princes impose recognition (legal and normative) on
other princes, they create the law. When the law creates principalities, princes in the
third world accommodate their struggles to those impositions. But who created this
law? This brings us to the second problem that Jackson’s analysis brings.
To speak of an international law, means also to speak of an author(s) of this
law. Laws are not initially givens; they develop out of certain struggles. Africa’s—
and the Middle East’s in this respect—current borders were not arbitrarily drawn.
Africans may perceive them as such due to the incongruity of these borders with
existing nations, tribes or ethnic groups. But from the perception of those who
actually drew them, these reflect previous (or existing) colonial competition over
Africa and the spheres of influence they created among themselves. Hence, do we
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look at the laws of sovereignty or at the power relations that made these Quasi-
states possible? Maybe we should look at both, but the persistence of the state in
Africa can not solely be attributed to the norms of an international society that keep
these states intact, because in other cases, as those discussed above, these norms did
not assist in this outcome. How can we only attribute state persistence to that
outcome? Isn’t it possible that the international state system (i.e. major states in this
system) is not interested in Africa? If we combine this with the internal weakness of
these states which are ruled by conservative leaders, isn’t it possible to look at other
factors to explain this outcome? Shouldn’t we look at other regions such as South
Eastern Europe, Central Asia, or the Middle East to test if different pressures from
the international system produce different affects? Is it possible that in regions
where powerful states have more interests, international norms do not matter?
Third, one needs to ask what if the authors of international law differ on one
case or another. One of the attributes of state sovereignty is international
recognition; however what if a few states recognize an entity and others don’t? We
have an outcome similar to that of Taiwan, which was recognized as China until
Western powers recognized the People’s Republic in the early seventies. Taiwan
however continues to function as an independent entity, although is not recognized
as such. But then we also have the northern part of Cyprus that is recognized by
Turkey but not the rest of the world, or Israel that is recognized by the rest of the
world but not by most Arab states. These formal and legal positions are not affected
by norms at the international level but by actual power conflicts. Borders were
imposed onto most of the developing world; however the response to these borders
wasn’t uniform. It is a grand simplification to consider the survival of African states
as an effect of international law or norms of an international society. This law
provides these states with a legal justification, and as Jackson rightly argues, it
provides them with foreign aid and representation in international organizations.
However, the real test of these norms is to be examined in regions where
international powers have strategic interests, not where international powers are
indifferent. Norms matter to the extent that international powers want them to. The
real question is to understand why norms matter in one case and not in another, not
merely to generalize their effects in the aim of undermining realist approaches.
Jackson’s approach provides a strong challenge to realism but also raises questions
on the role of norms in affecting politics in the developing world.
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In his Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival,
Christopher Clapham (1996) presents a challenge to realism by problematising its
systemic analysis but raises doubts on the international norms in maintaining states.
His main aim is to understand state survival in Sub-Saharan Africa from “a view of
international politics from the bottom up”. The point is to examine what African
leaders did to survive in their states and not only what the international state system
was inclined to do to keep states surviving. The crucial question is “whose survival;
the state’s or the ruler’s”. Clapham’s main hypothesis is that in most cases, African
rulers “seek to assure their personal survival by the survival and indeed
strengthening of their states” (Ibid., 4). Although survival is not the sole objective
of these rulers, it nevertheless is a precondition to satisfying other aims. However,
when economic and political difficulties loom or when the regime begins to face
internal challenges the object of survival deepens; borders remain intact as rulers
seek to secure their survival against internal and external enemies. Are these
borders congruent with African peoples? No. These borders were imposed on
Africa in the post-1945 period by European colonial powers largely “in order to
regulate competition between themselves” (Ibid., 31) and according to Clapham the
Africans were “almost powerless to alter” them (Ibid., 1941). African leaders
seeking survival had to accommodate themselves to these borders—a political
space necessary to maintain independence and a potential for socio-economic
development.
However, was elite survival enough to keep states intact? Clapham observes
that international recognition was not sufficient. African elites had to bargain with
international powers. External dependence was determined by the strength or
weakness of the regime internally. The weaker the regime internally, the more it
sought assistance outside its border, and the more it weakened its internal
legitimacy. Effective management of internal and external environments was
facilitated in two ways. First, on the regional level, Clapham looks at the
continent’s population density and concentration—as important indicators for the
emergence of states—and finds a low density and a scattered population. Lack of
such concentrations has created less competition on a regional level and made
possible “islands of relatively settled governments” (Ibid., 29). In the history of
European state formation as we will see below, migration, high population
density—which resulted in a fierce competition over land—and the blockage of
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external exits from the East were important preconditions to the emergence of
competing states.
A second facilitator to state survival in Africa is the low pressure from the
international state system. With the exception of the Horn, as a major strategic
passage between East and West, Africa, according to Clapham, did not matter for
the international state system (Ibid., 42). Competition between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union during the Cold War was low, as compared to other regions such as
East Asia or the Middle East. With the end of the Cold War, interest in the region
was limited to foreign assistance particularly to non-governmental organizations,
what Clapham call a “de-stating” of external relations with Africa (Ibid., 256).
As we can see, to understand state survival we need to examine several
dimensions, which include, but are not limited to, elite strategies of survival,
internal composition of states, the geo-political position of the state and the timing
of state formation. In weak states these vary and the development towards
“empirical statehood” need not be unilinear, rather there are both progressions and
regressions. “Quasi-statehood”, concludes Clapham, “provides no bridge across
which African or other states can pass in reasonable confidence from their post-
colonial origins to the empirical statehood that rests on national integration and a
set of viable political and economic institutions.” International recognition “has
provided only a temporary respite from external pressure”. Clapham finally
recommends that International Relations as a discipline needs to take internal
dynamics of states seriously and not to examine solely the interactions amongst
them (Ibid., 271).
We could add that the nature of the process of state formation has both
domestic and international dimensions. The strengthening of internal domestic
structures in the process of power centralization serves not only to consolidate the
power of elites internally but also to limit external intervention, which, potentially,
could limit the power of those elites. Now the extent of this centralization, its
necessity, and the time period it requires is historically and contextually contingent.
The study of state formation and collapse is therefore at the meeting point of the
two artificially divided subfields of Political Science—Comparative Politics and
International Relations.
Because Clapham’s work is attentive to both internal and external dynamics
of state survival it is hard to situate it in the division I have intended for this work,
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regardless of the fact that he follows a bottom-up approach. My intention is to
highlight this division so we can move beyond it. To do this however, we need a
theoretical model that provides the seeds of understanding the interactions of
domestic, regional, and international levels of dynamics. Studying state survival in
new polities provides a fertile ground in this objective. Before I suggest such a
model in the next chapters, I turn now to examine domestic factors of state survival.
2. 2. Domestic Explanations of State Survival
To understand the internal factors of state survival scholars have looked at material
and cultural factors. Among the material factors is coercion. Although coercion is
now treated as the last resort in established states, it was the main ingredient in the
process of state formation in those states and continues to shape domestic politics in
the new polities. A less coercive form of power intending to keep states together is
found in the economic sphere. Here regimes would reward their allies, who could
be major capitalists, religious institutions, or even a social class, and punish their
enemies whether they are a secessionist group or potential competitors for the reign.
A third dimension that is not tangible is the political management of social
struggles including: dividing the opposition, bargaining with external powers,
emphasizing one religious or cultural interpretation over another, etc.. Another
intangible power is found in the cultural domain. Politics, it is argued, takes place
within a cultural frame, which gives meaning to people and sometimes explains
power and not vice versa. Next, I will look at these factors in turn particularly in
their relation to state survival.
2.2.1. Besides Coercion
In most of the cases of the developing world, the emergence of the state in the post-
1945 was followed by the emergence of the military—largely through military
coups—as a major power in domestic politics, and indeed in the international arena.
In numerous cases in East Asia, Africa, Middle East, and Latin America democratic
institutions inherited from colonial powers such as parliaments and party systems
were seen as ‘divisive’ institutions serving either domestic conservative socio-
economic forces, colonial powers, or both. The intervention of the military in
politics was perceived as a passage towards socio-economic change but also, and
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more importantly, towards power centralisation. These changes were exacerbated
by dynamics of the Cold War politics that began to be accommodated in the new
polities. The process of power centralization was indeed violent. Yousef Cohen et
al., observe that the “entire historical process of creating a national state was a long
and violent struggle pitting the agents of state centralisation against myriad local
and regional opponents” (1981, 902). This point is stressed by students of state
formation discussed above. However, the authors want to stress that violence taking
place in the new states “is a function of the conflicts inherent in the process of
primitive central state power accumulation” (Ibid.902)
Accumulation involves the transfer of power from local and sub national
control to centralised institutions. The process is conflictual in the sense that the
initiator of such processes enters into power struggles with pre-existing socio-
economic and cultural institutions, be it peasants abstaining from tax payment or
religious powers refusing to compromise their power autonomy or coercion-
wielding and power-hungry rivals. Again, the intensity of such conflicts is
contingent on the context where it takes place. While resistance from socio-
economic and cultural institutions is universal, regime response varies. This
depends upon how state elites bargain with other societal forces, on the coalitions
they build (Waldner 1999) and the power of those social forces in specific
territories. The emerging political institutions reflect such conflicts (Moore 1966).
Coercion does not explain state formation; it is one of its ingredients, its variance
across cases makes this clearer. Coercion is a necessary condition for state survival,
but not a sufficient cause.
In their Beyond Coercion: The Durability of the Arab State), Adeed
Dawisha and William Zaartman eds., (1987) sought to explain “stability and
persistence of the state in the Arab world” (Ibid., 1). They define six characteristics
that may be of relevance to understanding stability and durability of the Arab state.
I have mentioned these factors above when I examined the Middle Eastern state
literature, it suffices here to stress that these factors centre on the political
management of stability. A major characteristic of the Arab state is the presence of
a “central strongman, leader, orchestrator.” The work reveals how through such
tools as continual reshuffling of personnel (see also Migdal 1988), the cooptation of
opposition and the regulation of the economy, the state in the Arab world survives
(Ibid., 4). These factors reveal important political tools that go beyond coercion in
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explaining why states stay intact and they do not necessarily refute the assumption
that coercion remains a precondition facilitating these less coercive powers.
Among such tools are economic policies which contribute to the survival of
elites who establish them. Several studies reveal how economic policies are shaped
by state elites worried about their survival or the survival of the state they rule in
newly established states such as those in Africa (Bates 2005), East Asia (Amsden
1985) or the Middle East where concepts such as the ‘Rentier state’(discussed
above) or the ‘Patrimonial state’ (Harik 1997) reflect regimes’ economic strategy
that target survival. Arguing that “coercion alone cannot keep a state intact”,
Migdal provides both Iran under the Shah and the Soviet Union as examples
(Migdal 2001, 149). While in both cases state institutions collapsed, in the former
the state territory remained intact. In the case of Iran, we see a reconfiguration of
public institutions that were imbued with Islamic norms and principles. Soviet
collapse, however, is different. Criticizing explanations on the collapse of the
Soviet Union, Mark R. Beissinger contends that these explanations “ultimately
cannot account for why the Soviet state ended by disintegrating into national pieces
as opposed to mere undergoing regime change” (2002, 8).
Another tool regimes possess to consolidate their rule, and sometimes their
states, is found in the interaction taking place with their rivals. William Zaartman
for example, reveals how opposition to these regimes in the Arab world serves to
consolidate the state. In trying to gain power, the opposition turns towards the
regime, hence justifying its role; “neither uses the other, but each serves the other’s
interests in performing in its own role” (Zartman 1987b, 61-62). Another involves
the foreign policy choices a regime takes and how this contributes to their domestic
legitimacy against their rivals (Dawisha 1987b, 260-1). As I mentioned above, these
factors help to contribute to regime survival, but this should not be conflated with
survivability of the territorial state.
Another explanation as to why states remain intact is to look at what Joel
Migdal calls the “organizational imperatives of the state” (2001, 142). This
approach regards the state as an organization whose functions pertain to other social
organizations. Organizations, it is argued, exist to harmonize interest of different
actors. But why don’t these organizations fall apart? The proposition is that the
centripetal force that keeps them intact has control over the ownership of goods,
which these organizations supply. By controlling the access to, and the distribution
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of, these goods, the centripetal actor can maintain the integrity of the organization
(Ahren 1994) simply by punishing those who seek to alter the existing power
configuration and rewarding those who abide by its impositions.
Although the logic of such analysis may be extended to states as social
organizations, there is a danger of overemphasizing the role of the organization in
itself, particularly when the social structures—be it cultural, political, or
economic—are not taken into consideration. The emphasis on organizational
capacity of states has complicated our understanding of that institution. Any state
requires an institutional apparatus, however, and as I will be discussing below, to
understand a state we can not start by examining its institutions. Institutions, as
defined above are intervening variables—humanly devised constraints that structure
political, economic and social interaction” (North 1991, 97). We need to understand
the balance of power that produces, maintains, and develops such institutions.
Institutions in this case are reflections of that balance of power. The effect they
leave on society is determined by the autonomy they possess. To understand their
autonomy, however, we need to look at their origins. Therefore, there is a need to
demarcate a political level, whilst defining its main actors, before we understand
institutions. Without an appreciation of this political level, we might fall into both
theoretical and policy problems.
For instance, Francis Fukuyama (2004) sees institution building in ‘failed
states’ as one of the “the most important issues for the world community”.
Fukuyama is aware that the demand for institutions “when it emerges is usually the
product of crisis or extraordinary circumstances that create no more than a brief
window for reform”. Nevertheless, what if such a demand does not exist, Fukuyama
is straightforward: “demand for [such] institutions must be generated externally”
through aid and “direct exercise of political power by outside authorities” (Ibid.,
35). But states are not mere institutions; rather, states are: (1) institutions (2)
competing social powers. Institutions are contributing factors that keep states intact
but do not cause state survival. More observant on this issue is William Zaartman,
who recognizes that domestic “power structures must be reconstituted from the
bottom up for legitimacy to spring up again” (1995). Zartman, however, directly
notices a dilemma: if warlords who are initially responsible for state collapse come
to reconstitute the new state then factors of its original collapse might emerge again.
On the other hand, if new elites are given the opportunity to build the new state,
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they would lack legitimacy. The answer according to him is to bring together both
types of elites (Ibid., 268-70). Hence the “cause and remedy” of state collapse
“relate to sociopolitical structure within a given sovereign territory and people, not
the shape of the state” (Ibid.; emphasis added).
2.2.3. Cultural Frames and the Political
Culture presents us with a problem; its effects on our lives, on the decisions we
take, on our behaviour, and on the aspirations we foster is apparent. But the power
of culture—generally defined here to mean the norms, traditions, and ideas we carry
and which our shape social, economic, and political environments—is hard to
situate among other dimensions of our lives such as the socio-economic system that
preserves—or is preserved by—culture, or the political system that may be a
reflection of that culture or simply an effect of it.
I think culture has a life of its own similar to that of the economic or
political systems. If this is right then we have two challenges. First, we have to
demarcate that life while analytically neutralizing the life of the other two systems.
And second, we need to understand the relationship among those systems. If each
of these systems has a life of its own, then we should seek to understand the sources
that preserve or alter each of these systems. To understand systems and their
interaction we need to look at the actors that constitute each of those systems. I
propose this general proposition here as a lens to look at cultural explanations of
state survival, while I keep the details of that suggestion to the following chapters.
“Why do so many states stay intact?” (Migdal 2001: Chapter 5). Trying to
answer that question, Joel S. Migdal, against Realist, Organizational theorists, and
utilitarian explanations, believes:
That certain areas of state-society interaction can create meaning for
people in society, and that meaning, in turn, can naturalize the state.
Naturalization means that people consider the state to be as natural
as the landscape around them; they cannot imagine their lives
without it. If that belief is widespread, it provides a powerful
antidote to disintegrative forces, even in the face of continued
weakness in delivering goods, effecting policy, and gaining
efficiency (Ibid., 137).
Migdal provides three areas in which to examine how “meaning” is
practiced and created. These include law generation, public ritual, and the
permanent constitution and reconstitution of public space. States create laws to
limit the power of their internal and external rivals. Law also limits the power of
the state by extending these powers to societies, through the protection of
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individual liberties and private properties (Ibid., 157). To surmount the problem
of inefficiency, states gain support from their societies by engaging in ‘public
rituals’ and ceremonies that “connect the sacred to the notion of the nation and the
mundane institutions of the state” (Ibid., 158). In such situations the existing
division between state and society become blurred. Building on Clifford Geertz
(1980), Migdal observes the presence of a “controlling political idea” that keeps
states intact. For Geertz the court and capital “is not just the nucleus, the engine,
or the pivot of the state, it is the state…it is a statement of controlling political
idea—namely, that by the mere act of providing a model, a paragon, a faultless
image of civilized existence, the court shapes the world around it into at least a
rough approximation of its own excellence” (Geertz quoted in Migdal 2001, 160;
emphasis original). States need that “cultural frame” to enhance their ability to
remain intact and to justify their domination. Finally, regarding the public sphere,
as no state apparatus can be omnipresent in society to provide security, “the
perceived effectiveness of the state rests on how all other sorts of implicit law or
rules guide proper behavior and limit to some manageable level the deviance
with which the state must deal” (Ibid. :165; emphasis original). Therefore, Migdal
contends that in addition to other factors such as the United Nations, the material
foundations of states, or globalization, states stay intact because of “a realm of
feelings and implicit understandings that go beyond rational calculation” (Ibid.,
167).
Persuasive as it is, Migdal’s explanation, by including its limitations, brings
us to the core of the problem, while not taking us far in terms of solving it. Some
questions remain: under what conditions does the law contribute to state survival?
Why are there different sets of laws in the first place? Why does one set of laws
prevail over others? What happens when public rituals and state religions are
challenged? Under what conditions do certain public rituals survive? As for the
public space, what explains the broadness of public space in one case and its
narrowness in others? Last, definitely not least, what is this state we are talking
about? Who defines it? What constitutes it?
To consider that the state has meanings in peoples’ lives is a very
influential argument, so powerfully influential that we can not refute it. Whether
we are supporting a given state or opposing it, that state shapes our behaviour just
as we attempt to shape it. Looking at laws may contribute to our understanding of
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states, particularly established ones, where state-society dynamics have matured
due to a variety of factors such as war and socio-economic changes and their
effects on the political—the state or its laws. To understand how laws affect—or
whether they do—we need to examine them initially as effects of social
development before we look at them as causes. Laws like the institutions that
govern them are human devices.
Regarding public rituals and ceremonies and their relation to power we
need to be very cautious here, especially if our objective is to explain political
phenomena. Political statements with all the diplomatic parlance and symbolism
that guides them are theatrical and are aimed at a specific audience, at specific
times, and for specific objectives. The problem is that we overstretch or generalize
this symbolism and treat it as an end itself. Clifford Geertz observes that:
Court ceremonialism was the driving force of court
politics; and mass ritual was not a device to shore up the
state, but rather the state, even in its final gasp, was a
device for the enactment of mass ritual. Power served
pomp, not pomp power. (Geertz 1980, 13)
As we see in the paragraph above, Geertz is suggesting that power was intended to
serve public ritual. I do not intend here to discuss the 19th century Balinese state,
however, I aim to show that culture could explain power, but what we need to
examine are the conditions that preserve such cultural predominance, without
falling into synchronic understanding of political phenomena and taking culture or
material power a priori before looking at the evidence.
It is important to note first that although Geertz aims at understanding the
cultural foundations of the Balinese state, its “beliefs and values, for the most part
religious ones, which animated it, gave it direction, meaning, and form”, he also
looks at the socio-structural “arrangements, the political instruments, in terms of
which it attempted, with but intermittent success, to sustain such direction and
achieve such form” (Geertz 1975c, 331; emphasis added) and geographical
landscape , which sets up a “very intricate and unhomogenous field of geopolitical
forces whose action was anything but integrative.” In the Balinese state “it is not
possible to locate a genuine hegemony anywhere in this entire system” (Ibid., 22-
23).
Although Geertz examines the cultural foundations of the Balinese state, he
doesn’t believe that culture is power “something to which social events,
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beahaviors, institutions, or processes can be casually attributed; it is a context,
something within which they can be intelligibly—that is thickly—described”
(Geertz 1975b, 14; emphasis added). Culture is context as I shall elaborate below.
This, however, makes it hard to capture the relations between the cultural context
and political phenomena taking place within it. Namely, how do these cultural
components translate into political authority and hence leave effect on socio-
political dynamics. Speaking of Indonesia, Geertz notes “with so much meaning
lying scattered openly around it is nearly impossible to frame an argument relating
political events to one or another strain of it which is totally lacking in
plausibility”. What should be avoided is rushing to conclusions about such
relations rather we need to “trace out the sociological links between cultural
themes and political developments.” This is because, and based on Weber, ideas
need “to be carried by powerful social groups to have powerful social effects;
someone must revere them, celebrate theme, defend them, impose them” (1975e,
314).
Conclusion
In this chapter I examined theories of state survival showing how different
approaches emphasise structural, agential, material or cultural factors to account
for survival. Each of these approaches has contributed to our understanding of state
survival, the lack of dialogue between them however has constrained further
development of our understanding. Systemic forces are crucial—as I argue in this
thesis for the Middle East—to understand state survival. However, these systemic
forces can only be demarcated if we account their effect on domestic structures. It
is the interaction between these two realms that we need to focus on. The process
of state formation is at the core of understanding the interaction between these two
levels of analysis.
As with the domestic-international divide, material and cultural forces need
to be situated in the repertoire of political struggles. It is through this repertoire that
we are able to understand the effect of cultural and material forces on political
phenomenon. The following chapter will provide a model to examine the
interactions of these social spheres. The role of political entrepreneurs will be
highlighted in examining these interactions. The model will form the basis to
understand state formation and survival in the Middle East in general and the cases
of Saudi Arabia and Iraq in particular.
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Chapter Three
Historical Structuralism
Human beings cannot live and coexist except
through social organisations and cooperation
for the purpose of obtaining their food and
other necessities of life. When they have
organized, necessity requires that they deal
with each other and thus satisfy their needs.
Each one will stretch out their hand for
whatever he needs and try to simply take
it…the others in turn will try to prevent him
from taking it motivated by wrathfulness and
spite and the strong human reaction when
one’s own property is menaced. This causes
dissension.
—Ibn Khaldoun, The Mokadima
Men make their own history, but they do not
make it just as they please; they do not make
it under circumstances chosen by themselves,
but under circumstances found, given and
transmitted from the past. The tradition of all
dead generations weighs like a nightmare on
the brain of the living. And just when they
seem engaged in revolutionising themselves
and things, in creating something entirely
new, precisely in such epochs of
revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure
up the spirits of the past to the service and
borrow from the names, battle slogans and
costumes in order to present the new scene of
world history in this time-honoured disguise
and this borrowed language.
—Karl Marx, The Eighteenth
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte
Introduction
The theoretical framework presented here has two aims. First, it presents an approach I
name Historical Structuralism that will set the framework through which we can
examine the theme of state formation and collapse. Second, the model will provide the
necessary analytical tools to examine the conditions of state survival in the Middle East.
This part divides into two chapters. While this chapter will be heuristic in nature serving
to examine the ontology of the political world and the underlying structures that form it,
the following chapter will examine the ontology of the state in the Middle East and the
conditions of its formation and survival.
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The main components of the approach examined in this chapter and divided into
four sections include: (1) structures, (2) structures as social fields, (3) the constitution of
social fields, and (4) history of social fields. The complexity of the political world we
are dealing with stems from the interrelation between domestic, regional, and
international arenas of power, on the one hand, and interrelation of identities, interests,
and other institutions of power on the other hand.
I argue here that one way to examine the political world is to examine its
situation within structures. To understand these structures, we need to examine their
history, observe how they change over time and to specify the actors that constitute
them. Examining actors within structures informs us on their identities—its formation
and development—and their interaction with other actors. Debates among scholars on
agent versus structure and identity versus interest may not be useful if not situated
within particular concrete contexts and time frames. Put simply, without structures we
can neither understand an agent’s behaviour nor the identity and interest that this agent
may hold.
When we examine the ontology of the political world we look at “being, to what
is, to what exists.” The focus is on the nature of the political and social realities and
what exists there which we can gain knowledge of (Hay 2002, 62). Ontological question
about the political world include:
What is the polity made of? What are its constituents and how do
they hang together? What kinds of general principles govern its
functioning, and its change? Are they causal principles and, if so,
what is the nature of political causation? What drives political actors
and what mental capacities do they posses? Do individual
preferences and social institutions exist, and in what sense? Are (and
of) these things historically and culturally invariant universals, or are
they relative to context? (Hay 2002, 62)
It is these sorts of questions that will guide the analysis presented in this and the
following chapters. I start with structures.
3.1. Structures and the study of Politics
‘Structure’ as a concept has become an anathema in the social sciences in the last two
decades. Academic interest in identity and its role in shaping actors’ (free) behaviour
came against two postulates: materialism and structural determinism. Structuralism for
James Mahoney “generally downplays or rejects cultural and value-based explanations
of social phenomena” or “opposes approaches that explain social outcomes solely or
primarily in terms of psychological states, individual decision-making processes, or
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other individual-level characteristics” (2003, 151). We need, I argue here, to go beyond
this narrow definition of structures or structuralism and in so doing, we need to go
beyond this agent versus structures. To do this, an answer is required on two questions:
What is a structure? And second, do structures determine or condition agents’
behaviour? I start with some definitions.
A structure means a “context and refers to the setting within which social,
political, and economic events occur and acquire meaning” (Hay 2002, 94). This
definition has two main elements. The first involves the context or setting where social
events take place within a limited space, circumscribed in place and time. The second
refers to where events acquire meaning. The second assumes an interrelation between,
at least, two actors. Speaking of an event, implies further that somewhere else no such
event is taking place or took place. It is here, where such a social event acquires
meaning, a meaning that is comprehensible within that context and differentiated from
other contexts. When we talk about an ‘Asian Miracle’, for instance, we are referring to
a political economic development within particular contexts (territories) in particular
times. If this miracle took place in several countries, then the Asian event wouldn’t have
taken the meaning it has, it wouldn’t be a ‘miracle’.
Combined together, an interrelation, specific setting, and specific time, form a
distinct sphere of social activity, a social field, which requires both analytical and
empirical isolation to understand while comparing to other social fields, or other
interrelationships. Actors within a social field acquire meaning in terms of their
identities, interests, strategies or development that is different from what they would
outside a social field. This brings us closer to a Kenneth Waltz definition of a structure.
For him a structure “is akin to a field of forces in Physics where interactions within a
field have properties different from those they would have if they occurred outside of it
and as the field affects the objects, so the objects affect the field” (Waltz 1979, 73).
Let us provide a concrete example. Let us think of a communal group holding
similar identity but situated in different social fields, the Shiites of Lebanon versus the
Shiites of Saudi Arabia. Although holding similar sectarian identity, the interests,
strategies, and development of each of the groups vary widely. To understand variation,
we need to situate every group in its context. We need to focus on three dimensions: (1)
the Shiites, (2) their competitors, and (3) social field in which (1) and (2) interact and
are situated. Dimensions 1 and 2 inform us about the social actors concerned, meaning
the Shiites and their counterparts. Dimension 3 informs us on the interrelation between
67
the actors and the setting where this takes place. The social field (more on that below)
tells us further about the nature of the interrelation and the forms of interactions
between different actors; is it a balanced relation? Or who regulates the relation? These
three points are related and we cannot understand one with out looking at the other. As a
matter of research outcome, we might find that the Lebanese social field (dimension 3),
due to the multiplicity of power centres (dimensions 1 and 2) within it, provides more
opportunities for the Shiites as opposed to the Saudi and Wahhabi more centralised
regime (social field, dimension 3) in Saudi Arabia, which places limits on other actors
(dimensions 1 and 2), including the Shiites.
On a social level, we can think about relationships such as marriages. Any
marriage, similar to a social field, has three dimensions involving a man, a woman, and
the relation that governs them. The behaviour of a partner inside a relationship differs
from that of his/her behaviour outside marriage. At this stage, I am not examining what
determines this relationship but just considering structures as interrelations involving
the emergence of a higher level of interaction, such as a social field or a marriage,
which is not easily noticeable but requires exploration and theorisation. In marriages, as
partners interact they form the relationship that links them together. Just as their
interactions constitute the relationship, the relationship affects them. In social fields, as I
will elaborate below, this level is the political sphere.
Does the definitional analysis of structures presented so far direct us to any form
of determinism? In comparative politics culturalist and socio-economic explanations
seemed to look at existing normative and material structures to explain political
phenomena. Hence, for some Marxist versions the material structure of society
determines the political superstructure. Politics becomes the ‘epiphenomenon’ of
material structures. However, a quick look at concrete historical examples would show
the limits of such analysis. Antonio Gramsci, working within the Marxist school,
noticed a role of ‘hegemonic’ ideas held by state power holders that reproduce the
(material) structures (Gramsci 1971). Gramscian contribution served to include ideas as
important factors for analysis within Marxist discourse. This raises an interesting
theoretical question: if material structures determine the political superstructure, what
determines those material structures in the first place? Marxists’ answers might centre
on class struggle and its development. This however will lead us to unpack the concept
of class and to examine how class is politicised, for what reason, and in combination of
factors.
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The same question can be raised on treating the international political structure
as a mono-cause for state behaviour: what determines this international political
structure in the first place? The Waltzian definition of a structure deals with actors’
interactions and how this frames the relations among them and eventually conditioning,
though not determining, their behaviour (Waltz 1986, 334).
The point I wish to make here in regards to structures is that we examine
structures to understand the possibilities and limitations—the ‘Political Opportunity
Structure’ (Tilly 2006)—actors face whilst making choices. This returns us to Marx’s
illuminating point that “men make their own history, but not of their own free will; not
under circumstances they themselves have chosen” (1960, 115). The point that needs to
be stressed is that structures are not independent of agents; agents’ interactions form the
structure over time. Political phenomena can be comprehended when situated within
particular structures. In the context of International Relations theory, Constructivists
emphasise the role of change, particularly examining how structures not only constrain
actors behavious but how the relationship between agency and structure is ‘mutually
constituted’ (Wendt 1992).
3.2. Structures as Social Fields and the Arenas of Politics
To move, however, from the broad category of a ‘structure’, I will suggest examining
these structures as social fields. By doing this, I intend to move further into the inner
world of these social fields. This section will take us two steps in that direction. In the
first, I define a social field looking in particular at the ingredients of a social field.
Secondly, I map the political world into three social fields, or the major arenas where
politics takes place. This will contribute to the aim of examining domestic-international
interactions worldwide and, henceforth, the conditions of state survival in the Middle
East.
The concept of social field is commonly used in sociology and denotes the arena
on which social interaction is bounded and takes place. According to Neil Fligstein,
“fields refer to situations where organized groups of actors gather and frame their
actions vis-à-vis one another”. New institutional theories examine the origins, stability
and transformation of fields. Elias argues that “To understand social structures and
processes, it is never enough to study a single functional stratum within a social field.
To be really understood, these structures and processes demand a study of the
relationships between the different functional strata which bound together within a
social field” (2001, 108).
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I wish here for the sake of the approach needed to examine state formation to
provide a precise meaning of a social field. At this stage, the analysis is descriptive
that largely represents the political world we want to examine by both modelling the
whole and disaggregating it into different parts. The explanatory part is left to the
following chapter. Accordingly, to understand a social field we can divide it into four
main ingredients: (1) space, (2) social powers, (3) interaction among social powers
and (4) institutions.
Space By space, I simply mean a geographical territory separating a social field from
other social fields. Factors behind its separation involve the process of the formation
of this field, which I will examine in the theoretical framework below. It suffices here
to suggest that the space is where certain social events take place leaving (the most)
effect on the social field level and not affecting, or indirectly affecting, other social
fields. Therefore, we can talk (as of 1953) of South Korean space (social field) as
opposed to North Korean space. In each of these spaces, we had different social
interactions and, hence, different events and political trajectories.
Social Powers The second ingredient of a social field is the social powers or social
actors who through their interactions constitute the field. Social powers are social
actors that attempt to monopolise, reproduce, and consolidate power within a
particular social field largely to maintain an autonomy vis-à-vis other powers. In
reality, a social power could be a leader, tribe, political party, clan, ruling family,
monarchy, sectarian elite, or an economic social force. These forms of social powers
are represented by a minority, an elite, that seeks to articulate the interests of the
larger group by attempting to monopolise coercion, the means of financing coercion,
and ideas. This largely depends on how a social field is constituted (section 3).
Interaction of Social Powers The third ingredient of a social field is the
interrelation that takes place among these social powers. We begin to think about
social powers, as actors, to the extent that they relate to other social powers and that
this relation recurs over an extended period of time. The driving force for this
interrelation initially takes place when one social power seeks to dominate over
others. The point of interaction, or the point of engagement between different social
powers, establishes a new phase of integration and consequently a new sphere that
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structures the relation between these powers. In theory, before this initial engagement
takes place, each social power could be considered ‘autonomous’. This is very
important to understand later state autonomy and state capacity and to differentiate
between strong state as a totality and a strong regime in a weak state. That sphere of
relation becomes a point of contention among different social powers, who initially
attempt to construct institutions to monopolise power at this level.
Institutions The fourth ingredient here is institutions. The rise of a social power to
dominance requires the establishment of institutions that consolidate and expand this
dominance. Whether they are a tribute or tax extracting agencies, religious or
educational establishments, security apparatuses, or a court system, these institutions
in the beginning are driven by a need and interest vested in a social power, social
powers, or the interrelationship that governs them. These institutions are, as Douglas
North observes, “humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North
1990, 3). From the beginning, we realise that institutions are ‘intervening variables’
because they evolve from interactions among social powers. “The process of
institution building takes place in the context of powerful actors attempting to
produces rules of interaction to stabilize their situation vis-à-vis other powerful and
less powerful actors” (Flingstein 2003, 108).
By perceiving institutions as humanly devised, we are thinking about
institutions as intended and unintended outcomes resulting from interaction among
social powers. By intended, I mean institutions may be devised by a social power or
social powers to consolidate power, regulate power relations, or install constraints
against power monopoly. By unintended, I mean that interactions among social
powers may lead to the devise of institutions not initially sought or wished for by any
of the social powers, but evolve out of long-term interactions. The form, nature, and
the strength of institutions largely depend on the nature and history of interactions
among social powers.
The above provide us with the four ingredients of a social field. These,
however, don’t tell us why a space, and hence a social field, separates from others
spaces, why social powers seek to dominate, what are the nature and origins of social
powers behaviour or why institutions vary from one social field to another. In section
three below, we will examine other dimensions of a social field namely the
constitution of a social field, or the body that gives all these ingredients their
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dynamism. Before that, I move on to specify the three arenas of politics, I will treat
each of them as a social field following the characteristics specified here.
In examining state formation, particularly states that emerged in the
developing world that came late in time compared with older states, we are exposed to
a social field that is at once interrelated to two other social settings: regional social
setting and international social setting. In stating that politics takes place at three
major levels including the domestic, the regional, and the international, I am not
suggesting anything new. My claim, however, is to treat each of these levels as social
fields, following the description I am suggesting here, and to come up with general
relations that govern all these fields regardless on which level we are dealing. The
point I want to make here is that differences between these three social fields lie not in
the content but in the degree of each of the ingredients specified above; space, social
powers, interaction and institutions. This will be come clearer in the explanatory part
presented below. It suffices for now to extend the description to regional and
international social fields.
3.2.1. Regional Social Field
Social fields as I discussed them above constitute the domestic arenas of politics.
Within Political Science the examination of domestic politics has largely been limited
to the subfield of Comparative Politics (and ‘Area Studies’). This had great
advantages but also numerous limitations to political inquiry. Examining state
formation and survival cannot afford such division of labour between subfields as will
be shown below. Social fields belong to larger regional and international systems.
Regional social fields have similar ingredients to those defined above. For
Mohammed Ayoob a region includes “ a geographic proximity, regularity and
intensity of interaction between actors…internal and external recognition of a group
of states as distinctive area, and a size consisting of at least two and probably more
actors” (1995, 56). As is clear enough, geographic proximity, regularity of interaction,
and recognition fit well with the description of a social field provided above. In a
regional social field, states constitute the major social powers, while institutions vary
from one region to another. Considering states to be the major actors at a regional
level should by no means underestimate other non-state or global actors such mult-
national corporation, transnational movments—such as Al-Qaida—or international
institutions (UN) that shape and constrain states action. While the level of
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institutionalisation is high in the European Union for instance, institutionalisation
remains low in other regions of the world. Once again, I note that I will leave the
nature (cooperation versus conflict) of the interaction between actors and the degree
of institutionalisation among actors for now.
It suffices for now to suggest that just as social powers within a social field
interact and constitute the social field so do states in a regional social field. In varying
degrees, just as the regional social field affects the social fields within it, so do the
social fields affect the regional social field as whole. The rise of Nasser in 1950s
Egypt left its impact on the Middle East region as a whole. The same could be said in
regards to the ‘rise’ of China in Asia and the consequences this may have on Asian
regional security management. On a different scale, think of the American invasion of
Iraq (as a change in regional setting) and the consequences this caused for states like
Lebanon, Syria, Iran and Israel among others.
3.2.2. International Social Field
The third arena of politics is the international social field. It consists of a larger space
where states from different regions interact and institutions, such as the United
Nations, evolve to regulate inter-state relations. Although states remain the dominant
actors, we can observe, due to a higher level of regional integration, a community of
states, such as the European Union, emerging as social actors at an international level.
In content, the international social field is similar to other social fields, the
difference lies in the degree of each component. While within a domestic social field we
see higher levels of power monopolisation, at the international level no power came
close to form such monopoly. The multiplicity of social powers and diverse identities
and interests of these social powers on one hand, and the limited capabilities and
interests of a potential monopole on the other hand, have all historically acted as
constraints to domination. On a domestic social field, this reminds us of state constraints
or ‘capacity’ to ‘penetrate’ the peripheries in that social field (Migdal 1988).
Power centralisation domestically becomes an important dimension as opposed
to power decentralisation present at regional and international levels. The international
system particularly as theorised by Realists in the field of International Relations, is
anarchic and has three main characteristics. First, it is a ‘self-help’ system where states
(assumed here to be unitary actors) have to protect themselves because there is no
higher authority to protect them. Second, states are primarily driven by the need for self-
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preservation. Realism understands states to be rational and self-interested actors.
Thirdly, in striving to sustain their security, states are obliged to adapt to changes
(power shifts) in the system. This adaptation leads to the emergence of balance of
power. States balance against other threatening states to prevent the emergence of
hegemony; by doing so they reproduce anarchy in the system. The core of Waltz’s
theory of international politics is a structural distinction between these two realms of
power. The domestic structure is hierarchical where authority is centralised in
government institutions. While, “national politics is the realm of authority, of
administration and of law”, “international politics is the realm of power, of struggle and
of accommodation” (Waltz 1979, 111-3). As we shall see, this holds true to a certain
extent. His theory assumes that domestic structures of states are centralised and
hierarchical; however, this would be problematic for states at their early stages of
formation, where centralisation is continually constructed and reconstructed.
In terms of interaction of social powers, while the domestic social fields
involves intense and frequent interaction among major social powers and between
social powers and their dependents, the frequency and intensity of interaction at a
regional level is less frequent, even lesser at the international level. In all three cases,
however, the frequency and intensity of interaction largely depends on the degree of
economic and political integration taking place in each of the fields. Within a
domestic social field, social powers interact on a daily basis to manage the social
field; they hold parliamentary sessions, governmental meetings, they protest, strike, or
even kill each other depending on the degree of stateness existing in that social field
(more on that below).
What about institutions? Once again, institutions reflect the degree of
economic and political integration taking place in the social field. The multiplicity of
power centres at international and regional levels, the asymmetrical power relations
among them and the permanent quest for independence (sovereignty) provide
structural constraints for the operation of institutions. When these institutions exist,
they largely reflect the interests and fears of major powers. The structure and rules of
the Security Council of the United Nations provides a clear example. Nevertheless, as
I shall elaborate below, social fields have histories of their own. Social actors learn
over time from their interactions and, where possible, attempt to avoid previous
historical tragedies such as war by choosing to design institutions to govern their
relations.
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The above provides a generic mapping of the political world. It sets the ground
to do two contradictory exercises; first, to isolate each social field and treat it on its
own for analytical purposes and second, to provide explanations of the interactions of
the social fields. Further, arguing that social fields have general characteristics, which
differ in degree rather than content, should facilitate the applicability of this exercise.
As mentioned above, a social field includes a space, social powers, interaction of
social powers, and institutions. However, on what basis do these social powers interact?
What drives their behaviour? Is it the norms that actors hold or the material structure
they are embedded in? Is their behaviour determined or conditioned by these structures?
3.3. The Constitution of a Social Field and the Origins of
Political Behaviour
This sections aims to answer these questions. In the first part, I will describe the three
structures that form a social field which are its cultural, material, and political
structures. In the second part, I will tie these three structures together and examine the
relations that govern them. The objective behind dividing a social field into three
structures is not because these exist in reality but to facilitate analysis and to establish a
theoretical understanding. In other words, we want to understand the
conditions under which identity or class matter and the political implications that
entails. I start by the cultural structure of a social field.
3.3.1. Cultural Structures
Culture is a difficult topic to examine not because it is a mysterious phenomenon ‘out
there’ that requires explanation but rather because it involves different aspects including
languages, symbols, religions, identities, norms, values, or ethnicities. Naturally,
defining culture becomes a difficult task, similar to many other concepts in the social
sciences. Scholars define culture based on their research question often as an
independent variable that shapes political behaviour (Lane and Ersson 2005).
Accordingly, some examined culture as values (Huntington and Harrison 2000) or
norms (Katzenstein 1996) that shape human behaviour, or as system of meanings
(Chabal and Daloz 2006). In considering culture here, I don’t seek to examine it on its
own or to provide a ‘cultural approach’ to politics, rather, I wish to consider it within a
social field or, and more precisely, as constituting this social field.
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I intentionally link the concept of ‘structure’ with culture as I consider structure
to constitute the basic make-up of a social field, its cultural fabric. By culture I mean
“an environment….within which human behaviour follows a number of particular
courses” (Chabal and Daloz 2006, 21)8. The cultural fabric of a social field constitutes
its non-material ingredients, ingredients that shape social actors’ identities and interests
as they interact in social fields. The cultural fabric provides individuals and
communities with a meaning and justification for their behaviour. Nevertheless, why
not call it a religious system, identity structure, normative structure, or ethnic
composition? One reason has to do with keeping the analysis at this stage at an abstract
level for theoretical purposes. Second, the cultural structure I have in mind could
actually include all the above ingredients of a culture. Third, one cultural structure could
be the source of different political identities and interests. Let us provide a concrete
example.
What is the cultural structure of Turkey? In other words, what is its ethnic,
religious, or linguistic composition? In terms of religion, Turkey is Muslim country,
with other religious minorities. In its Muslim population, Turkey has several sects
including Sunnis, Allawites, or Ismaelies. Ethnically and linguistically, Turkey has a
Turkish majority, significant Kurdish minority, and small Arab and Armenian
communities. When Turkey formed as a state, this amalgam came to constitute the
cultural structure of the Turkish social field. This structure shaped state formation in
Turkey, the behaviour of different social actors within it, and its political dynamics.
Politics of secularism and nationalism in Turkey shaped and were shaped by the
existing cultural structure. While secularism addressed and sought to go beyond religion
(Islam), Turkish nationalism provided the political identity of the new state, generally at
the expense of other ethnic groups such as the Kurds. This same structure, however, is
the source of political Islam and (different) Kurdish political agendas involving calls for
autonomy, independence, or integration.
Chabal and Daloz consider culture to be “a constantly evolving setting” (Ibid.).
By proposing a cultural structure of a social field, however, I am thinking of a cultural
fabric that does not constantly evolve. Rather, I am considering a cultural structure that
evolves very slowly over time, which forms the foundation on which political
development and evolution take place. Two main reasons explain the slow progression
and impact of a cultural structure. First, a cultural structure cannot be easily refuted,
8 Authors of this work aim to contribute a “cultural approach”, I use their general definition to fit it within
the approach followed here, Historical Structuralism.
76
and, hence, overcome. Think of religion as one ingredient of a cultural structure. The
power of religions lies in their fluidity; religions do not provide a specific formula or
social agenda as, say, Marxism-Leninism. This fluidity acts as a basis for the permanent
interpretation and re-interpretation of religion throughout the centuries and hence
explains its survival. Interpretation, nevertheless, requires social actors who have certain
social or political intentions. This brings us to the second point.
Think this time of identity and ethnicity. The attempts to overcome ethnic
divisions—meaning the politicisation of ethnicity—in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, or
Iraq have actually led to their reproduction. As Yahya Sadowski argues, “individuals
make choices about their political identity, but not under circumstances of their own
choosing” (2002, 138). In attempting to survive in certain political contexts—social
fields—social actors promote, defy, manipulate, and interpret cultural structures and
hence reproduce them over time (more on that process below). With the weakening of
the universal idea (and political identity) of Communism or Baathism, new ideas
emerged to fill the gap. These ideas, however, do not come out of a void but from the
existing culture structure. Think on the other hand of a case in where one ethnic or
sectarian group rules over different groups. Think of Turkey once more. The more the
Turkish ruling elites promoted ‘Turkishness’ as a state identity the more the Kurdish
identity was (indirectly) being promoted and reproduced. Alternatively, think of
Lebanon. The more Lebanon’s ruling Maronites sought to preserve the state for their
‘own’, the more they have created a resistance in their own image consisting of
sectarian defiance that largely characterised Lebanese politics.
3.3.2. Material Structures
When discussing material structures I have in mind the socio-economic foundations of a
social field but also the climatic or geographic conditions unders which a socio-
economic system becomes possible. These foundations include the socio-economic
means through which people produce and exchange goods and services to ensure their
survival. Once again the socio-economic structure needs to be seen as the context
through which we can understand political behaviour. In human history, we had
different types of socio-economic systems ranging from household economy in where
people produced and consumed for subsistence purposes within a unit, such as a family
or a tribe, to the market economy, which acts as an institution for the exchange of goods
and services (Polanyi 2001, 40-65). Where surplus in goods was available, these were
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exchanged historically for other goods but later for silver, gold and money, hence going
beyond the household economy.
Different socio-economic systems such as tribal, mercantile, feudal or industrial
indicate the material foundation or the economic structure of a social field on which
politics can be analysed and comprehended. We talk about a structure as this provides
limits and opportunities for political actors operating within such structures. As we will
see when we examine the case of Saudi Arabia, desert climatic conditions and the
dispersion of oasis historically have limitied the appropriation of surplus on a grand
level and, hence, the emergence of centralised political power in Najd. For example, the
extent to which a material structure is agricultural largely depends on the percentage of
labour force engaged in farming. We begin to talk about an industrialising society to the
extent that there is a structural change taking place in the economy indicated by a
movement of labour, land, and capital from agriculture to industry. This structural
change generates new social forces such as labour or industrial syndicates, movements,
or political parties and hence affects the politics of the social field as a whole.
Historically, socio-economic systems did not function on their own independent
from the interests of social powers. Rather, different forms of coercion and
redistribution existed. Coercion meant that in agrarian economies lords coerced peasants
to farm their lands, while slavery was imposed on peasants in some case. Modern states
and (previously) city-states imposed taxes on people (Tilly 1990). With the rise of the
market as the major economic institution in industrialised economies, it began to coerce
producers and consumers to follow its logic of competition. Societies and major social
powers within them, however, continually resisted the self-regulating mechanism of the
existing socio-economic system by following different forms of economic
redistribution. The current welfare states are one example, but historically in countries
such as Egypt or China, leaders attempted to redistribute goods and made land
accessible for the community as they sought political survival, stability and social order.
Marxist analysis has centred on the concept of class and the dynamic of class
struggle; peasant-lord, worker-capitalist, etc.. The attention of this approach as we saw
earlier focuses on the material structures of society. Just as culture was examined as an
‘approach’, so was class by scholars attracted to a materialistic reading of the social
world. Like the state, class is a concept that requires not only a clear definition but also
(theoretical) assumptions on class behaviour. In other words, should we assume class, as
a social category, to behave as a unit in social struggles? What if a class is, as is the case
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usually, divided? Do members of a class necessarily identify themselves as such?
Against treating class as a unified actor some argue that “unified social classes and
wide-ranging social struggles for dominance—class struggles—have often been easier
to find in imaginative theorizing than in real societies” (Migdal 2001, 19). Nevertheless,
like treatments of culture, in examining class and class struggles the level of theorising
needs to go deeper. Theda Sckopol observes that class tension is “always present in
industrial societies but the political expression of class interests and conflicts is never
automatic or economically determined.” There is no rush to abandon class analysis;
rather she recommends that “the classical wisdom of Marxian political sociology must
be turned, if not on its head, then certainly on its side” (1985, 25; emphasis added).
Karl Marx distinguished between a class ‘in itself’ and a class ‘for itself’. This
distinction tells us that not only classes develop but that also there is an ideational
level—a ‘vanguard’—involved in making a class conscious of itself. This is to be found
initially in the intellectual level before it materialises in the political sphere: “it depends
on the capacities classes have for achieving consciousness, organisation, and
representation” (Ibid.). Once again, as with culture, we need to situate class within the
whole set of social relationships. To do this there is a level, which many schools have
identified as the ‘state’, and which I prefer to call here the political structure that ties,
manages, shapes and is shaped by other structures.
3.3.3. Political Structure
Where the cultural and material structures form the fabrics of a social field, the
foundation on which politics as a whole is based and determined, the political structure
acts as an emerging sphere. Social powers emerge from existing material and cultural
structures. The political structure forms the sphere where social powers meet; it
constitutes the sphere of political engagement. It is within this sphere that elements of
the cultural or material structures are politicised and are given political meaning. Social
powers always respond to existing material structures as they attempt to revise or
reproduce these structures. By doing so, they enter into political struggles with their
rivals forming a political-strategic level.
Dynamics within the political structure can be comprehended by situating them
within the whole social field. Commenting on the primacy of the political ‘realm’ in
security dimensions, Ayoob argues that “does not mean the political realm can or
should be totally insulated from other realms of human and social activity when it
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comes to dealing with security issues.” Rather “the political realm must be informed by
these other areas of human activity”. Other human activity must be “filtered through the
political realm and must be directly related to that realm” (1995, 8; emphasis added).
To be sure, political structures exist at different levels such as the interrelations
between different families within a tribe, tribes within tribal federation, or political
parties in democracy. The higher the level of socio-economic integration, the higher is
the level of politicisation between different social units. For the object of this study, I
talk about a political structure as the most general and highest sphere where conflict or
cooperation within it determines the politics of the whole of a specific social field.
In the political structure, social powers act as political entrepreneurs who
articulate ideologies, organise and mobilise populations for certain political ends.
Political entrepreneurs make three claims: identity, standing, and program. While
“identity claims asserts the presence of a substantial collective actor”, standing claims
avows that actor has a political weight and program that “calls for the objects to take an
action, adopt a policy, or otherwise commit themselves to change” (Tilly 2006, 32).
These claims in essence involve political questions: “what is always meant is that
interests in the distribution, maintenance, or transfer of power are decisive for
answering the questions” (Weber 1964). These claims may be a call by an ethnic group
to gain political recognition or a struggle by vulnerable or marginalized social class
seeking socio-economic rights.
These claims and the counterclaims they face form the nature of political
struggles in a social field. We begin to talk about a structure of a political sphere to the
extent that certain social actors within a social field continually relate and the relation
forms a structure that defines the opportunities and limitations of their behaviour. In the
Middle East, Sami Zubaida observes the emergence of a ‘political field’, where as a
result of European state implantation a “whole complex of models, vocabularies,
organisations and techniques [which] have established and animated”. This field
“developed with the modernist as well as the reactive struggles against patrimonial
states and the threats of foreign incursion and domination” (1989, 146).
This political structure and the conflicts taking place in its sphere act as the
foundation to the emergence of institutions that seek to regulate the relations among the
competing social powers. Institutions emerge as resolutions to underlying conflicts.
Institutions here act as another emerging level, which in its turn provide the means
through which policies are formulated and applied. Institutions both consolidate
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domination where this exists or reflect the underlying balance of power giving it formal
and public recognition. With institutions we reach the highest layer present in social
relationships. It is now time to bring all these structures together and to define the
relations that govern them. Below I provide a simplified model for the social field. The
model pyramidically positions different structures that form a social field.
FIGURE 3.1 THE SOCIAL FIELD
The above model represents different structures, which different schools
sought to emphasise in their analysis. While Marxists focused on material structures
and their role in shaping both domestic and international politics, cultural approaches
and the Constructivist school in IR emphasised the role of culture, norms, or religion
in shaping political actors behaviour. Constructivism in particular looked at how
actors—states or nations—“may build on the basic material of human nature, but they
take specific historicl, cultural, and political that are a product of human internation in
a social world” (Fierke 2007,168). Realists focused on the political level particularly
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at those horizontal relations among actors, usually states at the international level, and
the security dilemmas they face in conditions of anarchy. Finally, institutionalists
would examine the role of institutions in shaping political behaviour by setting certain
standards and norms on social actors. Debates within and among these schools—‘thin’
constructivism, realist Marxism, Gramscianism, social institutionalism—would see
these schools sharing more than they are ready to accept.
Below I will examine the relationship between these structures; I will
recapitulate some points made earlier and state the main argument:
 The political, cultural and material structures are analytically separable yet in
reality are interdependent structures.
 Political behaviour could be analysed and examined only within and in
response to these structures.
 The material and cultural structures (hereafter foundational structures)
determine the nature of politics as a whole, but do not cause individual
political behaviour.
 Substantive changes in the foundational structures generate changes in the
nature of the political within the social field.
 Foundational structures are latent (Mann 1993), meaning present and
potentially capable of becoming but not necessarily active or obvious.
 In their political struggles, social actors activate and de-activate (see
definitions below) foundational structures.
 Over time, the political sphere becomes an autonomous structure shaping
actors’ behaviour.
 Political struggles are resolved in the formation of institutions, which in turn
shape the nature of political struggle.
First, when we speak of a political world we assume the presence of conflict
involving domination and resistance to this domination. Domination establishes
inequality, which “is a relation between persons or sets of persons in which interaction
generates greater advantages for one than for another” (Tilly 2005, 104). This
inequality could be economic in nature situated at the material structure involving, for
example, a socio-economic system where a minority of feudal lords employ a
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majority of peasants in their lands and deprive them of basic rights. Or, an inequality
can be cultural, consisting of an ethnic group repressing another.
In both cases, the political sphere will involve attempts at managing the
reproduction of this inequality by the articulation identities, ideas, and ideologies.
This management involves the construction of institutions to make the reproduction
possible. These include coercive agencies to punish those who resist the domination
or cultural/religious institutions to reproduce existing ideas. So far, the analysis
centred on the ‘first round’, which might seem that material structure determine the
politics and institutions of a social field. Looking at the arrow on the right of the
pyramid, we realise that institutions and the political structure that support it begin to
reproduce certain economic and cultural relations in the foundational structures. Now,
the foundational structures become the dependent variable, meaning developments
within them are determined by the mechanism of reproduction. The statist literature,
attempting to go beyond certain Marxist interpretations, emphasises the relation
indicated in the movement from the state institutions to material structures (arrow on
the right of the figure). This is done, as we recall from Chapter One, by looking at
state capacity and autonomy (Evans et al. 1985). Nevertheless, state capacity and
autonomy cannot be isolated from the political and foundational structures. This is the
argument presented by critics of statist literature, particularly attempting to show the
limits of state power (Kohli et al. 1994). As I will show later, state autonomy
presumes political autonomy of a social actor in the political structure thus making
this possible at an institutional level.
Keeping this dynamic in mind, I argue that we cannot start an inquiry by
looking at one structure of a social field because anytime we examine a particular
structure we are in essence examining other structures. Social fields are social
configurations that are interdependent. The underlying assumption of examining a
social field is that structures and processes within them cannot be understood by
studying individual or actors rather, “they can only be comprehended in connection
with structure of relationships between people, and with the long-term changes in the
structure”. Should this entail the examination of every structure in society? “To
investigate the totality of a social field” Elias shows, “does not mean to study each
individual process within it. It means first of all to discover the basic structures which
give all the individual processes within this field their direction and their specific
stamp” (Elias 2000, 411; emphasis original). The basic structures here are the
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foundational structures, which give political actors their direction and provide a
framework of expectations.
The social field as sketched in Figure 4.1 above maps the political world
which we try to understand and explain. It provides a basic map of this political
world. Maps, as we know them, provide a synchronic picture of the world, which is
largely descriptive and static. However, mapping the political world cannot afford
such synchronicity. This is because any time we seek to map the political world; we
are implicitly assuming some sort of dynamism. We assume political change.
The material structure at the bottom layer forms the geographic and climatic
conditions of a country acting as a natural constraint/opportunity for human
interaction. As described above, the material structure is the socio-economic system,
which in its primitive state is largely dependent on climatic conditions, such as the
presence of river. In a social field, the material structure forms the common
denominator of the field regardless of whether it is culturally or politically
homogeneous. The material structure constitutes the first of the two foundational
structures.
The second foundational structure is the cultural, which I situate above the
material structure. This structure, as mentioned above, informs us on the cultural
composition of a social field. It tells us if a social field is culturally homogeneous or if
it is ethnically or religiously divided. I place the cultural structure over the material
because this structure constitutes a channelling layer between the material and
political structures. To give an example, in culturally heterogeneous social field socio-
economic inequalities are channelled or ‘filtered’ to the political structure through
political entrepreneurs. In culturally homogeneous social fields, socio-economic
interests are more likely to take an ideological dimension—Liberalism, Marxism,
Conservatism—as political leaders have no heterogeneous structures to activate.
The political structure I argued above emerges from existing foundational
structures, from political structures at a lower level of centralisation such as a tribal
polities, regions, family etc… . At this level we have political interaction taking place
between influential rivals competing for power. These interactions vary from
democratic struggles within an institutionalised and legal framework to bloody wars
taking place in a total anarchic context. This largely depends on where a social field is
situated in the process of state formation and deformation (more on that below). For
now, it suffices to mention that it is at the political where socio-economic and cultural
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inequalities are politicised and negotiated by social actors reflecting and representing
these inequalities. The politicising of socio-economic and cultural inequalities leaves
consequential effects on incumbent power holders creating a dynamic in a social field.
At the pinnacle of the pyramid institutions emerge largely reflecting power
struggles taking place at the political structure. As discussed above, institutions are
formed to consolidate or reproduce power relations. These institutions can be
designed by one powerful social actor or come as a result of interaction amongst
several. Institutions in turn become an independent variable in the process of power
consolidation and reproduction
The above provide us with a description of the social field. The question now
is: how is political power reproduced in social field? I start by specifying a generic
process applicable to a wide array of cases and which can be useful to understand
political reproduction. The process involves attempts of domination (D) by a social
force, forming an inequality (I), establishing the means of reproduction (R), and
generating resistance (R) from those effected by the inequality taking place. I will call
this process here DIRR.
Domination Inequality Reproduction Resistance
DIRR will serve as framework for us to understand and explain political
dynamics in processes of state formation and deformation. Examining DIRR as a
process would lead us away from taking particular structures (material foundation) or
variables (class or identity) to determine political behaviour within a social field.
To understand DIRR as a process we need to think of rounds of power,
represented by the arrows surrounding the pyramid in Figure 1 above. In an imagined
situation, a first round would involve a powerful social actor emerging from
foundational structures and bidding for domination over other competitors. Assuming
this actor succeeds in dominating he would then construct institutions that form the
instruments to consolidation power. These institutions create the basis on which
power—and inequality—is reproduced. What does this power reproduction involve?
It consists of the monopolisation of coercion, of a political idea, and the economic
means to reproduce the former two monopolies. On Figure 4.1, this reproduction
mechanism is represented in the arrow on the right of the pyramid. A quick
observation of many regimes in the developing world would find authoritarian
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leaders, families, or political parties monopolising these three forms of power. On the
state formation scale this reflects a higher stage of political centralisation going
beyond existing social and cultural institutions at lower levels of centralisation.
Domination and the inequality it establishes (broadly) divides politics between
those who want to maintain and others who want to revise the status quo. Revisionist
forces, who could be workers in search for better working conditions, industrialists
aiming at restructuring trade policy, or an ethnic community searching for cultural
recognition, begin to form resistance. These emerge from foundational structures and
politicise their economic or cultural interests and making new claims (see above)
challenging political incumbents in the political sphere. If these claims succeed, this
means that the political structure is able to accommodate emerging forces and this will
end up in the reconstruction of (state) institutions to reflect this change. A new form
of domination takes place with a new power balance emerging and creating its own
process of reproduction.
What happens if the claims fail? Theoretically there are two expectations,
either : (1) the political incumbent succeeds in reproducing its power monopoly, or (2)
this monopoly is challenged creating multiple centres of powers. This primarily
entails a multiplicity of coercion wielding organisations with different political ideas
and sources of economic means. An observation of the collapse of Yugoslavia in
1990, Lebanon in 1975, or Iraq in 2003 would show a collapse of regime leading to
the collapse of a state. In this situation, institutions at the top of the pyramid either
collapse or, under a multitude of pressure, become neutralised. The latter is a situation
where the political structure expands, while power devolves and decentralises.
Although the DIRR process is generic the forms and degree it takes vary from
one case to the other. Above I argued that the material and cultural structures
determine the nature of politics as a whole, but do not cause individual political
behaviour. In an agricultural socio-economic system, the material foundation would
foster, for example, two major social classes; landowning and peasant social forces.
The politicisation of these new interests affects the balance of political forces in a
given country.
Let us consider a more complicated picture of the political world by including
a cultural structure that is heterogeneous. What happens when a social field is
composed of a culturally diverse structure? Where, let us assume, different ethnic
groups compete for recognition and political power. Although we can assume that
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such a heterogeneous cultural structure would generate a politically heterogeneous
political structure, social actors, however, for ideological or political purposes can
resist structures. A social actor can articulate a political identity that is universal in
nature, such as Communism as in the case of Soviet Union, Islamism as in the case of
Saudi Arabia, or Arabism as in the case of Syria and Iraq. In all cases, however,
structures continue, as Waltz puts it, to “shape and shove” (1986, 343).
However, which foundational structure would we give priority to when in a
culturally heterogeneous social field? In a situation where we have a social actor
holding a universal ideology, we expect the cultural structure to be deactivated or
neutralised intentionally by the social actor. Nevertheless, in situations where a
universal ideology is lacking, where the political sphere reflects the cultural structure,
socio-economic interests are channelled through the cultural structures before they
become politicised. Identity overrides class. This is because each identity group
interprets socio-economic interests through cultural lenses. The weakening of the
Yugoslav centralised state was simultaneous with the rise of national identities for the
Croats, Slovenes, and other ethnic groups whilst challenging Serbian centralisation of
economic resources. However, how are identities activated and what role do political
entrepreneurs take in this activation?
I argued above that we need to theoretically treat these structures as latent.
This raises the question of who activates cultural structures, why and how. Just as a
social field comes together with an actor attempting to accumulate power and hence
forming a new social boundary, within social fields cultural boundaries exist. Social
boundaries “interrupt, divide, circumscribe, or segregate distributions of population or
activity within social fields” (Tilly 2005, 133). Initially, these boundaries are “sites of
differences” (Abbott 1995, 862),9 “as interaction intensifies between clusters of
previously unlinked or indirectly linked social sites, boundaries between them become
more salient” (Tilly 2005, 139). These boundaries are activated when “political
entrepreneurs draw together credible stories from available cultural materials,
similarly create we-they boundaries, activate both stories and boundaries as a function
of current political circumstances, and manoeuvre to suppress competing models”
(Ibid., 216). The activation of social boundaries forms path dependency making it
hard to reverse, as we shall see in the following section.
9 Abbott argues that social boundaries initially are not “boundaries of anything, but rather simple
locations of difference”, (868; italics original).
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Three implications arise from the above analysis. First, structures continue to
define the nature of politics within a social field as long as there is no substantive
change in these structures. By substantive change, I mean a structural change that
generates new social forces with the capability to alter existing power configurations.
In the material foundation this could be a process of industrialisation that fosters new
social forces such as a working and industrial class, whose collective action leaves an
effect on the nature of the political system (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Moore 1966).
A cultural substantive change may involve a shift in the demographic balance among
different identity groups or a politicisation of one group, which, in both cases, disrupts
power balances.
Second, and for research purposes, we need to differentiate between long-term
changes in foundational structures and short-term political interaction. When certain
structures define the general parameters of political action, social powers operate
within them and, by doing so, contribute to their reproduction. The higher the
intensity of political interaction, the more foundational structures are activated. These
may include attempts by political actors to extract resources from people to wage wars
or to arouse ethnic or sectarian feelings to counter-balance against rising threats. In
the short-term, political actors have power over the latent structures, however, certain
political interactions may lead to unanticipated consequences leading to change in
foundational structures. This brings us to the third point.
How do foundational structures change? Long-term changes in foundational
structures are caused by the short-term interactions of political actor. In seeking
political survival, social actors economically or culturally mobilise populations and
therefore alter their composition or identities. European state formation, discussed
below, reveals how short-time political interactions created foundational changes
causing political and economic shifts.
3.4. Social Fields: History, Memory, and Distinctive
Interactions
After having examined structures and social fields, it remains that we look at the
second element of this framework: History. The formation of boundaries—whether
these are social fields where states develop or other forms of social boundaries—sets a
historical path giving social dynamics taking place within it a distinctive form.
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History matters in several ways. First by ‘historical’ we mean situating political
phenomena in place and time (Pierson 2004). We do this by examining processes—“a
connected stream of causes and effects”(Tilly 2006b)—which inform us on the origins
of political phenomena—markets, states—and the conditions of its development (or
collapse). Second, we examine (contextually) history to see how events taking place
in one field influence and shape local practices in another field. Third, in historical
processes path dependency (see below) occurs where events taking place at one stage
shape and constrain future developments. Finally, once a process has started, it
acquires a symbolic meaning making it costly to reverse (Ibid.).
History matters in other ways. Social actors hold memories of their previous
struggles that shape their current strategies and political choices. I take historical
memory here to mean “the collective understanding that a specific group shares about
events in the past that it perceives to have shaped its current economic, social,
cultural, and political status and identity” (Davis 2005, 4). In the context of this
framework, historical memory can be found in the cultural structure of a society
defining and distinguishing one group from the other. This element provides cultural
ingredients for organised social forces (both state and state-like organisations) to
politicise. Davis calls this “a politically inscribed memory”, which “becomes an
important tool for political elites to enhance their legitimacy and control” (Ibid., 1-2).
Memories are preserved by social actors, who after several rounds of DIRR process,
learn from previous mistakes and avoid being trapped in previously experienced
interactions. As an example, we can think about ideological political movements who
rise in resistance to a particular regime. Think about Islamic movements. Limits on
political participation in the Arab world, leads many Islamic movements to resort to
violent resistance. The first encounter usually takes a bloody form. After several
interactions, however, these movements change their strategies becoming less
ideological, more strategic, and hence more structured in existing contexts. This can
be observed in Egypt, Turkey, Morocco, Lebanon or Algeria. Memories of previous
struggles challenge existing strategies and inform future ones. Islamic movements
learn from both the democratic experience of the AK party in Turkey but also from
Algeria’s long bloody war. These processes are interesting to observe, particularly to
see how political identities and ideologies are bent to accommodate structures within a
social field.
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On a different level, community groups observe different collective memories
of their particular histories. For example German, Italian, or French national groups in
Switzerland form different political identities from their counterparts in their
respective countries. On the same level, one can differentiate between Egypt’s
Christian minority’s political behaviour from that of Lebanon’s Christians minority.
While Egypt’s Christian’s were resisting domination and the status quo, Lebanon’s
Christian until 1990 were resisting a revision of the Lebanese political system. The
variance has been shaped by the social field in which they are situated and in their
position in the DIRR processes. In the case of Iraq, we shall see that strategies of
different communal groups in Iraq have largely been influenced by their historical
experience within Iraq and the Middle East region in general.
To understand the history of a social field, we need to introduce the concepts
of path-dependence and positive feedback. We speak of a ‘history’ of a social field to
the extent that developments taking place within this field are different from
developments taking place outside it. The emergence of a social field may be
considered as a ‘critical juncture’ that sets a path, which defines future choices by
individual actors within a social field. Path dependence maybe defined narrowly to
mean “that what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes
of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time” (William Sewell quoted in
Pierson 2000, 252). A broader definition is that “once a country or region has started
down a track, the costs of reversal are very high…the entrenchment of certain
institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice” (Margaret
Levi quoted in Ibid.).
For this study, I take this broad definition of path dependence. The emergence
of states in the Middle East has set a general path, as the following chapters will
argue, however, it is important to note that this generality requires auxiliary
explanations of subtypes—variation in trajectory of path dependence of different
states. One of the arguments presented below is that state resilience in the Middle East
is due to the structure of international state system, it is, as Levi’s quote above
suggests, “entrenchment of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy
reversal”. This is largely due to positive feedback that generates a path-dependence
trajectory (Pierson 2004, 21).
Further, this will tell us, and this is very important to advocates of cultural
determinism, that grand cultural explanations that take Islam or Arab Nationalism to
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explain politics in the Middle East have very weak ground to build on. Structural
constraints, imposed by states and processes within them, shape identities (and hence
political choices) and defy grand cultural explanations for the Middle East. When a
path is set in motion, status quo powers establish the “mechanism of reproduction
which carry and often amplify the effects of a critical juncture through time” (Collier
and Collier quoted in Ibid., 263; emphasis added).
Conclusion
This chapter aimed to examine the Historical Structuralism model suggested for this
thesis. I examined the concepts of ‘structure’ and its usefulness for the study of
politics and ‘social field’ including its composition and their internal dynamics. The
model provides a basis for studying the interaction of different structures (cultural,
material, and political) within a social field while demarcating the role of political
actors in responding, activating or deactivating these structures. Further, the model
suggested a generic dynamic—DIRR—that can provide a basis to examine the
ontology of the political world.
This generic model will act as a framework to examine processes of state
formation and collapse in the Middle East. It will set a range of theoretical expectations
that will contribute first to examine the conditions of state emergence, ontology, and
survival in the Middle East situating these processes in time and place in the following
chapter. With the following chapter, this model will provide us with the theoretical
lenses to examine the two case studies of Saudi Arabia and Iraq in chapters five and six.
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Chapter Four
The Middle East State:
Ontology, Formation and Survival
Boundaries come first, then entities….a
crucial property of entities is their ability to
originate social causation, to do social action.
—Andrew Abbott, Things of
Boundaries
When things happen within a sequence
affects how they happen.
—Charles Tilly, Big Structures,
Large Processes, Huge Comparisons
Introduction
As the major objective of this thesis is to define the conditions of state survival in the
Middle East, the following chapter, drawing on the theoretical framework examined
earlier, has four aims. In tune with the need to situate the state in the Middle East in
time and place, this chapter will in the first section examine the initial conditions of
state formation in the region by specifying the enabling conditions for this emergence
and how these would lay the basis to examine state development and survival.
To understand the peculiarity of the state in the Middle East, section two will
look at European state formation and examine how this shaped state making in the
Middle East. In section three, I will examine more closely the ontology of the state in
the Middle East and the dilemmas this state faces. In situating this state at the
crossroads of domestic-international arenas, I will provide an explanation of state
weakness in the Middle East. Finally, the fourth section will define the main variables
that would contribute to our understanding of state survival in the Middle East and
which will facilitate the examination of the empirical cases in subsequent chapters. I
start with the initial conditions of state formation
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4.1. Initial Conditions of State Formation: Theory and
History
Examining state survival requires the definition of the theoretical conditions that made
the initial emergence possible while keeping contact with history. Before I proceed, I
briefly define a state under late state formation to include two major characteristics.
Externally, this state came late in time relative to European states, which structure the
international state system. Internally, this state is at the early phases of formation, where
authority is in state of construction and reconstruction in ongoing rivalries between
different forces attempting to monopolise power.
Three enabling conditions had to be present for a state to emerge during late
formation: (1) Externality Neutralisation; (2) Boundary Drawing; and (3) Regime
Emergence. What we get is the following relation:
FIGURE 4.1. CONDITIONS OF STATE EMERGENCE IN LATE FORMATION
How do these conditions interact to form the basis for state development? The first
condition defines the external conditions for the rise of states. What does External
Neutralisation precisely mean? Before I answer this question, it is important to
emphasise that state emergence in the Middle East is due to two structural changes
affecting the region: collapse of the Ottoman Empire and European encroachment to the
Middle East. For local powers to emerge external effects had to be neutralized. We
realise that European expansion neutralised Ottoman power enabling the emergence of
‘autonomous’ power centres in the Middle East.
This neutralization can take two forms. On one extreme, we have external
indifference. This indifference largely reflects the disinterest of external power in the
geo-political position of a particular proto-state. For example, external indifference to
central Arabia in the eighteenth and early twentieth century made possible the rise of
Saudi power there. On the other extreme, we have external engineering of a state. In
this situation a potential state is of great geo-political importance for external powers,
who seek to construct its authority, define its territory, and (indirectly) manage its
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affairs. Here boundaries are imposed. The division of Syria and, as we shall see below,
the drawing of Iraqi borders are examples of external engineering. However, regardless
of these two factors the outcome of external neutralisation is maintained.
How does this work? To assume that external powers engineer a state as
outlined above, we need to theoretically presuppose that these external powers are
divided, or else why would they engineer a ‘state’ or a demarcated space and against
who? However, why would they engineer a state, why not rule it directly? In addition to
minimising costs, engineering a state (a ‘sphere of influence’) reveals a relatively weak
power leverage of an external power vis-à-vis its own competitors. We assume an
international anarchic system. Competition in that system precedes in time the
emergence of new states, while these struggles extend to other territories leading to the
drawing of boundaries. Had there been no competition among those states, had one
state established hegemony, there would be no interest to draw these borders. This is
what is meant by diffusion of the European state-system to the rest of the world, as
suggested by many scholars. This situation, however, is short of empire because the
external power has no direct rule but rules indirectly through local powers, as it
competes with other states. It is also short of a state, as understood in terms of
‘sovereignty’, since agreement between external powers on the distribution of ‘spheres
of influence’ amongst them limits the power of local actors.
This condition—external neutralisation—is in short the antithesis of the
preceding period of centralised Ottoman rule, which repressed any centrifugal in its
domain. Ottoman rule acted as a centre of gravity attracting power towards it. The
weakening of that centre and the emergence of other powers, however, meant that
dissenting forces radiate elsewhere. Examples include Mohammad Ali in Egypt, then
with minority groups in the empire’s periphery such as the Christians of Eastern Europe
and Greece, and then, with the further weakening of the empire, other parts of the
empire rebelled including Sheriff Hussein in Mecca, Saud in Najd, Maronites in Mount
Lebanon, and sheikhdoms of the Gulf. This structural change fostered a new mechanism
leading to the activation and de-activation of identities establishing new social
boundaries. Below, I will explain this mechanism in more detail. Further, as we shall
see later, these external conditions contribute to our understanding of state survival
during late formation. States emerging late in time live and survive on this external
neutralisation.
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The argument I want to advance here is that the anarchic state-system emerging
in Europe constituted the pre-condition for the emergence of state-system in the
developing world, including the Middle East. Accordingly, the history of the Middle
East cannot be isolated from the international history of this system. At the core of this
encounter is a clash between two forms of political organizations; consolidated states
versus loose forms of political organizations such as empires, tribal confederations, or
ethnically fragmented polities.
Understanding European state formation is useful here for several reasons. First,
European state formation could provide a template to contrast against the state in the
Middle East and to understand its peculiarity. The expansion of this system to the rest of
the world not only contributed to creating polities in its image, but also continues to
structure the development of these organisations. Second, dilemmas of early state
formation and development in Europe contribute to our understanding of problems
faced in late state formation. The difference, I will show, is not in the actual process but
in the different systems within which each state developed. In the European experience
states consolidated before the pressure for democratisation emerged. A major dilemma
for the state in the Middle East is that it faces two concomitant pressures of survival and
democracy simultaneously. Finally, in examining the origins of that system we can
understand its expansion to the rest of the world and how it created polities in its own
image.
4.2. Dynamics of European State formation and
Peculiarity of the State in the Middle East
How did a continent which hosted hundreds of kingdoms, princedoms and city-states
end up with tens of states? Why did the state as a political organisation triumph against
other forms of political organizations? (Mann 1986; Tilly 1990; Reinhardt 1996; Elias
2000; Bates 2001)
External blockage to European expansion to the east and the sea from the west
shifted the European struggle internally. As the external world was neutralized,
combined with demographic shifts and limited resources on the continent, competition
intensified. This competition took place among kings over territory and resources. In the
process populations were pacified and mobilised, territories demarcated, nationalist
fervour substituted for universal ideologies, and states incorporated in different phases
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dissenting socio-economic and political forces. Charles Tilly cogently explains this
process as follows:
Power holder’s pursuit of war involved them willy-nilly in the
extraction of resources for war making from the populations over
which they had control and in the promotion of capital accumulation
by those who could help borrow and buy. War making, extraction
and capital accumulation interacted to shape European state making.
Power holders did not undertake those three momentous activities
with the intention of creating national states—centralized,
differentiated, autonomous, extensive political organizations. Nor
did they ordinarily foresee that national states would emerge from
war making, extraction, and capital accumulation.
Instead, the people who controlled European states and states in the
making warred in order to check or overcome their competitors and
thus to enjoy the advantages of power within a secure or expanding
territory….it all began with the effort to monopolize the means of
violence within a delimited territory adjacent to a power’s holder’s
base (Tilly 1985, 172).
We realise from this excerpt some dilemmas of early state formation. Intentions
(agent) of power-hungry rulers drove them to maintain and expand power in
environments (structure) not of their choice. The limitations produced by these
environments constituted the unanticipated consequences, not initially planned by social
actors. The process starts with what Elias terms as the ‘Monopoly Mechanism’ a “free
competitive struggle” that “arises… when land and military opportunity are so evenly
distributed among several interdependent parties and that none of them has clearly the
best chance, the greatest social power” (Elias 2000, 303). Wolfgang Reinhardt observes
that “Rulers of states were but first among equals, among hundreds of competing and
more or less autonomous power-holders” (1996, 1) where power is “diffused” (Mann
1986, 8).
Competition over land and its produce created ‘private’ dominions, while this
contributed to the demarcation of territories and raised the need to secure them against
‘external’ aggressors. Robert Bates observes that the “growth of northwestern Europe
was…accompanied by the militarization of households” (2001, 54). Two monopolies
had to be established: coercion and taxation. “The financial resources thus flowing into
this central authority maintain its monopoly of military force, while this in turn
maintains the monopoly of taxation. Neither has in any sense precedence over the other;
they are two sides of the same monopoly” (Elias 2000, 268).
The social power monopolising these activities became a centripetal force. Then
centripetal force within a particular social field created a path-dependent trajectory and
attempts to resist this centripetal force reinforced it. Any venture to break this
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monopoly meant reconstructing it in one way or in another. This took two forms, either
resisting in attempts to capture it or to balance against it therefore creating power on its
own image: another monopoly. The establishment of this institution meant that “social
conflicts are not concerned with removing monopoly rule but only with the question of
who are to control it, from whom they are to be recruited and how the burdens and
benefits of the monopoly are to be distributed” (Ibid.)
The monopoly mechanism took centuries to materialise. Elias notes that in the
“ninth, tenth, and eleventh century it definitely did not yet exist.” “At first each warrior
who controlled a piece of land exerted all the functions of rule; these were then
gradually monopolized by a central ruler whose power was administered by specialists”
(Ibid.) Pacifying populations meant an end to anarchy in certain territories. Examples
include “general seizures of weapons at the end of rebellions, prohibitions of duels,
controls over the production of weapons, introduction of licensing for private arms,
restrictions on public displays of armed force” (Tilly 1990, 69). In England, for
example, the Tudors repressed private armies, co-opted aristocratic challenge, and
fought against the autonomies of English magnates.
Here we recognize the rise of two structures of power and, eventually, two
arenas of politics. First, we had horizontal struggles between different rulers in different
territories and second we had vertical struggles involving rulers and their dependents.
These form the seed of what we now term state-society and state-state relations. In the
beginning of the process, however, the lines between these two structures are vague.
The lines begin to become clearer the more that domestic power monopolise their rule,
this being always relative, which gives rise to an ‘international’ realm. The external
limits imposed on rulers for ‘external’ expansion reflected structural constraints dictated
by those rivals. Tilly substantiates this argument by reflecting how Louis XIII, the
seventeenth century French monarch, suppressed domestic autonomies to maintain his
monopoly, by observing that he “probably tore down more fortresses than he
constructed. But he built at the frontiers, and destroyed in the interior” (Ibid., 69;
emphasis added).
As we can see, any understanding of the state needs to place it at the crossroads
of domestic and international pressures. The peculiarity of the European state formation
process is that states were being formed concomitantly with the international structure
that governed their relations. States made the system and the system made states. Rulers
were at the intersection of four activities: (1) war-making with external rivals; (2) state
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making, struggling with ‘internal’ rivals; (3) protection, fighting and balancing against
rivals of their clients; and (4) extraction, acquiring the resources to carry out these
activities (Tilly 1985, 181).
Although these activities were generic, the degree to which each activity took
place varied. Tilly adds to Elias’ duopoly—coercion and taxation—the third important
factor: credit. Rulers had to borrow to wage wars. The strength of states depended on
the availability of such financial support. Robert Bates argues that, “specialists in the
use of violence needed revenues to fight their wars; and those who prevailed were those
who allied their political force with economic fortunes of the towns” (Bates 2001, 51).
One main transition took place with the shift from private mercenaries to
standing armies. Before the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, most armies within Europe
consisted of mercenaries recruited by power holders. Before that armies were seen as
economically costly and politically risky. This transition meant increased integration
within states and involved higher levels of institutionalisation. This both increased the
dependence of the ruler on his population and widened the scope of the state. States had
to adjudicate, (re-) distribute, and produce goods. Through adjudication states sought to
settle disputes among the populace in its own territory. In distribution, states played an
important role in the economy in the allocation of goods and services to different social
classes. Finally, through bureaucratic powers of taxing and the imposing of tariffs,
states affected the production of goods and services and trade (Tilly 1990, 97).
Institutions began to take a public dimension. Popular resistance to conscription
and taxation obliged rulers to bargain with, co-opt, or coerce their populations, who in
turn sought to extract rights from their rulers. Institutions here ceased to be the private
domain of rulers. One implication of great importance for this study is to perceive the
process of state formation as a transformation from the private monopoly rule of one or
more individuals in a loosely structured polity to a public monopoly in highly integrated
and structured polity. This, as we shall see below, is important to situate the Middle
East state along a continuum reflecting this transition. Norbert Elias succinctly
describes this complicated and multidimensional process as following:
The more people are made dependent by the monopoly mechanism,
the greater becomes the power of the dependent, not only
individually but also collectively, in relation to the one or more
monopolists. ..Whether it is a question of land, soldiers or money in
any form, the more that is accumulated by an individual, the less
easily can it be supervised by this individual, and the more surely he
becomes by his very monopoly dependent on increasing numbers of
others, the more he becomes dependent on his dependents. .The
privately owned monopoly in the hands of a single individual or
family comes under the control of broader social strata, and
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transforms itself as the central organ of a state into a public
monopoly.( Elias 2000, 207-1; emphasis added).
It is here that Max Weber’s definition (see Chapter One) becomes perceptible.
Moreover, it is only here that Kenneth Waltz’s understanding of international political
structure becomes possible. This historical presentation gives Weber’s ideal state and
Waltz’s parsimonious theory historical substance. Struggles taking place ‘domestically’
began to shape the nature of the international system: “The very logic by which a local
lord extended or defended the perimeter within which he monopolized the means of
violence, and thereby increased his return from tribute, continued on a larger scale into
the logic of war. Only the establishment of large perimeters of control within which
great lords had checked their rivals sharpened the line between internal and external”
(1985, 185). Lecturing more than a century ago, Otto Hintze observed that the method
to study the state should centre on two pillars: the social structure of that state and the
state system in which a state is embedded (Gilbert 1975, 183).
How did the expansion of this system affect territories outside Europe? This
system, as mentioned above, encountered different forms of political organisations. In
Africa, the imposition of arbitrary borders by colonial powers divided the continent into
different spheres controlled by European powers (Clapham 1996; Jackson 1993). In the
Balkans and the Middle East, states emerged in different proportions with the
weakening and the eventual collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Hourani 1991). “The
Ottoman system was the antithesis of the European nation-state system” (Hinnebusch
2003, 15).
Scholars have debated the extent to which European experience in state
formation can be generalised to explain processes in the developing world. Thierry
Gongora, for example, examines state expenditure on war in the Middle East to test
state power there (1993). Jeffrey Herbst observes that states in Africa are “developing
in a fundamentally different new environment.” He notes “lessons drawn from the case
of Europe show that war is an important cause of state formation that is missing in
Africa today” (Herbst 1990, 117-9). Steven Heydemann, on the other hand, doubts the
idea that European experience could automatically be generalised to the Middle East,
observes a weak correlation between war-making and state formation in the region
because “in the Middle East as in other developing regions, war making has been
indirect, mediated, and deeply transnationalised”. He further notes that the drawing of
borders by colonial powers in the Middle East “is far removed from the dynamic that
link war making and state formation in early modern Europe” (Heydemen 2000, 9-10).
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As we saw above, the formation of the state in Europe formed concomitantly
with the environment (structure of European international politics) in which it was
embedded leaving its effect on state development there. In the Middle East, I will
elaborate below, the environment and rules of the games were defined before the states
emerged. It is this structural difference that makes state formation in the developing
world (the Middle East included) peculiar. Heydemann notes Tilly’s warning about the
difficulty of generalising European experience to the contemporary developing world
for he argues that “our ability to infer the probable events and sequences in
contemporary states from informed reading of European history is close to nil” (Tilly
quoted in ibid., 4). Tilly, however, was aware of this divergence between the two state
formation trajectories arguing that “the later the state making experience…the less
likely the sorts of internal processes…are to provide an adequate explanation of the
formation, survival or growth of a state” (Tilly 1975b, 46; see also Ayoob 1995).
The Middle Eastern state was born in an international structure not of its own
choosing, while competition between European rulers, as we saw above, actually
produced (constituted) their system, that of the Middle East was constituted externally.
In the Middle East the international system structured the development of the state there
and defined the possible responses to that structure. Next, I want to examine more
closely these emerging polities, their dynamics, and responses to systemic forces.
4.3. State Ontology in the Middle East: Explaining State
Weakness
Situating the Middle East state in time and place requires emphasising two points.
First, what emerged in the Middle East with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire is not
a state, meaning strong, legitimate, sovereign, and demarcated entity but social fields
on which states can form or deform. Boundaries were drawn before (national) states
emerged as legitimate entities (Anderson 2004). Second, the state formation process
needs to take two principles into consideration; first this came late in time to the
international state system and second this state is at the early stage of its formation
(Saouli 2006). Mohammad Ayoob maintains that security dilemmas in the developing
world involve “the early stage of state making and in which Third world states find
themselves, and their late entry into the system of states in which they form the weak,
intruder majority” (1995, 4).
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The establishment of these boundaries created a ‘critical juncture’—“persistent
paths of political development” (Pierson 2004, 51)—taking place within social fields.
This critical juncture was amplified by international state system, which made it
possible in the first place, and by social powers attempting to preserve their domain.
Political dynamics and accompanying ideologies in the Middle East since the
emergence of the state system reflect attempts to either maintain the system or to
reverse this process. How is a critical juncture amplified?
In the beginning we need to think of an Exogenous Shock (ES). In the Middle
East, this is Ottoman weakening and European expansion. This shock establishes a
New Political Structure (NPS) that sets a new ‘range of expectations’. An NPS is a
political context that emerges out of, and disrupts, previous political structures and
existing mechanisms of reproduction: “the transformation of fields is possible when
current arrangements start to break down” (Fligstein 2001, 109). In reaction to the
new political structure we get Endogenous Responses (ER). Would-be political
actors’ reactions’ to new political structures largely reflect their power position in
previous political structures.
Exogenous Shock New Political Structure Endogenous Responses
The stages in the process laid out above are not neatly separated from one
another. First, what makes the initial exogenous shock possible is the internal fertile
ground that gives the shock its effect. Within the Ottoman Empire, local rulers who
have for centuries attempted to increase their autonomous power vis-à-vis the
Ottoman power saw the weakening of the centre as an opportunity to gain this
autonomy. The new opportunities arise with the emergence of European powers with
the ability to neutralise the Ottomans. In other cases, rulers, in search of political
survival, shift alliance. Ottoman rulers and their allies, nevertheless, read the situation
differently. For them the new structure, should it succeed, would limit if not end their
political power. For example, as we shall see below, civil conflicts between Ibn Saud
and Al Rasheed in Najd, reflect this logic stated here. While Saud, in alliance with the
British, sought to disrupt Ottoman power in Najd, Al Rasheed, allied with the
Ottomans, sought to preserve it.
The first three stages (ES- NPS-ER) overlap. As revisionist local rulers receive
signals of potential political changes taking place in their context, they begin a process
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of political adaptation to a new structure. By political adaptation I mean would-be
political leaders begin to politically reposition themselves to new contexts. This takes
different forms including the mobilising of forces, activating certain identities (see
above), or by building new alliances. Under such conditions, structures lose their
latency. Political adaptation through endogenous responses reinforces the initial
exogenous act. In concrete historical terms this meant that the more local rulers
attempt to politically adapt, for example by revolting against the Ottoman ruler, the
more European encroachment was possible. Studies emphasising external designs (Al-
Najafi 2007; al-Bushra 2004) usually underestimate the importance of endogenous
responses missing important domestic dynamics, which are treated as passive, and
which are crucial to understand state formation (see Brown 1984).
This political mechanism not only created new social fields in the Middle East,
where new and eventually distinctive interactions may take place, but it also left its
effect on the cultural structure in the Middle East. The idea that kept the Ottoman
Empire intact was that this empire had Islam, which represented the bulk of ottoman
population, as its formal value system. With the collapse of the Ottoman system, new
identities were activated. These include, but are not limited to, Arab, Armenian,
Greek, Kurdish, Syrian, Lebanese, and Turkish identities. With the emergence of
social fields, activated identities began to be expressed within and, as in the case of
Arab nationalism, across social fields. Arabism shaped political behaviour particularly
as it constituted the source of legitimacy for Arab rulers (Barnett 1995). However, less
than a century after the emergence of states in Arab territories, Arabism is beginning
to erode under the twin pressures of state identity and, more specific, sectarian
identities. In examining the cases of Saudi Arabia and Iraq below we will explore how
rulers activate and de-activate identities.
The political mechanism discussed here can be used at smaller scale to
understand state deformation in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, or Somalia. In
all of these cases, external shock directly or indirectly formed new political structures
leading to endogenous (usually contradictory) responses. The external shock in Iraq
led to the collapse of the Baathist regime was reinforced with Iraqi elites, especially
Kurdish and Shiites, seeing this as an opportunity to overthrow the regime there.
Nevertheless, other Iraqi and external actors saw this as a threat and began to resist
U.S. designs. The US invasion of Iraq created a potential for new political structure
creating different endogenous responses in Lebanon, Palestine or Syria. The
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difference between what is happening now and what happened with the Ottoman
Empire is that the external shock is taking place in specific states. The political
mechanism persists however.
Nevertheless, why are these states after many decades of formation prone to
external shocks? One main reason is that these states are in their early phase of
formation and second this process regresses as much as it progresses. Before I
elaborate on this answer, it is important to situate these states on state a formation
continuum. This will help us understand the ontology of the state during late
formation. Figure 5.2 below maps this process.
Power/Coercion
Dispersed
Power Disequilibrium Power/Coercion
institutionalised
State
Formation
State
Deformation
FIGURE 4.2. STATE FORMATION CONTINUUM
The figure above attempts to describe the process of state formation and deformation.
Starting on the left side of the arrow, we have a social field where power dispersed,
where numerous power holders—tribes, princedoms, war lords—are each in a state of
political autonomy. A direct derivative of this situation is that conflict arises between
different social powers within these social fields to form a hierarchy, namely to begin
the process of internal interdependence and external independence. At this phase, we
have power equilibrium. As one social power begins to dominate over others—
moving rightwards in the figure above—a change begins to take place at the political
level. A centre of gravity begins to emerge in a social field when one social power
initiates an attempt for dominance—the monopoly mechanism. A complimentary
strategy is to articulate an ideology, usually existing within the foundational cultural
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structure, to legitimise this power monopoly. This forms the seeds for the emergence
of ‘public’ institutions challenging other local institutions.
As we move rightwards in the figure above, what emerges is a political
organisation—a regime—holding relative power in relation to other organisations.
Therefore, what emerges is not a public organisation but an organisation driven by a
private social power. As Joel Migdal puts it this organisation sustains the ‘image’ of a
“dominant, integrated, autonomous” entity (Chapter One). The capacity of this regime
is determined by the strength of its competitors within a social field; the stronger other
organisations, the weaker the regime’s capacity. Power struggles foster security
dilemmas for the ruling social power. To combat its enemies, the state attempts to
pacify and coerce the population in its own territories. This becomes possible as this
new social organisation monopolises coercion and extracts taxes. In the case of the
Middle East, external rent could come from the international state system (Heydeman
2001).
Finally, at right end of the continuum, we have the category of ‘Strong States’.
Let me be clear about state strength. Scholars measure state strength by examining
state extractive abilities or to achieve its declared objectives, especially in economic
development. State capacity involves “the ability of state leaders to use the agencies
of the state to get people in the society to do what they want them to do”(Migdal
1988, xiii). For this study, I take state strength to indicate the extent to which state
institutions are able to incorporate different social power in state institutions. The
factor to be examined in this case is not capacity but incorporation. The process of
incorporation involves a transition from an authoritarian state organisation driven by
one or more social powers to a democratic institution rising above all social powers in
a social field. The question is to what extent is a state representative and legitimate in
the eyes of its constituents. State strength accordingly relates to the state as a regime
of power and territorial entity.
In studying states as a ‘process’ we need to demarcate three phases, which also
represent different population of cases. A ‘no state’ population of cases would see
some states (Lebanon, Yemen, Somalia or Iraq) moving in that direction during
certain periods in their respective histories. By indicating a no state situation I mean
that existing states deform when other state-like organisations challenge existing
regimes monopoly on coercion and sources of legitimacy. What we have here are
“competing locations of authority; these are usually weaker than the state in terms of
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coercive capacity but equal to or stronger than the state in terms of political legitimacy
in the view of large segments of the states’ population” (Ayoob 1995, 4).
A ‘weak state’ situation, located on the centre of the graph is where a regime
accumulates more power vis-à-vis other social organisations (parties, tribes) and is
able to attract power to itself. However, rivals continue to pose threat to the existing
regime. This state is weak as it is vulnerable for deformation, a movement to the left
of the figure above. Furthermore, it is vulnerable to external penetration. The extent of
regime capacity varies from one case to another. While Saudi Arabia has strong
regime capacity, the Lebanese counterpart is weaker. Other cases of strong capacity
include Morocco, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Iran, or Tunisia. The regimes have the
capacity to coerce their population through, primarily, the monopolisation of coercion
and to articulate identities to consolidate power.
Finally, a ‘strong state’ population of cases sees institutions providing the legal
foundation to incorporate different social powers. These institutions and laws define
the opportunities and limitation for political actors. Political participation here is open
for all actors and political power circulates among different political actors regularly
through elections. With the exception of Israel, the Middle East provides no cases that
fit this category. Turkey can be situated somewhere in the middle between the centre
and the right end of the figure as it has multiparty democracy, while the army
continues to structure politics there.
The figure above is descriptive, however, and does not tell us why a certain
state is on one point of the graph or how it reached there. To understand why the state
in the Middle East is on these points, we need to examine some dilemmas of late state
formation that these states face. By referring to the factor of political incorporation, I
want to argue that there is a relation between state weakness, external penetration and
state survival in the region. Examining why these states are weak will leave us one
step away from defining the conditions of state survival, which I will look at in the
final section of this section. The starting point to understand state weakness in the
Middle East and its vulnerability to reformation is to return to the argument presented
earlier. Social boundaries, I argued, emerged in the Middle East because of Ottoman
collapse and competitive European expansion. In understanding the state in the
Middle East, we need to treat European and later international penetration as a given.
The region’s geographical position between east and west was crucial for trade routes
(especially Suez Canal), and the vast oil reserves constitute important factors to
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account for the region’s vulnerability (Halliday 2005; Hinnebusch 2003; Brown
1984).
The division of the region in the post-Ottoman period into different spheres of
influence, as in the case of Sykes-Picot Agreement, may constitute the first round of
British and French attempts for domination in the region. Attempts to reproduce the
system took place in building of state institutions in these social fields, usually by
British and French local allies. This however initiated different domestic responses.
Ruling elites sought to preserve the status quo while their domestic adversaries sought
to reverse it. Similar to mechanisms during Ottoman rule, domestic oppositions began
to support the adversary of their mandate power. In Egypt for instance the National
Party supported France against Britain, while in Yemen opposition to the Imamate
sought British support (al-Bushra 2004, 7). Resistance to the system became rife during
World War II and later with the emergence of two new super powers in the Middle East.
The coming of revisionist powers starting in Egypt but later in Syria, Yemen,
Algeria, or Tunisia sought to reverse socio-economic and political conditions
reproduced by colonial and domestic powers. Emerging state elites attempted to
increase their power autonomy by building states to weaken their internal opponents—
‘reactionary’ forces—and to increase their independence vis-à-vis outside powers.10
This was facilitated with emergence of a new international order centring on the Soviet
Union and United States, which left its effect on the Middle East region. Most
revisionist powers came from the military, which was the most powerful institution in
the new states and which was infiltrated by officers coming from poor social
backgrounds and driven by leftist and Arab Nationalist ideologies. The coming to power
of those revisionist regimes left its impact on the Middle East regional order, weakening
British and French influence there. For example, the political union between Egypt and
Syria in 1958, coming two years after the tripartite war, of which Nasser emerged
triumphant disrupted British-French order established after WWI.
The intensification of regional and international power struggles exposed the
vulnerability of the Middle East region and the state there. External penetration is a
form of domination in where external states attempt to influence developments taking
place in other domestic and regional social fields. Here we need to think of crises
spilling over “from other fields or by the invasion of groups into a particular field”
(Fligstein 2001, 109). The weakness of these states emanates from the process of state
10 Most of these regimes sought economic development involving land reforms, industrialisation, and
import-substitution trade policies.
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formation where, as mentioned above, in its early phases there exists a multiplicity of
state-like organisations struggling to monopolise power there creating a situation of
insecurity.
For consolidated states security means protecting the state from external threats.
As for late forming states, “the sense of insecurity from which these states suffer
emanates largely from within their boundaries rather than from outside” (Ayoob 1995,
7). For this study security/insecurity relates to:
Security of the state—in terms of territory and institutions—and to
the security of those who profess to represent the state territorially
and institutionally. In others words, security-insecurity is defined in
relation to vulnerabilities—both internal and external—that threaten
or have the potential to bring down or weaken state structures, both
territorial and institutional, and governing regimes. (Ibid., 9)
We realise that Ayoob’s definition differentiates between regime and state (see
Chapter One for definitions). This differentiation is very important and both
theoretically and empirically telling. The existence of a social field—i.e. states in-
formation—that hosts competing power sites—potential regimes—with different
sources of legitimacy provides the basis on which external penetration becomes
possible. I argue here that there is an inverse relationship between regime strength and
state weakness during late formation. External penetration increases the security
dilemma of rulers who resort to authoritarian forms of power, which in turn weakens the
state in terms of political incorporation sustaining the initial cycle of external
penetration. This constitutes a major dilemma facing late forming states. What we get
is the following dynamic:
External Penetration
Insecurity
Authoritarian Power
Weak State
FIGURE 4.3. STATE WEAKNESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
107
How does external penetration take place? In the process of domination, external
powers ally with one (or more) domestic power at the expense of others within a social
field. The monopoly mechanism becomes part of regional power balance. The higher
the level of insecurity the more the ruling power becomes authoritarian by repressing its
adversaries and the more the state weakens by intensifying opposition or eroding regime
legitimacy. State weakness on the other hand facilitates external penetration. We find a
relation between the level of democratisation, state weakness, and external penetration.
Attempts for political centralisation generate “resistance to state designs by
unassimilating minorities or vulnerable peasants and workers clinging for security to
tried and true folkways” (Migdal 1988, 14). In their turn ruling elites perceived these
vulnerable groups and their opponents as subversive.
To elaborate on this logic we need to examine domestic dynamics of state
formation and how these states respond to systemic forces. The main dilemma facing
the state in the Middle East is the concomitant need to legitimise itself largely through
the process of democratisation on the one hand, and to survive as a regime of power and
territorial entity on the other. Hence, while European states established borders and state
institutions before the democratisation process, in the Middle East, the two pressures are
concurrent. Stein Rokkan notes that “What is important is that the Western nation-states
were given a chance to solve some of the worst problems of state-building before they
had to face the ordeal of mass politics” (quoted in Ibid., 30).
At the early stages of state formation, social powers face a dilemma. Social
powers face a dilemma of having a strong power hold in a weak social field (polity) or a
weak power hold in a strong social field. This dilemma strikes both types of status quo
and revisionist social powers. By distributing power among competing social powers
through the building of democratic institutions, dominating social powers risk loosing
their own power base. On the other hand, by maintaining their own strong hold by
repressing their competitors they weaken the social field. The presence of a strong
social power moves the social field one step away from anarchy (movement to the right
in Figure 4.2), but that does not constitute an advanced step in state formation.
Samuel Huntington captured this reality in examining modernisation. In an
attempt to situate the limited choices faced by monarchs between modernisation
(‘success’) and tradition (‘survival’). He observes that:
On the one hand, centralization of power in the monarch was
necessary to promote social, cultural, and economic reform. On the
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other hand, this centralisation made difficult or impossible the
expansion of the power of the traditional polity and the assimilation
into it of the new groups produced by modernization. The
participation of these groups in politics seemingly could come only
at the price of the monarchy… Can he [the king] escape the dilemma
of success vs. survival? (1968, 177)
This dilemma was not limited to monarchs, however it has also struck
revisionist powers who intended to mobilise their populations for political and
economic reform. Raymond Hinnebusch makes the point that Syrian domestic
revisionists at an advanced stage began to pursue a “path of convergence” in both
policy and structure with the traditional monarchy of Saudi Arabia. (Hinnebusch
2003, 124-129). The point here is that when reforming social powers seek to
reconstruct a social field to their own advantage they face structures not of their own
choosing. As they ‘socialise’ with these structures they begin to face limitations on
their reforming agenda driving them into a security dilemma with their competitors:
“Assad put revolution on hold to concentrate on the recovery of Syria’s occupied
territory and containment of the Israeli threat through military build-up…Assad, as
well as Nasser, was ready to bury the ideological cold war with the traditional
monarchies” (Ibid., 126). An examination of the Syrian case would find Assad’s rule
as following an internal realist strategy too, largely balancing between an Allawite-
dominated security apparatuses, with a secular Baathist party, and a cooptation of the
Sunnite Damascene bourgeois (Seale 1988). These acts consolidated the regime but
weakened the Syrian state. External attempts to isolate the regime saw opposition to
the regime activated, with the regime becoming authoritarian.
In the process of power consolidation rulers—just as states in the international
structure—socialise in structures not of their own choosing. Under circumstances of
domestic and external insecurity, regimes intensify their grip on power limiting it to a
narrow circle (political contraction, see below). The initial attempts to establish a state
with strong capacity to transform societies leads regimes to establish organs such as
political parties, security agencies, or economic councils. These attempts are driven by
(private) social power such as a military junta, a tribe, or the political elite of
particular a sect. A regime will rely on its entourage to lead these organs. Whether it’s
South Korea’s or Egypt’s military junta, Saudi family, or Baathist Syria or Iraq,
institutions in each of these states came to reflect the social power that designed and
managed them.
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Transforming societies, nevertheless, requires social mobilising organisations.
One example is the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, whose politburo constituted
the major policy making committee in the Soviet Union. In Nasser’s Egypt, the Arab
Socialist Union constituted a similar organisation. Institutions involve a set of norms,
rules, and procedures and go beyond individuals. In a quest for survival leaders may
undermine these institutions. Nasser’s fear of what he called ‘power centres’ within
his regime weakened the institutions he built. John Waterbury describes Nasser’s
dilemma as the following:
For two years Nasser laid aside his fears and hesitation and tried to
make the ASU an instrument that could promote his increasingly
radical goals. He seemed genuinely to want to reach out to new,
underprivileged constituencies to sustain the socialist transformation.
At the same time he knew that if the ASU became such an
instrument it could be turned against him. (Quoted in Migdal 1988,
201)
Nasser’s security fears were part of Egypt’s regional security dilemmas.
Nasser wasn’t only a revisionist within Egypt fighting against the monarchy,
landlords, and other political communist and Islamic movements, but also a
revisionist at the regional level. Analysing Nasser’s external strategy, Stephen Walt
observe that attempts to preserve “his own leadership of the Arab revolution, whether
through formal unity or other mechanisms, became the cardinal principle of Nasser’s
foreign policy” (1987, 53). In his attempts to weaken his internal opponents he was in
essence providing his external opponents with strong ground to penetrate Egypt. This
dilemma wasn’t limited to Nasser only. All states in the Middle East faced, and
continue to face, this dilemma. As Nasser was trying to preserve his domestic regime,
he sought to support revisionist powers outside Egypt mainly by supporting the
domestic opponents of his regional adversaries. His adversaries, such as Saudi Arabia
or Jordan, followed a similar strategy in Egypt. As we shall see below, this was part
of regional struggle for influence between the US and the Soviet Union. From an
American point of view, Saudi Arabia was a major candidate according to Eisenhower
to form “a counterweight to Nasser” (quoted in ibid., 68). These struggles left their
imprint on many states such as Algeria, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq. Insecurity
was augmented to unprecedented levels, which in turn contributed to state
authoritarianism and weakness. How do we explain state weakness?
To understand this we need to examine state response to systemic forces.
Waltzian assumption is that the state—as an actor in the international arena—
responds in unitary manner to systemic forces. This provides the basis on which Waltz
establishes a distinction between the domestic and international realms and hence the
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foundation to build a theory of international politics. Nevertheless, what the Waltzian
theory misses is the time factor dividing old—legitimate, differentiated, cohesive—
states from late forming states. In the Middle East, states have “started off so
fragmented, unstable and permeable to trans-state forces that realism’s unitary rational
actor confronting an external chess board cannot be assumed and is only one possible
product of a contingent state formation process” (Hinnebusch 2003, 7). Below, I
reproduce Figure 4.2 on state formation and deformation and show some theoretical
expectation relating to state behaviour at different phases of formation.
Power/Coercion
Dispersed
Power Disequilibrium Power/Coercion
institutionalised
State
FormationStateDeformation
Multiple Responses Unitary/Multiple Response(s) Unitary Response
FIGURE 4.4. STATE (DE) FORMATION AND STATE BEHAVIOUR
When a state deforms—a movement to the left in the figure above—power
devolves as mentioned above to social organisations existing in a social field. The
multiplicity of state-like organisations in a social field forms a political anarchy
similar to that described by Waltz for the international arena. The distinction between
domestic and international structures of power ceases to exist. What we get is an
extension of international anarchy with different social organisation competing for
power monopoly within a social field. These conflicts take place within one social
field without, necessarily, spilling into other social fields because of varying levels of
political centralisation in other social fields. For example, the fifteen-year (1975-
1990) civil war was contained in Lebanon without directly affecting Syria or Israel as
Lebanon’s bordering states.
One direct consequence of state deformation involves the way a state responds
to external environment. What we have is one social field responding in multiple ways
to systemic forces. Each social power within a social field will attempt to improve its
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standing there by allying with different external forces. External forces will, on the
other hand, provide support for their domestic allies, which reinforce the domestic
divide. If we maintain that the regional social field involves competition among states
there, then these regional conflicts transfer to weak and fragmented states. External
powers interfere in a state to define its role and direction in a regional power balance.
This takes place either by buttressing existing monopoly of power or by de-
monopolising power there to shift existing foreign behaviour. This contributes to civil
wars and state fragmentation.
I have shown elsewhere that variation in the stability of Lebanon is largely due
to shifts in regional power balance. Domestic social powers responded differently to
external power shifts leading the country to divide in different periods of its modern
history (Saouli 2006, 708-714). However, the ability of domestic powers to respond
differently to systemic forces assumes that external environment is divided. A
movement right-ward in the figure above signifies a higher level power centralisation.
The higher the level of coercion monopolisation in a social field, the more the social
field’s response to external environment becomes unitary. Cases like Saudi Arabia,
Morocco, Syria or Egypt provide illustrations to this category. The low level of
political incorporation and democratisation mean, however, that opposition within
these cases respond differently to international developments. This usually takes place
from outside the state as the Moroccan, Syrian, or Saudi opposition groups residing in
Europe or other Arab states that are usually in conflict with their home state. From the
point in the centre moving right-wards we continue to have a state responding in a
unitary manner until we reach the point where a state’s responses to external
environment become legitimated through the democratic process.
4.4. State Survival in the Middle East: Conditions and
Variation
Although most states in the developing world in general and the Middle East in
particular share many of the characteristics specified earlier, variation exists when it
comes to the nature of the social field these states develop in, specifically regime
capacity and the geopolitical position of a state. This section will examine some of these
variables and by doing so I will specify the main conditions that account to state
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survival in the Middle East. These will pave the way to examine the case studies in the
following chapters.
In the previous section, I argued that most states in the Middle East are weak
when it comes to political incorporation. This deficit contributes to weakening the
state—both as a regime of power and a territorial entity—and facilitates external
penetration. For states to survive during late formation, I want to argue here, two
theoretical conditions need to be present. The first involves the monopolisation of
power at the domestic level and second the division of power at the regional level, or
external neutralisation. Monopolising power domestically, maybe due to the presence of
economic resources (oil) or due to the homogeneity of a social field, is a necessary
condition for state survival but not a sufficient one. Without a division in the regional
structure, meaning the absence of a hegemon, domestic monopolisation would be
threatened. How does this work?
Monopolising power domestically weakens external intervention in a social field
and ensures a unitary response to systemic forces—a projection of power outside a
field. This power projection encourages division as other states threatened by this
projection aim to balance against it. External division in turn reinforces the domestic
monopoly. For a state to survive in late formation, this structural distinction—power
monopoly (hierarchy) at the unit level and power division (anarchy) at the systemic
level—needs to be sustained. In fact, regimes and rulers that lead them will behave in
ways to maintain that balance. In studying state survival, we examine how regimes
maintain that balance by spurring processes of power monopolisation in their own states
and de-monopolisation at regional level and in other threatening states.
The above are theoretical conditions. Although theoretical conditions aim to
explain reality, these should be distinct from that reality. As Waltz argues a “theory
explains some part of reality and is therefore distinct from the reality it explains” (1979,
7). The extent to which each condition is present varies from one case to another. In the
following two sub-sections, I will examine variation among the two conditions.
4.4.1. Power Monopolisation: Variables
The level of monopolisation taking place in a particular social field depends on a set of
factors including: (1) level of cultural homogeneity of a social field; (2) regime nature
and formation; and (3) economic resources available for a regime. These factors will
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accordingly affect how a state responds to systemic forces. Let’s look in turn at these
factors and the relation that governs them.
As argued in Chapter Three, the extent to which a social field is culturally
homogeneous affects the political dynamics taking place within it. Although in the early
phases of state formation, political struggles take place regardless of the cultural make-
up of a field, a culturally heterogeneous social field makes monopolisation difficult. A
cultural heterogeneity provides elements that can be politicised creating new social
boundaries (see Chapter Three) and makes political incorporation more difficult.
Accordingly, ceteris paribus, the higher the cultural heterogeneity a field is, the harder
(and usually bloodier) the monopolisation process and vice-versa, the higher the cultural
homogeneity of a field, the easier the monopolisation process.
As we shall see in the Saudi Arabia case below, the cultural and religious
homogeneity of most parts of what is now Saudi Arabia facilitated political
centralisation there and made possible the articulation of a universal idea (Islam). We
observe the opposite in the case of Iraq, where ethnic and sectarian divisions challenged
attempts at power monopolisation and, eventually, the cultural structure shaped the
political dynamics with increased saliency. However, why, although sharing similar
divisions to Iraq (and Syria for that matter), is Lebanon’s political trajectory different
from Iraq?
This brings us to the second variable—regime formation. In Lebanon a
particular social power’s—the Maronites—interest coincided with external powers
attempting to establish borders in the region. This (as the case of Ibn Saud and the
British will also show) contributed to regime formation in Lebanon. In this formation
social (sectarian) boundaries were drawn from the beginning, setting a path-dependent
trajectory. State institutions and major positions were distributed along sectarian lines.
At the political level a Sunni-Maronite consensus maintained Lebanon’s fragile
‘consociational democracy’ (el Khazen 2000). In Iraq and Syria the absence—with
some exceptions—of a domestic power with an interest to maintain the emerging
borders saw a rise of universal ideologies aiming to reverse the imposed borders (Mufti
1995). Regime formation set the path for a different trajectory. Sectarian and ethnic
boundaries took longer to develop in Iraq and Syria as opposed to Lebanon.
The way a regime is formed affects the prospects of power monopolisation.
Regime formation does not only set a path that may explain the foreign policy prospects
of a regime but it also figures the nature of responses a regime incurs from revisionists
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internally as well as externally. Tilly argues that “identities become political identities
when governments become parties to them” (2005, 210; emphasis original). One
argument presented here is that although some regimes in culturally heterogeneous
societies resort to a universal idea to go beyond existing divisions, security dilemmas
and inter-elite conflicts agitate cultural divisions leading regimes to become parties to
them.
Finally, the available economic resources for a regime determine the prospects
of power monopolisation. Ceteris paribus, the more the economic resources available
for a regime, the higher the potential it has to monopolise power. Economic means
contribute, as we saw above, to a regime’s ability to sustain coercive forces, which in
turn reinforce the monopoly over the economic power. These means provide a regime
with the ability to project power internally as well as externally making it a relatively
stronger and distinct organisation within a social field. Saudi Arabia provides a clear
example of a monarchy having the economic means to monopolise power and to
socially and economically integrate a social field.
Like Saudi Arabia in its early stages, Yemen is a case of a weak regime unable
to go beyond other social organisations—particularly tribes—due to weak economic
base. Economic resources provide only a contributing factor to regime and state survival
and without appreciating other variables, we can lose sight of other causes of state
survival as the cases of Jordan, Morocco, or Oman indicate. For example, what should
we expect if a regime is rich but operating in a culturally heterogeneous field? While the
presence of economic resources might strengthen a state in a culturally homogeneous
society by consolidating its cultural and economic ties, the presence of similar resources
in heterogeneous society coupled with low political incorporation would strengthen the
regime but weaken the state.11 This is especially true if resources are unequally
distributed.
The cases of Sudan and Iraq provide examples of how regime behaviour was shaped by
the presence of oil in regions where certain ethnic or sectarian groups are present and
able to monopolise. In Sudan, successive Khartoum governments sought to redraw the
boundaries of oil-rich southern regions such as Upper Nile and Bahr El Ghazal (Alier
1992) in attempts to deter separatist movements in the south. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein
attempted to ‘Arabise’ the oil-rich Kirkuk to alter its demographic balance, a move that
11 This led some scholars to consider Iraq to be a ‘strong’ state (Zaartman and Dawisha 1988).
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is identical with Saudi attempts to employ thousands of state servants from Najd and
Hejaz in the Eastern Province.
The above constitute important factors that account for variation among different
cases in the Middle East states. Another factor may be added to the above which is the
level of political incorporation. However, as most states in the Middle East, as shown
above, figure low in political incorporation the examining of this variable might not be
very useful for this population of cases. One can argue that Lebanon may score high in
political incorporation given that its sectarian regime aims to incorporate all factions in
state institutions. However, this raises the question as to the extent to which state
institutions in Lebanon are independent from the social powers that constitute them.
4.4.2 Geo-political Position and External Neutralisation
The geo-political position of a state is determined by the level of monopolisation
existing in a social field, which we have just examined and the system (structure) that it
is embedded in. In this section we will examine the external variable for state survival.
Two external variables may be crucial to understanding state survival: (1) Geographical
location of a state and (2) the structure of regional order. It is important to emphasise
here that these variables as well as the variables examined above are in reality
inseparable. We isolate them here for analytical purposes; however, as we examine the
cases these variables will be treated in a configurative way. Let us start with the first
variable.
Stephen M. Walt observes that states in the Middle East find others in close
geographic proximity more threatening than distant states (1987, 162). The
geographical location of a state determines the degree it is influenced by the systematic
dynamics. During late state formation, the more strategically located a state is, the
higher it is influenced by the system. Moreover, the higher the influence by the system
on the state, the less will its domestic conditions affect its chances of survival. A
strategically located state is a state whose geographical location is pivotal for the
interests of regional and international great powers. The extent to which a state is
strategic relates to its proximity to main power struggle areas and, therefore, to
potentially threatening states. Historically, Egypt (Suez Canal), South Yemen, or Hejaz
were crucial for the Ottoman Empire’s and European states’ trade and naval power. The
emergence of oil in the beginning of the twentieth century and outbreak of the Arab-
Israeli conflict in 1948 shifted the focus to the Gulf region and to the Near East
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respectively. States such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait or Jordan, Lebanon or Syria
have been shaped by power struggles taking place over and in these areas.
Jordan’s survival and relative stability emanates from its geographical position.
As a buffer zone between Israel and major Arab states such as Saudi Arabia (and other
gulf monarchies) and Iraq, most states in the region had an interest to keep Jordan
intact. Lebanon’s varying stability, on the other hand, can be understood to result from
shifts in regional balance of power. Other cases where geographical location was less
crucial include Tunisia, Libya, or Morocco. However, these states’ relative insulation
from the main strategic arenas in the region was in certain periods disrupted.
The intensification of regional struggles drew even peripheral states to their
dynamics. Hence, we observe that with the rise of Egypt under Nasser, the Algerian
revolution was given impetus while Libya was ready to emulate the Egyptian model.
The Saudi attempts to counter the Nasserite expansion saw Yemen drawn to the conflict
and, with external support, different factions attempted to monopolise power there.
Yemen’s late entry into the state system not only reflects its geographical position but
also (due to its weak economic base) its low level of power monopolisation. The rise of
Nasser on the one hand and the emergence of two new global powers—Soviet Union
and U.S.—on the other hand provided new opportunities for revisionist power and
constraints for status quo ones. Revisionist forces in Egypt itself and in Algeria,
Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen based their domestic strategies on these
emerging new (external) political structures.
This brings us to the second variable, the structure of regional order. The way a
regional order is structured affects the chances of state survival and collapse during late
formation. The main variable here relates to the extent to which a system is polarised.
Ceteris paribus, the more a regional structure is polarised the higher the chances for late
forming states to survive. The less a state system is polarised (the more hierarchical it
is), the less autonomy a late forming state affords. The configuration of the state system
provides states with opportunities or constraints that condition their domestic dynamics
and international behaviour. We recall from the analysis above that external
neutralisation (collapse of the Ottoman Empire and expansion of the European state
system) contributed to the emergence of states in the Middle East. In a polarised state
system, this external neutralisation is sustained and contributes to the maintenance of
state borders. States in the international system will endeavour to prevent their
competitors from forming hegemony, in doing so they form alliances to balance against
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potentially threatening states. In the context of late state formation, these international
dynamics shapes developments taking place within states.
In the post-Cold War period, for instance, we observe that external
neutralisation diminished. With the US being the only power internationally, the
autonomy of Middle East regional powers eroded paving the way in the Middle East to
the isolation of Iraq, for Syria’s engagement in the peace process, and later providing
the US with the opportunity to attempt to re-order the region by occupying Iraq in 2003.
In explaining state survival, no one factor here can on its own account for that
effect. Accordingly, this section defined two theoretical conditions that need to be
present for a state to survive and specified a set of variables to account for these
conditions. In tune with the methodology of this thesis, these conditions and variables
will need to be examined in specific contexts (case studies). In examining different
cases, these variables will be interrelated, as we shall see below.
Conclusion
This chapter aimed to situate the state in the Middle East in time and space. In this
analysis the state has been treated as a process and not as a given. Accordingly, this
chapter first examined the initial conditions of state formation looking at the
interrelation of domestic and international forces to account for this emergence. To
understand the peculiarity of the state in the Middle East, a comparison with European
state formation was made in the second section. I argued that while European states
constituted the system that structured their relations and which affected their internal
development, the state in the Middle East developed in social fields—boundaries—and
a pre-existing state system. Section three examined the ontology of the state in the
Middle East situating it on state formation continuum and looking at the main dilemmas
facing this state. Further, that section examined how this state responds to systemic
forces.
In examining the ontology of the state in the Middle East, it was argued that
regime insecurity contribute to the construction of authoritarian regimes, which in turn
cause external penetration weakening the state. Finally, in section four two conditions
for state survival in late formation were defined: domestic power monopolisation and
external neutralisation. Further, variation in these two conditions was examined in light
of cases in the Middle East.
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This chapter and the one that preceded it constitute the theoretical model to
examine state survival during late formation. Moving from the general ontology of the
political world in chapter three to the ontology of the state in the Middle East and the
conditions of its survival, now we can move to examine the empirical case studies. Next
chapter will look at the factors that keep the Saudi Arabian state intact.
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Chapter Five
Saudi Arabia: A case of Continued State Survival
Society has created its own religions:
Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism,
Mohammedanism—these are social tricks.
Jesus is antisocial, Buddha is antisocial—but
Christianity is not antisocial, Buddhism is
not antisocial. Society is very cunning; it
immediately absorbs even antisocial
phenomena into the social.
—Osho
State Survival in Saudi Arabia: The Literature
The endurance of the Saudi monarchy and the survival of the Saudi territorial state have
been perplexing for both scholars and Middle East observers. Predictions of the fall of
the Saudi ruling family started in the 1940s12 and continued late into the twentieth
century (Aburish 1994). The perceived weakness of the Saudi state led several neo-
conservatives in the wake of September 11 incidents to call for direct regime change in
Saudi Arabia while others argued for establishing a state for the Shiites in the eastern
oil-rich part of the country ( see Teitelbaum 2003). State survival on the other hand has
been attributed to local culture (Hudson 1977), regime identity mythmaking and
reproduction (Anderson 2000), oil revenues (Gause 2002; Luciani 1990), the
accommodation of Assabia to capitalism (Champion 2003) or to a combination of oil
revenues and Islamic identity (Menoret 2005).
Other scholars in search for causes of state survival in Saudi Arabia have
protested against these domestic explanations of state survival in Saudi Arabia. Paul
Aarts, for instance, calls us to go ‘outside the box’, arguing that “it appears to be far
more conceivable that the crucial difference between the success and failure, and the
persistence and fall of monarchies can be found in the regional and global strategic-
economic picture, rather than in the local one” (2004, 4) arguing that Saudi survival is
“primarily attributable to external forces” (Ibid., Abstract; emphasis original). In a
similar fashion, F. Gregory Gause II argues that “the success and failure of monarchy in
the Arabian Peninsula in the twentieth century had more to do with the position of
Arabian countries in the regional security picture and the international political
economy than with their particular domestic characteristics” (2000, 167-8). Both
contributions place emphasis on the role of oil (and its security), while Aarts
12 The American consul to the Kingdom predicted the fall of Saud in the 1940s (Safran 1991, 58).
120
accentuates the “decisive factor” of the Saudi relations with the United States, in
explaining state survival (Aarts 2005, 399-429).
These accounts provide us with a way out of the box and, hence, contribute to
our understanding of state survival, particularly in the Gulf region. However, and in
tune with the theoretical framework presented here I argue that we should not replace
internal (domestic structure) with external (structure of regional and international
politics) factors to explain state survival. The debate should not centre on internal
versus external; rather we need to emphasise the interaction between the two realms.
Rachel Bronson challenges the simplistic ‘oil-for-security’, which many scholars
subscribe to: “After all America’s relationships with other major oil producing sates
have proven exceedingly troubled.” These not only include the Soviet Union, but also
Iraq (since 1967) and Libya in the Arab world or Iran (since 1979) (Bronson 2005, 373).
We can also turn Bronson’s analysis on its head to suggest that US relations are
strong with countries that are not oil-rich such as Jordan, Turkey or Morocco, which
suggests the presence of other factors. This chapter will illustrate that the Saudi state
scores high on most of the variables associated with state survival and discussed in the
previous chapter. First, we observe that the cultural homogeneity (Muslim and Tribal)
in the territories that later formed the Saudi state facilitated the monopoly mechanism
and, later, consolidation of power by the Sauds. The regime’s monopolisation over the
means of coercion gave it power over the religious establishment in particular to
promote interpretations that converge with the regime’s interest and to alienate others
that threaten the regime’s integrity.
Second, this domestic power monopolisation converged, not only with the
emergence of a state-system in the Middle East but also, with the interests of the
designers (Britain and France) of that system. With the crystallisation of the state-
system in the Middle East, power monopolisation in Saudi Arabia had been achieved
and a Saudi regime was in place. While the regional state-system contributed to
maintaining Saudi domestic power monopolisation, the latter reinforced the system as
we shall see below. This in some cases saw the Saudi regime countering British or U.S.
interests when these threatened Saudi interest.
Third, the emergence of oil revenue contributed to the above variables.
Domestically, oil revenue reinforced the Saudi regime’s hold on power switching the
country’s economic focus from Hejaz to Najd, while providing the monarchy with the
means to reward allies and punish rivals. The oil wealth of the country further
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augmented its geo-political position making it pivotal for regional and external powers
engaged in the Middle East.
Fourth, the nature of the Middle East regional system—divided between states
aiming for a status quo and others seeking revision—provided the Saudi regime with
numerous opportunities to maintain its domestic dominance. Whether in its initial
alliance with Nasser against the Hashemite monarchies (and in some cases Britain),
alliance with the US against revisionist forces in the Middle East during the Cold War,
or its current stand in relation to Iran, Saudi Arabia has aimed to maintain a division in
the regional system that contributes to its domestic dominance. These shifts come with
the activation or deactivation of different identities (Islam, Arabism, or Sunnism).
The following chapter will elaborate on these points. The first section will
examine the origins of the Saudi state, the rise and fall of its first states, and the origins
of the contemporary one. Section two will examine the nature of the Saudi social field,
the process of regime formation, and the monarchy’s relations with other social forces.
The third section will examine the kingdom’s foreign relations. The chapter will
conclude by highlighting the theoretical implications drawn from the Saudi case.
5.1. Geographical Position and Origins of the Saudi State
The state of Saudi Arabia is currently composed of historically four distinct regions: the
central region of Najd, the Eastern region of Ahsa, the western region of Hejaz, and the
south western region of Asir. During Ottoman rule, each of these regions formed a
distinct cultural and political sphere (Yamani 2004, 1-3). Situated on the Red Sea and
hosting Islam’s two holiest cities of Mecca and Medina, Hejaz was always under
external influence and rule and “too tempting a booty for any Middle Eastern empire to
permit” (Vassiliev 2000, 29).
The central region of Najd is situated between the two “sea sands” of Great al-
Nafud in the north and Rub Al-Khali or the ‘Empty quarter’ in the south and consisted
mainly of isolated oases ruled by chieftaincies. Difficult climate, aridness, and primitive
agricultural techniques meant that economic surplus and development were hard to
obtain (Ibid., 31), which in turn made it less attractive for foreign powers. Najdi
dwellers, both nomads and settlers, relied on the Ahsa coast for their survival and its
traders travelled to Baghdad and as far as India to buy products (Al-Rasheed 2005, 38).
The eastern region of Ahsa is strategically situated on the Persian Gulf and came under
Ottoman rule in 1550 after their control reached Baghdad in 1534 (Ibid., 37). Including
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many oases and forming an important trade route between the Persian Gulf and the Red
Sea, Ahsa, similar to Hejaz, was crucial for external powers.
Since 1745, there have been three attempts to unify these four regions and all
originated in the region of Najd. The first (1745-1818) and second (1824-1891) attempts
at state formation reached their limits when political expansion and centralisation
threatened pre-existing external structures of power, which was determined by Ottoman
power. While Ottoman authorities were indifferent to developments taking place in
Najd, Hejaz, due to its symbolic importance for the Muslim world and the income it
generates from annual Muslim pilgrimage, meant that it was too important to be left for
local forces. The Ottomans ruled over Hejaz by relegating power to local Hashemite
rulers, who are believed to have a family lineage traced back to Prophet Mohammad’s
daughter Fatima and first cousin Ali ibn Abi Talib. When in 1924 Al-Saud occupied
Hejaz, the Hashemites had been ruling this region for more than one thousand years
(Yamani 2004, 2).
In all its dimensions, the formation of the first Saudi state and its later collapse is
theoretically telling to understand the emergence and survival of the current Saudi state.
Generic processes of state formation, such as war-making, entangle with processes of
legitimacy formation in the establishment of regime and a particular boundary. This
process takes place in a locally tribal setting within an externally “restricted” (Niblock
2006, 23) structure defined and regulated by the Ottoman Empire. The lack of external
neutralisation meant that any challenger to Ottoman authority was to be punished
should it go beyond the limits defined to it by the Ottomans. Emerging in Najd, the first
Saudi state exemplifies the ability of a local Emir—or prince—to expand his power
beyond his own tribe to dominate over other tribes forming a strong state before the
expansion saw its limits with stronger external powers rolling back that state to its
initial point of departure. These initial attempts at domination included three major
dimensions, which have remained with us until now, and involve the monopolisation of
coercion, religious interpretation, and political decision making.
The region of Najd lacked any form of political centralisation beyond that of a
tribe, which was the most powerful political organisation beyond the family.13 A tribe is
composed of many Ashiras—or clans—which in turn consists of many families. Each
tribe has a Sheikh—or chief—who acts as an arbitrator in tribal conflicts, convenes and
presides over Majlis—or tribal council—handles external relations, and declares war
13 A tribe is “a group of people who shared a common territorial base, true or mythological kingship ties,
and a corporate existence” (Kostiner 1993, 3)
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and peace. The qualities a tribal chief should possess include courage, wisdom, wealth
and prudence (Vassiliev 2000, 51). Alongside the Sheikh there existed a religious
qadi—or judge—facilitating adjudication.
Climatic and socio-economic constraints existing in the Arabian Peninsula in
general and in Najd in particular contribute to our understanding of tribal persistence.
Najdi socio-economy remained similar for many centuries with economic development
and integration being constrained by two major impediments. The first involved the
inability of any oasis prince to dominate over others to pacify the relations amongst
them and create the necessary foundation for further economic exchange and
integration. Secondly, the lack of sufficient economic surplus, due to climatic
conditions and technological weakness, which provides the basis for such domination,
made political centralisation beyond the tribe difficult:
The narrow economic base, the hostile forces of nature, the primitive
agricultural technology and the isolation of the oases all resulted in a
very slow rate of economic development. Oasis formatting was
characterized by a fragmentation of effort and was undertaken by
small peasant groups and individual families. There were no large-
scale irrigation facilities or huge tracts of irrigated and cultivated
land in medieval Arabia. Combined with the isolation of the oases,
this meant that there was no need for a centralised government (Ibid.,
31).
.
The rise of the first Saudi state forms a historical exception since the rise of
Islam. This lack of political monopolisation and socio-economic circumstances meant
that inter-tribal relations were governed by war and Ghazu—or raids. John Lewis
Burckhardt observed that “Arab tribes are in a state of almost perpetual war against each
other” (quoted in Ibid., 45). With Saudi expansion this state of affairs came to an end.
The process started when Muhammad Ibn Saud, the prince of the small oasis north of
Riyadh called Diria, and Mohammad Ibn Abd Al Wahab, a religious reformer, formed a
strategic alliance. This initial alliance proved pivotal for Saudi state formation, and
continues to shape state-religion relations in Saudi Arabia until this moment. Why
would a particular religious interpretation of Islam, however, find its way in Najd of the
eighteenth century and not any other country or territory of the Middle East? Why
would a tribal prince endorse such an Islamic interpretation, which may place limits on
his power?
The alliance, and its success in establishing the Saudi state, had both domestic as
well as external enabling sources that provide us with a theoretical understanding of the
relation between religion, identity, and political behaviour. The condition of external
indifference that enabled the rise of the Saudi state in the eighteenth century acts also as
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a source for the rise of a particular religious interpretation of Islam. The political claim
of the Saudi tribal leader and the religious movement of Wahhab was such that if they
were to succeed they would necessarily challenge Ottoman power.
Locally, the alliance provided a religious legitimating force for Mohammad Ibn
Saud going beyond the tribe and acted as a universal identity for tribal unification.
Mohammad Ibn Abd Al Ahab’s thought constitutes a religious revival in response to the
spiritual decay—polytheism, idolatry, and innovations (bida)—prevailing in central
Arabia. Born in 1703 in Uyaina, a Najdi oasis, and travelled widely in Arab countries,
Wahhab sought to purify Islam from existing manifestations and return it to its
fundamentals. His thought, based on Taqi al-Din Ibn Taimiyya, a fourteenth century
Hanbali14 scholar, called for Tawhid, or monotheism and rejected all religious forms of
bida, or innovations, while supporting the excommunication of all Islamic sects that
deviate from the fundamentals of Islam (Steinberg 2005).
At any time in the process of state formation and political centralisation, several
identities compete, usually at different political levels. In Najd, tribal identities
competed with other forms of identity such as religion. While the tribe was the main
form of social organisation in Najd, Islam constitutes a higher form of identity,
particularly in its ability to unite many tribes and Muslim peoples under its banner.
However, the extent to which a religion succeeds in uniting different populations cannot
be determined purely by the nature of that religion, rather, by other political and
economic factors.
The alliance between Ibn Saud and Ibn Wahhab reflects a choice taken by the
former to accommodate the latter. Why would Saud accommodate Wahhab? The first
engagement of Wahhabi thought with the political world began when Mohammad Ibn
Abd Al Wahhab returned after intensive travelling to the Najdi oasis of Uyaina in 1740.
In the beginning, Uthman ibn Hamad ibn Muammar the prince of Uyaina supported the
religious agenda of the reformer. However, the rigid interpretation of Islam and its
literal application such as the destruction of holy places, stoning of women who
committed adultery, and the punishment of those abstaining from prayers, led both to
local opposition from the Uyaina religious scholars and, when the news reached other
oases, from the Bani Khaled tribe of Ahsa. Ibn Hamad’s fear of civil conflict and
14 Hanbalism is the most rigid interpretation of Islam amongst the four schools of Sunni Islam. Other
schools include Hannafism, Shafiism, and Malikism. As a representative of Habalism, Ibn Taimiyya
rejected all innovations or bida and advocated a return to the practices of the salaf al-salih, Islam’s
founders (Vassiliev 2000, 65-70).
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disruptions of relations and trade with Ahsa led him to send Wahab to exile (Al-
Racheed 2005, 41; Vassiliev 2000, 81).
The Uyaina incident shows both the strength and limits of ideas, religious or
secular, in influencing existing power structures. In 1744, Wahhab moved to the small
oasis of al-Diriya gaining the support of Mohammad ibn Saud: “Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s
need for military support and the emir’s interest in religious backing led them to unite
their efforts, and an alliance was concluded” (Vassiliev 2000, 82). It is clear that Ibn abd
al Wahab needed a political/military power to protect and spread his doctrine, however,
why would Mohammad Ibn Saud need such religious backing? Madawi al-Rashid
observes two weaknesses with the Sauds of Al Diriya that may explain Saud’s
accommodation of Abd al Wahab. First, the Sauds lacked a clear tribal origin, which
could help knit tribal alliances to protect and expand their power. Belonging to the
commercial class did not help in the tribal society of eighteenth century Arabia. And
second, the oasis size and low economic surplus constrained Sauds’ ability to fortify
and expand their power (Al-Racheed 2005, 39).
Ideas, in particular those that have a political effect as in the ability to
influence existing power relations, originate in response to existing material and
ideational structures aiming to provide a corrective to existing social relations.
Early in the process, ideas provide a reaction against dominant ideas but the extent
of their success depends on the ability of their holders to transform them into
organised power. The choice of a universal identity, Islam, by Mohammad Ibn
Saud answers to his first weakness mentioned above. The political logic in the
choice of universal ideologies continues with us until this moment. It acts as a
centripetal and justifying means to integrate different tribal or communal groups
under one centralised power. These factors form the internal enabling conditions
for the rise of Wahhabism in the process of Saudi state formation. Nevertheless,
what about Wahhab’s thought on politics?
Guido Steinberg observes that the “lack of organizational complexity of the first
Saudi state did not require any elaborate rules” (2005, 16). Although Wahhabi thought
did not have a comprehensive theory of politics, Vassiliev observes that “the centre of
gravity of the Wahhabi doctrine lay in politics rather than in the social sphere” (2005,
71). Here we need to consider principles in the doctrine that contribute to political
centralisation and domination. Of these we can think of Zakat, or alms-tax, social
obedience, and jihad. Wahhabism legitimated the payment of Zakat and made it
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“obligatory rather than voluntary”. Second, Wahhabism considered social obedience to
the ruler as congruent with Islam’s major principles; “mutinies and revolts against the
emirs must be punished with infernal tortures.” And third, the perception of non-
Wahhabis as polytheists justified war against them; “when the Wahhabis seized an oasis
or a town, they destroyed gravestones and monuments at the graves of saints and pious
people and burnt books by ulama who disagreed with them” (Ibid., 76-78 ).
These tenets provided the Saudi prince with a powerful legitimating force to
expand his power beyond his oasis and tribal sphere into, first, larger parts of Najd and
later into the wider the Arabian Peninsula.
5.1.1. Formation and Deformation of the first Saudi States
Using a combination of tools such as coercion, strategic marriages, and Wahhabi
ideology, Saud managed to occupy most of Najd in a course of three decades (Niblock
2006, 27-8). One of the early marriages took place when Abd al-Aziz ibn Mohammad
ibn Saud married the daughter of Uthman ibn Muammar the prince of Uyaina emirate.
Muamar was to lead the forces in the early Saudi battles (Vassiliev 2006, 84). Battling
against more powerful emirates required “a practical reason for concentrating first on
converting the populations to the new religion line” (Niblock 2006, 28; Vassiliev 2006,
85). Saudi-Wahhabi expansion did not go without resistance from the Bedouin tribes of
Najran, Ahsa, and southern Najd who attempted to halt Saudi expansion. Many tribes
sought to avoid “exposure to Saudi-Wahhabi raiding and share the loot from raiding
others” (Safran 1991, 10). By 1773, Riyadh, the future capital of the Saudi kingdom,
was captured by the Saudi-Wahhabi forces and controlling Najd cost 4,000 to 5,000
lives (Vassiliev 2006, 85).
Monopolising power in Najd laid the basis, for the first time, to project power
externally. By the1780s the northern part of Najd was under Saudi-Wahhabi power,
permitting further expansion to the predominantly Shiite eastern region of al-Ahsa.
After a tough resistance from its inhabitants who refused the Wahhabi doctrine and a
series of battles by Bani Khalid, who lost more than 1,000 people, Ahsa fell to Saudi-
Wahhabi occupation in 1792. Further expansion took place when Qatar and Bahrain
came under Saudi suzerainty (Niblock 2006, 28). The sultan of Muscat was obliged to
pay tribute to the Saudis; however, by gaining support from the British, whose presence
in the Persian Gulf began to increase, the sultan avoided total Saudi control (Safran
1991, 10-11).
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Saudi-Wahhabi expansion continued far north reaching Mesopotamia and,
occasionally, as far as Syria after 1801. In 1803, the Shiite city of Karbala was razed
when more than 4000 Shiites were killed and Shiite holy shrines were destroyed. Under
Saud, the grandson of Mohammad Ibn Saud, the Saudi state expanded westward into
Hejaz. In three successive years the Saudi-Wahhabi occupied Taif (1802), Mecca
(1803), and Medina (1804) (Niblock 2006, 28). “The effective loss of the holy cities”,
however, “was more than the Ottoman sultan could countenance” (Safran 1991, 10).
Although gradually weakening, the Ottoman Empire would not accept defeat in
Hejaz and its strategic posts on the Red Sea, while the influence of Wahhabism formed
a challenge to its own Hanafism interpretation, which constituted the official school in
the Ottoman Empire (Vassiliev 2006, 69). Ottoman failure to contain Saudi power from
Iraq led the Ottoman Sultan Selim to appoint Mohammad Ali of Egypt as viceroy for
Hejaz, who in 1812 ordered his army to recapture the holy cities and, in alliance with
tribes that had deserted the Wahhabis, captured Medina in 1812 and Mecca and Taif in
1813. In 1815, Qassim, the region separating Medina and al-Diriya, was recaptured and
al-Diriya fell to Ottoman power in 1818.
This brought the first Saudi state to an end. With the collapse of Saudi
monopolisation of power, Ahsa returned to the rule of Bani Khalid and central Arabia
returned to “its own tribal enmities” (Safran 1991, 14). In a way, the first Saudi attempt
at state formation constitutes the first engagement with international politics of the time
revealing the limits placed on a late comer to that arena. The experience, as we shall see
below, was to leave effect on strategies followed by Saudi-Wahhabi alliance in the
future state. The decline of external neutralisation was manifested in the fact that Saudi
state survival was determined by the only external power at the time, the Ottoman
Empire. In another way, also relevant for forthcoming developments, the rise of the first
Saudi state reflects the activation of certain identities already existing in the cultural
foundations of the Ottoman Empire. In this regards, the Wahhabi rebellion constitutes a
reaction against ‘Turkicized Islam’: “it was a collision between Arabian statehood and
the Ottoman empire.” In the Arabian Peninsula, it formed a Najdi reaction against Hejaz
(Vassiliev 2006, 80).
While the first attempt of Saudi state formation shows an aspirant revisionist
power, largely unfamiliar with limits placed on it by external structure, attempting to
establish power, the second Saudi state, established in 1824 by Turki ibn Abdullah ibn
Saud, was limited to Najd and exemplifies a status quo power. Scholars observe a
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policy of ‘Wahhabism in one country’ rather than a revolutionary policy as that pursued
earlier: “Though a faithful Wahhabi,” Turki “was careful not to fan the embers of
Wahhabi fanaticism and endeavoured to avoid clashing with Ottoman/Egyptian power
in the Hejaz and with the increasingly assertive British power in the Persian Gulf and
along its shores” (Safran 1991, 16). Seeking to increase his independence however,
Faisal “tried to tempt the British into an alliance with him against Ottoman power”
(Ibid.). British interests in keeping the Ottoman Empire intact, nevertheless, and
indifference to central Arabia meant that Faisal’s calls were unattended. Intra-Saudi
divisions and external limits to expansion, however, brought the second Saudi state to
collapse in 1887. This happened when Ibn Rashid, ruler of the autonomous emirate of
Hail, captured Riyadh. Abd al-Rahman, son of Faisal, fled to Kuwait.
5.1.2. External Neutralisation and the Emergence of the
contemporary Saudi State
We observe from the analysis above the external limits to Saudi state survival in the
first two attempts at formation. The process of state formation if it were to succeed
required, as a necessary condition, external neutralisation to be sustained. This is
especially true if this state formation is to go beyond Najd, where external indifference
made the rise of a domestic power there possible in the first place. From the beginning
we realise that Saudi-Wahhabi power formed a revisionist force in the Ottoman realm.
Many scholars date the beginning of the third Saudi state formation to when Abd al-
Aziz—son of Abdel al-Rahman (known, and hereafter, as Ibn Saud)—recaptured
Riyadh in 1902. Joseph Kostiner observes however that the nascent state as a “renewed
version of a traditional chieftaincy” reflecting a “departure from the chieftaincy phase
and the assumption of more state attributes” (Kostiner 1991, 29).15
As argued above, in studying state formation we are thinking of a process that
both progresses and regresses. The social bases of Saudi power—Najdi tribes and the
Wahhabi establishment—continued to exist outside Saudi state power. In the emergence
of the modern Saudi state we observe, sustained by an external indifference to central
Arabia, a continued attempt by the Sauds to regain their lost fortune in Najd. In this
15 Khoury and Kostiner define chieftaincy as “ a relatively homogeneous confederacy by comparison to
more organized states, which are higher political forms on the evolutionary scale. …In chiefdoms the
bonds between the chief and society are not necessarily institutionalized…Tribes that became chiefdoms
usually had to be comparatively well off; they had to produce a regular surplus.” (Khoury and Kostiner
1991, 8-9)
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sense, warring relations among different tribes is a constant situation involving attempts
to monopolise power as a precondition in the process of state formation. The choice of
1902 as point of departure to Saudi state formation however is important if we look at
the changes in external factors which conditioned, regulated and shaped the domestic
dynamics in central Arabia and eventually carved the future Saudi state. These form the
international dynamics of Saudi state formation.
The major developments in this sphere include an increase in British influence
in the Persian Gulf, change in British interests’ vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire, and
European competition in the build up to WWI. Locally, these changing dynamics
required adaptation from certain players and resistance from others. The more intense
the regional conflict, the more local players became pivotal. Kuwait began a phase of
adaptation by accommodating British interests in the Persian Gulf when in 1899 it
signed a secret treaty with Britain making it a suzerain power over the sheikdom.
Kuwait became pivotal as a Persian Gulf terminal (Safran 1991, 29) when plans of a
Turkish-German railway linking Baghdad and Berlin were being discussed.
As argued above, the emergence of states in the Middle East was made possible
when external powers—composing the external structure of power—carved territories
in attempts to neutralise them against their competitors. Competition among the British
and Turks made possible the rise of social fields in the gulf principalities and Kuwait.
This should not lead us to consider these states as ‘foreign inventions’ or merely as
externally implanted polities. Though external factors determined the emergence of
states, domestic struggles provided the basis on which external factors would matter.
All agreements between external and domestic powers involved: (1) a guarantee by the
external power to recognise the autonomy of a domestic leader, and (2) a guarantee by a
domestic power not to sign an agreement with another foreign power, effectively
diminishing their foreign relations.
In trying to weigh external and domestic factors in explaining the birth of the
Saudi state, Madawi Al-Rashid argues that the British played a crucial role in the rise of
Ibn Saud, but, on the other hand she believes the Saudi king was not a British invention
(Al-Racheed 2005, 23-4). Struggles in central Arabia continued to exist regardless of
external changes however, it was the intensification of external conflicts that made these
domestic struggles of value to external powers. During his presence in Kuwait, the
young Ibn Saud had acquired a complex understanding of changes in the regional
balance of power (Kostiner 1991, 227). Defeat against the Rashidis in 1891 made Abd
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al-Rahman and his son Ibn Saud a revisionist force seeking to alter power relations in
Najd. In their turn the Kuwaitis had an interest in defeating the Rashidis—an Ottoman
ally—and becoming a major power in Arabia using Ibn Saud as a vehicle.
Four years after the capturing Riyadh in 1902 most of Najd had fallen under Ibn
Saud’s control. In 1920, Ahsa and Asir came under the rule of Ibn Saud, and by 1926
Hejaz surrendered to his power. The domestic developments took place in a regional
setting defined by international powers and the decaying Ottoman Empire. Though
reflecting the traditional attempts to expand power in central Arabia, Ibn Saud’s
behaviour was responsive to developments in the regional order, particularly those
linked to British interests.
“Hardly anyone noticed” argues David E. Long “when, in 1912, Abd Aziz
elevated Najd from an amirate to the Sultanate of Najd and Its Dependencies in
recognition of its increased size and importance” (Long 1997, 30). Preserving an
interest in keeping the Ottoman Empire intact, the British abstained from supporting
revisionist powers in central Arabia. Like Faisal before him, Ibn Saud tried to persuade
the British to support his efforts in driving the Turks out of Ahsa.
Ibn Saud sought British assistance during the unsuccessful battle of Bukairiya against
the Rashidis and in 1906 Ibn Saud when he agreed to the Trucial System (Safran 1991,
34). A series of British rejections, however, led Ibn Saud to initiate a unilateral attack
on Hufuf, the capital city of Ahsa in 1913, in search for booty and of British recognition
of his power.
This recognition materialised when Britain altered its Middle East policy during
WWI. It had become clear that by the end of the war a competition among the victors—
now allies (Russia, France, and Britain)—would ensue over the Middle East. The
Russian quest for Constantinople led the British to radically alter their strategy: “In the
100 days between the outbreak of the German war and the outbreak of the Ottoman war
Britain had overturned the foreign policy of more than a century by abandoning any
commitment to the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire”
(Fromkin 1991, 142). Precursors to this policy started in the late 19th century when
Britain expanded its power to the Persian Gulf basin (Vassiliev 2000, 206-7).
With the intensification of the war, Britain provided assistance to local leaders in
a ‘Subvention Policy’ aimed at weakening the Ottoman Empire (Kostiner 1993, 55)
while the Ottomans delivered assistance to the Rashidis. The Ottomans tried to
neutralise Saudi power in the war by seeking a truce between him and the Rashid is and
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recognising Ibn Saud as a ‘Turkish Vassal’ (Safran 1991, 70). The British, fearing
instability in the Persian Gulf, responded to these Turkish acts by signing a treaty with
Ibn Saud recognizing him as the ‘Ruler of Najd, Ahsa, and its Dependencies’, that
guaranteed him protection against Turkish assault.
The emergence of external neutralisation came with the rise of a Saudi role in
regional politics and the beginning of the politics of rentierism. To preserve Saudi
power, the British provided Ibn Saud with financial assistance and supplied him with
weapons16 while the Turks supported the Rashidis. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire,
however, saw the isolation of the Rashidi state and then its total collapse.
On the Arabian Peninsula several rulers gained British patronage in their quest
for independence from the Ottomans. In addition to Mobarak of Kuwait, Ibn Saud, and
the al-Idrisi of Asir, the most important for the British was Sheriff Hussein of Hejaz. As
a custodian of the Holy cities in Hejaz, Hussein could rally Muslims behind him in a
potential confrontation with the Europeans. When Britain altered its Middle East
policy, Sheriff Hussein was promised an Arab state under his rule after the Arab Revolt.
Arab identity was activated during this period especially after the Young Turk’s
revolution. France and Britain were seen as vital allies in the creation of an Arab state.
Competition among European powers, nevertheless, made initial promises to
Hussein null. The Sykes-Picot agreement signed by France and Britain divided Arab
territories among the two victors recognising Hussein merely as the ‘King of Hejaz.’
According to the agreement, France was to take Lebanon and Syria, while the British
would take Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine (Fromkin 1989, 189-192). Sheriff Hussein
protested against the agreement and his relations with the British deteriorated further
after the Balfour Declaration, which promised the Jewish state in Palestine.
With the end of the war and the emergence of a new political order in the Middle
East, British monthly subsidy to Ibn Saud was suspended. Financially weak and
refusing to accept Hussein as Caliph in 1924, (Al-Racheed 2005, 75), Ibn Saud directed
his energies towards the successful occupation of Hejaz in 1926 (Vassiliev 2000, 259)
becoming the ‘King of Hejaz and Sultan of Najd’. In the process of Saudi state
formation, similar to previous episodes, external powers limited Saudi expansion and
determined the borders of the Saudi state. In the first attempt of state formation the
Ottomans defined the parameters of Saudi state expansion. In the new regional order, it
was France and Britain who set those limits. In 1925, Ibn Saud signed the two
16 In signing the treaty Ibn Saud received 1000 rifles, £20 000, and a monthly subsidy of £5 000 (Al
Racheed 2005, 71 ; Vassiliev 2000, 206)
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agreements of Bahra and al-Hada delimiting Najdi borders with Iraq and Jordan
respectively (Ibid., 264) . Previous agreements with the British confined Saudi
expansion southwards with other gulf sheikhdoms. After a dispute over the oasis of
Najran, a war took place between Ibn Saud and Yemen. The Italians, occupying Eritrea
and Somalia, feared Saudi expansion to the Bab al-Mandab and intervened in support of
the Yemenis. British counterbalance, however, brought the war to an end (Safran 1991,
54-5) leading both parties to sign a treaty demarcating their common border in 1934
(Vassiliev 2000, 286).
In signing the treaty with Yemen, Ibn Saud had concluded the process of Saudi
state formation. By 1934, Ibn Saud, now King of Saudi Arabia, had transformed from a
revisionist power in the Ottoman Empire to a status quo force in the new regional order.
This will set Saudi Arabia on path dependent trajectory and define it responses to
systemic forces. The ability of Saudi Arabia to reproduce the regional power
configuration was enhanced by domestic Saudi power monopolisation. Next, I examine
Saudi regime formation and the composition of the Saudi social field, which will
contribute to explaining Saudi state survival.
5.2. Constituting the Saudi Social Field: Political Monopolisation and
Regime Formation
In examining internal processes of Saudi state formation we will draw a broader picture
of the Saudi state, the nature of its regime, and conditions of its survival. In a
comparative manner, especially with Iraq as we shall see later, the major element of
Saudi state formation is the congruence in the timing of political monopolisation with
the drawing of the state’s borders. In other words, the monopoly mechanism was
advanced with the formation of the territorial state in 1932. Why? The section above
showed that the Saudi state wasn’t externally engineered rather; external indifference to
Najd, initially, and later Saudi revisionism coupled with British strategy made domestic
attempts at political monopolisation possible. As Vassiliev makes clear:
After the capitulation of the Ottoman empire, there were five
independent states in Arabia—Hijaz, Najd, Jabal Shammar, Asir, and
Yemen. Their future was to be determined both by the struggle
between them (eventually won by the strongest, the emirate Najd)
and Britain’s policy (Ibid., 247).
Where external factors contributed to the emergence of a field— the context setting
where state formation takes place—domestic struggles were shaped by the nature of that
133
field. This section will aim to define this social field, examine strategies of political
monopolisation, and the emerging Saudi regime.
The context in which Saudi political expansion took place was defined by a
cultural foundation existing in Arabia composed of two components. The first included
the tribal system, which provided the normative context in which the Sauds achieved
their conquests. The second component included Islam, particularly Sunni Islam, which
defined the religious inclination of most of the population of Arabia. This cultural
structure formed the source of Saudi political monopolisation which centred on
maintaining the tribal value system and using religion as both a unifier and a pacifier in
that process. As such, Saudi political monopolisation developed in harmony with that
cultural structure, which formed the social base of Saudi power. This would reflect, as
we shall see below, on Saudi political structure.
By the time the third Saudi state formation began, tribes continued to exist as the
basic social organisation in Arabia. In the process of Saudi political monopolisation
tribes were pivotal as a military force and as a source of Saudi value system (Kostiner
1991, 227). The majority of Ibn Saud’s forces came from tribes. Tribes legitimised
their conquests utilising the Wahhabi creed. As mentioned above, Wahhabism provided
for a revivalist religious doctrine challenging existing religious interpretations and,
hence, existing political authorities. A combination of tribal traditional activities with
religious zeal made conquest possible. These two factors facilitated the emergence of
the Ikwan (Brotherhood) movement, which was pivotal for Saudi expansion, especially
in Hejaz. The movement emerged in Najd by a member of the Shaikh (Ibn Wahhab’s)
family, qadi (religious scholar and judge) of Riyadh and qadi of Ahsa (Vassiliev 2000,
227). Consecrating raids in the name of religion and obeying the leader or Imam
(spiritual leader), which became Ibn Saud’s title17 after recapturing Riyadh, were
important reasons leading Ibn Saud to connect his cause with the movement. Composed
of tribal forces, the movement initiated a sedentarisation process leading tribal groups to
resign from nomadic life and settle in prearranged locations, called Hujar (Kostiner
1991, 230) numbering around 120 in 1929. Encouraged by both Ibn Saud and Najdi
ulama (Vassiliev 2000, 228-9), the Ikhwan movement had three important elements in
Ibn Saud’s power monopoly: “traditional military prowess, religious fervor, and
detachment from restraining official positions” (Kostiner 1991, 231).
17 To differentiate himself from other tribal leaders, Ibn Saud promoted himself not only as tribal and
military leader but also as an Imam giving his rule a religious basis. (Al-Rasheed 2005, 95-6)
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Similar to the founder of the first Saudi state, Ibn Saud succeeded in diverting
the movement’s energies to his political causes. After all Islam as an ideology
transcended tribal affiliation and provided a universal identity. “The crucial Wahhabi
connection,” argues Ghassan Salame, “gave the Sauds a supra-tribal ideology to
manipulate in their drive to establish a permanent principality, rather than one of those
numerous volatile and short-lived tribal confederations” (Salame 1989, 70). Building on
the tribal and religious elements of the movement, Ibn Saud strengthened his social base
as he was expanding his power in Arabia.
Another strategy enabled by the cultural structure that contributed to Ibn Saud’s
power is intermarriage of different tribes. Ibn Saud’s marrying to families of leading
tribes formed blood ties among them and demobilised their warring traditions (Niblock
2006, 33). Marriages, such as those with Al Shaikh and Jilawi families, were crucial in
the incorporation in the new regime and for consolidating Saudi power. Al-Rasheed
observes that most of Ibn Saud’s marriages came after he defeated the tribe (Al-
Racheed 2005, 115). Less influential families were incorporated through financial rents
and by serving, at later stages, in the Saudi Arabian National Guards. Kostiner and
Teitlebaum argue that “the royal family itself ..became subdivided into kinship groups
echoing some of the tribal formations of society….the Saudi leaders accommodated
themselves to the prevailing principles of tribal loyalty and identity” (Kostiner and
Teitelbaum 2000, 131).
In expanding Saudi power in the kingdom’s three regions, coercion was pivotal.
In consolidating power, however, Ibn Saud used different forms of incorporation
depending on the region he conquered. When Ibn Saud occupied Ahsa in 1913, fearing
a Turkish retaliation from the Persian Gulf, he made an agreement with major Shiite
scholars guaranteeing their religious freedom in return for their loyalty to him (Al-
Racheed 2005, 70). This was in contradiction with the Wahhabi doctrine, which
considered the Shiites as ‘rejectionists’. He for instance guaranteed their security by
issuing a special ordinance after the fall of Jabal Shammar (Vassiliev 2000, 255). In
Asir, Ibn Saud signed an agreement with Hussein Ibn Ali al-Idrissi neutralising the
latter’s external relations but guaranteeing him the local management of Asir and its
tribal affairs (Al-Racheed 2005, 78).
Similar to mechanism taking place at a macro level, the agreement between Ibn
Saud and Idrissi sustained Saud’s rule to Asir by mediating this power through the
Idrissi. As we shall see, increase in regime strength and autonomy, however will lead
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over time to the transfer of power from local or regional powers to direct Saudi rule.
Finally, in Hejaz and due to the region’s cultural and political evolution, its relatively
advanced economy in comparison to Najd, the presence of a business class, and higher
forms of socio-economic and political institutionalisation, saw Ibn Saud embarking on a
different strategy. Kostiner argues that “in contrast to Western experiences, which drew
on mobile urban classes and class struggle as stimulants to centralised government,
Saudi state bureaucracy resulted from the expedient practical calculations of the local
leader” (Kostiner 1991, 233). Practical calculations of the local leader did mean that Ibn
Saud had to incorporate certain social forces in the process of state making. “The king
understood”, observes Vassiliev, “that he had to take account of the interests of Hijazi
nobility” (2000, 269). This however is not very different from early European state
formation. European kings, before the rise of mobile urban classes and class struggle,
had to cope with different feudal factions, particularly as they prepared for and waged
wars. Ibn Saud’s occupation of Hejaz led him to the establishment of a Majlis Shura, or
consultative assembly, made of Hejazi notables. The assembly consisted of Faisal, son
of Ibn Saud as a viceroy, four of his advisors, and six Hejazi nobles.
These practical considerations, however, did not go without resistance from the
more ideological factions of the Saudi alliance, mainly the Ikhwan movement. As we
shall see below, these factions will clash with Saudi interests. Nevertheless, what does
this form of political monopolisation tell us about the emerging Saudi regime? And,
what are the relations that distinguish this regime with other social groupings?
5.2.1. Political Structure, Regime Nature and the Saudi State
The emerging regime in Saudi Arabia cannot be isolated from the process of state
formation discussed above and which led to the emergence of a political structure in the
Saudi social field dominated and monopolised by the Sauds. In exploring this regime,
we will be able to draw a detailed picture of the Saudi state and its formation. To
recapitulate, external neutralisation provided the external conditions for domestic
monopolisation of power. Monopolisation of power in the Saudi state was facilitated by
the existence of a cultural foundation composed of a tribal system with Islam as its
religious value system. Saudi strategy relied on these two components as part of its
expansion. Political monopolisation will lay the foundations for the emergence of state
institutions and explain Saudi unitary response to systemic forces. These will form the
internal and external conditions for Saudi state survival. In this section, I will examine
the internal conditions.
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In going beyond their tribe, beyond their chieftaincy, beyond Najd, in
dominating beyond their immediate circle of power, the Sauds have established a
political structure; the basis on which we can talk of a Saudi state. Forms of
incorporation in the Saudi case did not mean political incorporation. Rather, this form
of inclusion meant political exclusion. As we shall see below, the ulama and business
were able to influence policy making in each of their respective areas however political
decision making, especially those affecting Saudi regime and state security and its
foreign policies, was monopolised by the monarchy. In this way, the Sauds have
maintained political autonomy from other social forces. The institution that maintained
this autonomy is the Saudi monarchy. Emerging state institutions were designed by the
Saudis to (1) consolidate domination and (2) maintain autonomy.
The Saudi state is an expression of Saudi domination over other social
organisations in Saudi Arabia, initially the tribes but at a later stage other social forces.
The domination reflected the ability of one tribe to form hegemony over others. “It is
remarkable” observes Salame that “in a tribal society that one tribe has been able to gain
the degree of hegemony attained by the Sauds” (1989, 70). The state is a reflection of
this hegemony.
The Saudi state is a reflection of the tribal society which it emerged from. The
Saudi drive for domination forms the agential condition for state emergence, while both
coercion and incorporation as we saw above form the structural dimension of state
formation. As soon as the power of a tribe, party, or any political force begins to project
its power outside itself it enters into structural interaction with other social organisations
forming a new sphere. The state comprises this sphere; it is a social relationship.
Defining the state as a social relationship tells us little about the nature of this
relationship, however as this varies from one case to the other. To understand the Saudi
state it is important to define it first and then understand its nature.
Saudi political domination forms the locus of this state. The Saudi state
constitutes the political sphere separating the Sauds from other social organisations. It is
this difference that forms the political structure of the Saudi social field that is
monopolised by the Sauds. By Saudi political domination, I mean that the Sauds form
the major player in the political structure, as defined above. In the Saudi case, given the
cultural structure, political conflict has taken vertical forms more than a horizontal one.
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Saudi political domination forms not only the locus of the Saudi state there but
also constitutes the structure that keeps different Saudi social forces, including tribes,
intact and, increasingly, interdependent. Power in Saudi Arabia gravitates to the centre
that is monopolised by the Sauds. Through socio-economic policies and religious
legitimating processes of power reproduction, a relation of interdependence emerges.
According to the formula here, any change in the nature of the Saudi social forces will
affect Saudi domination and lead to a change in the totality of the Saudi state. I will
show below that there is constancy in the Saudi case in terms of political domination.
We will examine in some detail as to how and why this is preserved, and therefore how
the Saudi state survives.
5.2.2 The Monarchy, Social Forces and State Institutions: Power
Reproduction in Saudi Arabia
To understand the nature of the Saudi regime, its predominance in the Saudi social field,
and the totality of the Saudi state, we need to locate the main actor or element that keeps
the Saudi state intact by examining: (1) The institution of the Monarchy and the
dynamics within it, (2) the relation of the monarchy with the religious establishment,
and (3) the relation of the monarchy with different socio-economic forces.
Political monopolisation by the monarchy effectively weakened potential
adversaries providing it with an autonomy and capacity to influence other social forces.
The emergence of oil income reinforced this autonomy. Increasing socio-economic
integration in Saudi Arabia required a change in regime tactics and forms of
incorporation and institutionalisation. This incorporation, however, did not alter
relations in the political sphere, where the Saudi monarchy remains the dominant actor.
The actor responsible for maintaining and reproducing the Saudi domination is
the royal family. This constitutes the sons and grandsons of Ibn Saud and now consists
of around 7000 princes dominating the major positions in the security, military and
bureaucratic apparatuses (Niblock 2006, 14). Naturally, not all princes posses strong
political weight as divisions and power struggles within the family imposes a hierarchy
of power. All kings of Saudi Arabia were sons of Ibn Saud who died in 1953. Tim
Niblock compares the royal family to that of “a political party in a single-party state”
(2006, 28). It forms a “patriarchical elite” (Kostiner and Teitelbaum 2000, 132).
Initially, Ibn Saud refrained from appointing his sons in administrative posts
(The exception was the appointment of Saud and Faisal as viceroys of Najd and Hejaz
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respectively). However, socio-economic and security threats demanded a sophisticated
state machinery of which royals were ready to control. In the formative year the king
formed the central figure within the monarchy acting as an imam, military commander
and supreme executive. These roles were later delegated to different state institutions
such as the council of ministers, the royal diwan, and ministries of justice and defence,
commander of the National Guard, and the majlis al-shura (advisory council) (Vassiliev
2000, 436).
Monopolising coercion formed the basis of other monopolisations. The main
organs of the security apparatuses involved the two military corps, the National Guard
and the Army. The guard had its origins in the White Army and included the remnants
of the Ikwan movement. The Army on the other hand is an expansion of Hijazi troops
inherited from the Sheriff of Mecca (Champion 2003,72; Salame 1989, 72). Regular
troops are tasked with defending the kingdom’s borders, while the Guard is charged
with the protection of cities and oil wells. In addition to the police, which is an organ of
the Interior Ministry, each “local emir-governor had a guard of his own” (Vassiliev
2000, 441)?
These two military branches not only reflect instruments of Saudi domination,
but also reflect the power balance within the monarchy. Former Prince, and now King,
Abdullah has been in command of the National Guard since 1964, while his half brother
Crown Prince Sultan, who has been Minister of Defence for 44 years (Lees 2006, 44),
commands the regular army forces (Glosemeyer 2004, 149). The National Guard acts as
a countervailing force to the Army reflecting two main factions within the monarchy.
First the ‘Sudairi Seven’, who are the seven sons of Ibn Saud and full brothers from Ibn
Saud’s wife of Al Sudairi of Najd. In addition to Fahd, Crown Prince Sultan is minister
of Defence and Aviation, Turki is his deputy, Naif has been minister of the Interior for
31 years, Salman is governor of Riyadh, Ahmad was vice-governor of Mecca, and
Sattam is vice-governor of Riyadh (Vassiliev 2000, 436).
King Abdullah on the other hand forms a counterweight to the Sudairis (Salame
1989, 75). He has no full brothers but has strong tribal backing as a descendent from the
powerful Shammar tribe. Abdullah earns the support of the opposition-in-exile who see
him as an important force to counterweight the power monopoly of the Sudairis
(Glosemeyer 2004, 150). Although several scholars point out the dominance of the
Sudairis (Ibid., ; Salame 1989, 75; Niblock 2006, 111), Al-Rasheed observes that since
the mid-1990s the regime has generated a five-faction power arrangement (2005, 200):
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“the royal family itself is best seen as a headless tribe within which several groups have
competing claims to leadership” (Ibid., 188). Of the five circles of power, four come
from the Sudairis—Al Fahd, Al Salman, Al Sultan, and Al Nayif—while the fifth is Al
Abdullah. Each of these circles has its own family, for example, before his death King
Fahd made his son Abd al-Aziz his spokesman in his diwan, Nayif appointed his son
Muhammad to the post of Deputy Minister of Interior Minister (Ibid., 203), King
Abdullah, placed his sons Abdu Aziz and Faisal as his advisors and Mitab as the
Assistant Deputy Commander of the National Guard and finally Sultan, the new Crown
Prince made his sons Khalid as Deputy Defence Minister and Bandar (the former
ambassador to Washington) Head of the newly established National Security Council
(Lees 2006, 46).
The major security apparatuses, headed by royals, are composed of social forces
loyal to the Sauds. For example, in the Interior Ministry, observes Al-Rasheed, “Nayif’s
ministry allocates top positions in the Saudi security forces… to loyal Qassimis and
southern Najdis… while low-ranking policemen and intelligence personnel are drawn
from impoverished and peripheral tribal groups in the Hijaz, Asir and Najd” (2005,
202). The large size of the royal family makes it possible to install its members in
sensitive positions within the security organs (Salame 1989, 76). Members of the
National Guard, which benefits “up to a million Saudis by providing income, medical
support and education”, come from traditional tribal groupings that are loyal to the
Saudi regime. The majority of advisers and high ranking officials surrounding King
Abdullah come from Najd and Qassim, “mainly the cities of Unayzah and Burydah”
(Al-Rasheed 2005, 205). Similar to the major security posts, the posts of provincial
governors are reserved for royal princes and families loyal to the Saudi regime
(Vassiliev 2000, 446-7).
The domination of these positions in public institutions like the Army, National
Guard, and security apparatuses of the Interior Ministry, have formed a strong basis on
which Saudi power is reproduced. No social force in the Saudi social field can
counterweight the regime’s coercive powers. In 2007, the Saudi government planned to
establish special security forces for the protection of oil wells against possible attacks
(al Riyadh 2007). This provides one major pillar to understanding Saudi domination and
the regime’s autonomy in the Saudi field. The other two pillars form the religious
legitimacy and socio-economic bases of power reproduction in Saudi Arabia.
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Understanding the role and place of ulama and the religious establishment in the
Saudi social field and exploring its relation to the Saudi regime raises a few important
points. The first is the fact that the Saudi state religious interpretation is based on
Wahhabi thought. The monopoly of this interpretation is guaranteed by the regime’s
monopoly over coercion and, as we shall see shortly, economic resources. Second, this
Wahhabi monopoly over religious interpretation in turn reinforces the other two
monopolies. Accordingly, the structure of relations between the Sauds and the ulama is
mutually constitutive, with a boundary separating the two. Where these boundaries have
been crossed by one actor a crisis ensued. Several instances, nevertheless, reveal that the
political regime had the upper hand in solving the crises. Crises emerged when Wahhabi
theory could not provide easy answers to changing socio-economic and political
domestic and external environments that the Saudi regime faced in the process of state
formation.
Niblock observes that “without the support of the Al Su’ud, Wahhabism would
not have gained predominant position within the Islamic framework of the Arabian
peninsula, and without the militant support of the Wahhabi movement it is unlikely that
the Al Su’ud would have gained territorial control of the peninsula” (Niblock 2006, 29).
This entailed a division of labour between Al Saud and the Shaikh family, which are the
second most ‘prestigious family’ in the kingdom (Long 1997, 22). While the Sauds have
concentrated their power in political, security, and economic spheres, the religious elite
focused on justice, education, and religious affairs. Their power to issue fatwas
(religious rulings) has been pivotal to provide a religious rationale for the regime’s
political strategies giving them “the capacity to legitimize, or delegitimize, the rule of
the Al Saud” (Glosemeyer 2004, 33). Their control over Committees for Encouraging
Virtue and Forbidding Vice gave the ulama strong power over public morality issues. In
1971, Ibrahim Al Shaikh was appointed minister of justice, giving the family a strong
influence in this domain (Vassiliev 2000, 440). The ulamas weekly meetings with the
king and the ‘core elite’ gave them access to and influence on decision-making
processes.18
Outside their educational and religious domains, the religious elite have in
several instances been able to alter government policy as in 1960 when they obliged the
government to restrict the introduction of income tax to foreigners. The dethronement of
King Saud in 1964 was facilitated by a fatwa signed by high-level ulama (Vassiliev
18 “By simply not attending their weekly meetings with the crown prince—and thus threatening to
withdraw their support— the religious elite blocked decisions” (Glosemeyer 2004, 152)
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2000, 440). In 1950, the ulama objected to Ibn Saud’s plans to celebrate the 50th
anniversary of his capture of Riyadh and the celebration was cancelled. Furthermore, an
approval from the ulama was required before Western equipment was imported into the
kingdom (Niblock 2006, 33).
The ulamas access, however, to decision-making and their political and
economic dependence on the state, which does not only provide them with their income
and with the financial resources to expand their ideology but sustains their monopoly on
this field, made them socialise in socio-economic and political structures pushing them
into pursuing a pragmatic behaviour largely resembling that of the political regime. The
regime’s relation has fluctuated with the religious elements in the kingdom.
When opposition by the Ikhwan intensified against Ibn Saud he was able to
divide the religious establishment by supporting the Wahhabi ulama of Najd against the
Ikhwan on one hand and to suppress the movement by coercion on the other. The
Ikwan’s main objection involved Ibn Saud’s relationship with the ‘infidel’ British,
prohibition of trade with Kuwait, the incorporation of the ‘schismatics’ Shiites of Ahsa
and Qatif, and the importation of Western equipment to the Kingdom. A fatwa,
however, was issued by 15 Riyadhi ulama accepting some of the objections of the
Ikhwan, but maintained that it was the Imam (Ibn Saud) who only had the right to
proclaim war (Vassiliev 2000, 273-4).
The ulama’s decision balanced against the Ikhwan who had the potential (tribal
backing and religious legitimacy) to turn against Ibn Saud. This incident is indicative of
the pattern of relations between the Saudi regime and the religious establishment. The
main factor that needs to be recapitulated here is that religion does not provide a socio-
political formula that is easily applied and which can be easily refuted. Islam, like all
religions, is fluid and open to interpretation. This is especially true when it comes to
mundane issues of socio-economic, political, and security problems and the ways to
solve them. In this regards, what is to be interpreted is as important as who interprets.
This factor has two implications that are important for the analysis here. First,
given that religion is open to interpretation and that certain religious scholars socialise
(at the expense of others) in political structures, the religious establishment and
religious groups do not form a homogeneous group. This provides the political regime
with more power to manoeuvre. Second, this means that the religious elements in a
system will produce oppositional groups who are not incorporated by the regime or
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disagree with its official interpretation of the doctrine, particularly those calling for a
return to the original tenets of the doctrine. A few examples may illustrate the point.
In 1941, American experts began to arrive in Saudi Arabia to develop
agricultural and other economic projects. For some scholars, particularly the young Abd
al-Aziz ibn Baz, who later became an eminent scholar (Glosemeyer 2004, 155), this
meant an intrusion into Muslim holy lands by foreigners. Ibn Saud reaction to ibn Baz’s
objections was to summon him along with other ulama and to explain that these foreign
experts were under his control. Gaining the backing of other ulama, Ibn Saud jailed and
threatened to execute ibn Baz. Later ibn Baz “accepted the argumentation” and
submitted to the regime’s policy (Steinberg 2005, 25-26).
On 20 November 1979, a group of young Saudi Islamists led by Juhaiman al-
Utaiba, who was a Wahhabi hardliner and who claimed that his companion Muhammad
ibn Abdullah al-Qahtani was the expected Mahdi, captured the Grand Mosque in Mecca
and took hundreds of Muslim pilgrims as hostages. The group’s campaign threatened
the integrity of the Saudi regime as it severely criticized the royal family for its
corruption and relations with the ‘infidel powers’, especially the United States. After a
two-week confrontation with Saudi forces, the group was defeated with the assistance of
French anti-terrorism forces, and its 63 members were executed in 1980.
Another crisis between the monarchy and the religious elite ensued as a result of
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait leading the Saudi government to ask for American support.
An endorsement from The Council of Senior Scholars headed by Ibn Baz, however, was
crucial to legitimate the act. After an initial refusal, scholars submitted to the regime’s
political line. In issuing the fatwa, Steinberg observes that “the Wahhabi ulama’s
evolution from guardians of an activist ideology to state servants was completed” (Ibid.,
30). As a reward for his crucial cooperation, Ibn Baz was appointed Grand Mufti in
1993 (Glosemeyer 2004, 155) filling a post that was vacant since 1970 (Vassiliev 2000,
440).
The 1990s saw a confrontation between the regime and Islamic forces coming
after the end of the Afghanistan war and the return of many Saudi’s from there to the
kingdom and increased American influence in the Middle East. The ideological
persuasions of the Islamic opposition ranged from moderate ‘Islamo-Liberal’ calling for
reform within an Islamic framework to more conservative factions supporting a return
to the fundamentals. At the centre of this spectrum is the Sahwa (Awakening), whose
intellectual origins go back to the 1970s combining traditional Wahhabi tenets and
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modern ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood. The second gulf war, according to Lacroix,
politicised these intellectual trends (2005, 35-6). Born in 1950s, the “Awakening
Shaikhs..came up with their own agenda—thus challenging the core elite and those
parts of the religious elites who legitimized the core elites’s policies” (Glosemeyer
2004, 153).
In 1991, 52 scholars from the Sahwa movement, supported by Ibn Baz,
presented to King Fahd a petition including their demands for reform followed by an
elaborate one in 1992. The demands, which called for respect of human rights and for
strengthening of religious institutions, were later published in the Arab media (Ibid.,
142-153). The regime considered this “an unforgivable crossing of the line” (Lacroix
2005, 42) leading Ibn Baz and the Council for Senior Scholars to withdraw their support
and to the arrest of Sahwa activists (Glosemeyer 2004, 153).
The above illustrations reflect the regime’s autonomy in relation to the ulama,
which is possible because they “were far from a homogeneous group” (Ibid.). As some
scholars were incorporated in the regime, others’ opposition was either tolerated or
repressed. In 1999, Abd al-Aziz Al Shaikh became Grand Mufti. As opposed to his
predecessor, he was less ambitious and followed the regime’s political line. The
incidents of September 11 and the war in Afghanistan and Iraq activated the Islamic
opposition, leading one scholar to issue a fatwa calling for support of Taliban against
US forces. This led the government to reaffirm the role of Council of Senior Scholars as
the only legal council to issue fatwas (Steinberg 2005, 32).
Religious legitimating had a dual effect. In some cases—like the support of
Afghan wars against the Soviet Union—ulamas political line converged with the
regimes interest, as we shall see below. In other cases, as the opposition to US war in
Iraq and Afghanistan grew, the regime was able to control the religious elements. In the
Israel-Lebanon war of 2006, the Saudi regime’s objection of the war was backed by a
non-‘official’ fatwa by one of the signatories of the 1992 memorandum and which
called upon Muslims not to support the Shiite Islamic movement in its war with Israel
(Al-Rasheed 2006). In 2007, the Grand Mufti, Abd al-Aziz Al Shaikh, prohibited jihad
outside Saudi Arabia, in particular Iraq, arguing that Saudi youth should not be used as
tools for external powers. Of the major ‘sins’ of this act, according to the mufti, is the
opposition to the ruler’s will (elaph 2007). In 2007, the official institute of Scientific
Research and Iftaa established a website confining fatwas issuance to the council based
on the teaching of Ibn Baz (Mtair 2007).
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Another form of religious opposition came from a different element in the Saudi
cultural structure: the Shiites of the Eastern Province. The Saudi regime’s strategy
towards the Shiites differed from other religious or tribal elements in the Saudi cultural
structure.19 The Shiite community constitutes around 8 percent of the Saudi population
and is geographically concentrated in the Eastern Province (Ahsa) with another small
community residing around Medina.20 Regime-Shiite relations are centred on: (1) the
regime’s political strategies to coerce and co-opt opposition in the process of political
centralisation, (2) the constraints placed on the regime by the ulama and the perception
of Sunni majority in the country, and (3) the geographical location of the Shiites in the
oil-rich Eastern province.
The relationship developed from the Saudis attempts to incorporate the Shiite in
the first phase of state formation to the latter becoming a ‘security problem’ for the
regime with the increase of the emergence of oil in 1950s and 1960s and, especially,
after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. The formation of the Saudi state with its
Wahhabi elements shaped the political and cultural developments of the Shiites in Saudi
Arabia as opposed to Shiites in other states such as Kuwait (Nakash 2006, 42-43),
Lebanon, Bahrain or Iraq. As we saw above, when Ibn Saud annexed Ahsa in 1913 he
guaranteed the religious freedom of the Shiites in return for their allegiance. His
appointment of Ibn Jilawi as governor of the Eastern Province, however, saw the latter
aiming to convert the Shiites to Wahhabism, prohibiting their rituals, and introducing
Hanbali law into their legal system. Part of the Ikhwan’s revolt, discussed above,
involved their opposition to the incorporation of the Shiites, which the Riyadh ulama
had shared. During the crisis, these ulama, asked Ibn Saud to send teachers to the Ahsa
and Qatif to promote ‘true’ Islam. Yitzhak Nakash succinctly explains Regime-Shiite
relations:
In dealing with the Shi’is, the Al Sa’ud has the backing of the
Wahhabi religious establishment. While the Wahhabi ulama often
pushed the Al Sa’ud to impose restrictions on the Shi’is, the rulers
used the “Shi’i question” both to appease the ulama on issues
relating to the status of minorities and religious freedom and as a
means of reducing tension among competing Sunni groups within
the Kingdom (Ibid., 46).
Sunni-Shiites differences have stood as a barrier for reconciliation between the
two communities in Saudi Arabia leading to “intolerance of the Sunni majority of this
19 For a comparison in Saudi state response towards tribal and religious opposition groups see (Al-
Rasheed and Al-Rasheed 1996, 96-119)
20 We don’t have an accurate estimate of the size of the Shiite community in Saudi Arabia, which may
range from 275,000 to half a million (Ibid., 109)
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Shia enclave in Arabia” (Al-Rasheed and Al-Rasheed 1996, 110). The discovery of oil
in 1938 in the Eastern Province further transformed the Shiites into a ‘security problem’
for the regime. The community’s predominance in Ahsa and the refusal of Sunni
tribesmen to take menial jobs made the Shiites the backbone of the Arabian American
Oil Company (Aramco) until 1979. Oil strikes of the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s reflected
poor work conditions, sectarian discord, and anti-imperialist ideals. On a sectarian level
the strikes reflected the Shiites opposition to Ibn Jilawi calling for his removal.
Economically it was a protest against the poor work conditions and finally on a
nationalist level the strikes indicated a frustration with the presence of foreign workers
and American forces in the Dhahran base (Nakash 2006, 48).
Similar to many minorities who resort to universal ideologies in search for
equality with the rest of their compatriots, the Shiites of Saudi Arabia embraced Arab
Nationalism, especially during Nasser’s rule in Egypt, and Baathism. Those opposed
Wahhabi teachings that discriminated against the community (Al-Rasheed and Al-
Rasheed 1996, 111). Here, Nasser’s revisionism on the regional level coincided with the
revisionism sought by Shiites in Saudi Arabia. Nasser’s death, however, and the
regime’s rejection of such ideologies saw the regime repress all political activity during
the 1970s.
The Islamic Revolution in Iran both as a national (independence from US
dominance) and religious (ending Shiite political ‘quietism’) revolution provided a new
impetus for Saudi Shiites. In 1980, an intifada (uprising) in the Eastern Province took
place in defiance of the government’s ban on celebrating of the ritual of Muharam—the
annual commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein (Nakash 2006, 5). Sparked
by Aramco workers and students, the uprising inaugurated a decade of confrontation
with the Saudi regime and marked a shift towards political activism. This started with
the founding of the secret The Organisation of Islamic Revolution (OIR), which drew
its members from students and workers in the oil industry sector and had coordination
and information offices in Tehran.
The Shiites accordingly came under attack from the religious scholars, like Ibn
Baz who considered them as ‘infidels’ and banned Muslim dealings with the
community (Ibid.) and by Saudi authorities especially the National Guard (Al-Rasheed
and Al-Rasheed 1996, 111-2). The publication of the Organisation of Islamic
Revolution monthly journal al-jazeera al-arabiya (The Arabian Peninsula), on the other
hand, sought to expose the regime’s strategies against the Shiite community. By 1990,
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however, revolutionary attitudes began to shift towards accommodation. Its leaders,
exiled in London and Arab countries, “moved from total rejection of the regime during
the time when the movement was ‘revolutionary’ to a call for dialogue with the state”
(Ibid., 113). In 1992, the OIR became al-Haraka al-Islahiya (The Reform Movement)
(Ibrahim 2006). Moving away from revolutionary calls, the movement began to
advocate religious freedom, democracy and socio-economic and human rights. In 1993,
the Saudi regime announced reconciliation with the leaders of the movement pledging
to improve their socio-economic conditions and asked them to return back to the
kingdom.
Some observe that the “barrier that long separated Sunnis from Shiites—a
barrier reinforced by Saudi official mistrust of the big Iranian neighbour—no longer
really exists anywhere else than in people’s minds” Regime reconciliation with the
Shiites, the latter’s loss of “demographic preponderance” in the Eastern Province21
(Ibid., 37), and economic openness with Iran have altered the regime-Shiite relations.
Further two Shiites from the Eastern Province were appointed to the Saudi consultative
assembly, while Crown Prince Abdullah and the ulama recognised the kingdom’s
confessional diversity (Menoret 2005, 36-37).
As I have argued throughout this thesis, developments taking place within states
are also shaped by systemic forces too. Saudi-Iranian relations may be determined
largely by changes taking place at the regional level. The collapse of Baathist Iraq in
2003, the changing balance of power within Iraq, and increased Iranian influence there
has soured Saudi-Iranian relations. Further, Iran’s support of Lebanon’s Hizbullah and
Hamas, its strategic alliance with Syria, and its resistance to US strategy in the region
have placed the two states at extreme poles. These regional changes have intensified
sectarian divides between Sunnis and Shiites in the region, signs of which have been
acute in Iraq, Lebanon, and occasionally in Bahrain. What about the domestic factor of
reconciliation? Nakash argues that “the 1993 reconciliation was a gesture on the part of
the government towards the Shi’i minority, but it did not alter the basic relationship
between the Al Sau’d and the Shi’is…indeed the decade leading up to the 2003 war in
Iraq, the ruling family, as well as the U.S. administration, continued to view the Shi’is
as a security problem” although, he argues, “real threats came from al-Qaida” (Nakash
2006, 132). Away from the domestic and regional power balances, some
Neoconservatives elements in the US have argued for the detachment of the Eastern
21 This process started as early as 1950s when the Saudi regime settled Sunni tribes in new cities and
constructed new ports in Dammam and Khobar in the province (Nakash 2006, 49)
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Province or the establishment of ‘Muslim Republic’ to weaken or displace the Saudi
regime (for a brief review see Aarts 2004)
We have so far examined the Saudi power monopolisation by focusing on
external neutralisation, the monopolisation of coercion, and cultural reproduction. What
needs to be examined now is the material structure or the socio-economic foundations
of political centralisation. Since oil income is a crucial factor here, two historical
periods will be emphasised: the pre-oil era until 1950s and the post-oil period.
The discussion above showed how the Saudi regime incorporated different
social forces in each of the kingdom’s regions. The political economy of
monopolisation followed a similar trajectory. It is important here to differentiate
between the process of monopolisation and the political economy of regime survival
that came after that monopolisation was achieved. Initially, the monarchy had to rely on
active socio-economic forces, namely the Hijazi nobility, income from hajj, and the
British subsidy (terminated in 1917) as sources of income. The oil factor changed the
socio-economic formula and increased the regime’s autonomy from the Hijazi nobility
leading to the formation of a Najdi class created by and largely dependent on the state.
These socio-economic developments did not challenge the political monopoly of the
Saudi monarchy.
“It is surprising”, observes Kiren Aziz Chaudhry “that the impetus behind the
Saudi process—a quest for taxes and a unified army—matches that of Europe more than
that of post-colonial states where the bureaucracy, the tax system, and the military were
created by European powers” (1997, 47). This, as argued above, has been a result of
external neutralisation reflected in the indifference towards Arabia by external powers.
In 1934, Saudi Arabia had four distinct political economies: Ahsa oases where oil was
later found, the rich agricultural region of Asir, the arid region of Najd, and the
commercially rich Hejaz province. Political monopolisation involved the monopoly of
tax collection and the establishment of a central bureaucracy, border erosion between
regions, and the creation of a national currency. In this regards, institutional building led
to the destruction of three constraining social organisations: the tribal confederations of
Najd, the guilds of Jeddah, and later the bigger merchants in Jeddah. These social
groups either were eliminated or subdued to the state protection (Menoret 2005, 94).
The stabilisation of state-business relations came after “the successful
completion of a rudimentary military and institutional infrastructure” (Chaudry 1997,
45). The financial bases of political domination were driven by the need for revenue to
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maintain an expanding army and territory, which in turn generated tax-collecting
bureaucratic structures and a standardised currency. Two social factions contributed to
the emergence of a common currency—these were the Islamist jurists, who by installing
universal Islamic law code replaced regional and tribal laws with a standard law
imposed by a state, and the commercial Hijazi elite who saw greater opportunities in the
emergence of a national market.
The emergence of a national market and a state bureaucracy came at the price of
Hijazi guilds, which formed local monopolies, and tribal elements, which disrupted
their nomadic economy (Ibid., 67). Tax collection further generated resistance taking
violent means in Najd, Ahsa, and Asir encouraging secessionist movements in many
parts of the nascent state. The Ikhwan’s rebellion involved an opposition to the
monarch’s objective of tax collection. Before the emergence of oil, most state revenues
came from Hejaz. As mentioned above, state institutions emerging after the conquest of
Hejaz such as Majlis al Shura saw commercial elites there having a strong bargaining
power in relation to the Sauds in contrast to other agricultural and tribal regions in the
kingdom (Ibid., 70-71).
Nevertheless, similar to the regime’s reliance on the Riyadh scholars to weaken
the Ikhwan, Saudi strategy sought to isolate the guilds and support the merchants in
Hejaz. While the guilds refused the enlargement of the market and an end to their
monopoly, market entry restrictions, and monopsonies, the import merchants of Jeddah
allied with the state earning themselves a place in the Majlis al Shura. In 1950, the
kingdom issued a unified income tax with exemption being made only to the royal
family, security forces, ambassadors, and low-income earners and called upon the
Department of Zakaat and Income Tax (DZIT) to execute the law. Tax agencies targeted
the commercial sector, foreign enterprises, and imports (Ibid., 77). The influx of oil
revenue in the1950s did not directly alter the fiscal policy of the Saudi regime, although
national revenues of oil income increased from $53 million in 1948 to $337.7 million in
1960 (Niblock 2006,38).
It was only in the1970s that Saudi Arabia became a purely rentier economy
largely relying on oil revenue. Between 1970 and 1975, GDP grew on an average rate of
13.2 percent largely because of oil revenue which increased from an average of $500
million a year in the 1960s to a staggering $48 billion by 1979 (Ibid., 52). The
introduction of oil began to turn the tide towards strengthening regime autonomy and
led to a change in the social bases of the Saudi state and its institutions.
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The Saudi state changed from an extractive state to an allocative or distributive
state. “In a mere decade” observes Chaudhry, the regulatory and extractive capabilities
of the Saudi state had all but vanished…taxing and regulatory agencies..had been
replaced by a larger but functionally narrower distributive bureaucracy that governed
the economy solely through the domestic employment of oil revenues” (1997, 140).
This provided the regime with the ability to reshape the state-society relations. Directly
after the 1973 oil embargo, most taxes on Saudi citizens and fees on residents were
eliminated, while foreign companies were exempt from taxes for five years. Most of the
DZIT offices throughout the kingdom were closed (Ibid., 145). The financial autonomy
of the state meant that it relied less on commercial elites or multinational companies and
became the major actor driving Saudi economic development. Put simply, the influx of
oil resources made taxation unnecessary.
One major result was that the economic focus in Saudi Arabia shifted from the
commercial elite of Hejaz to the economic elite from Riyadh. Royals form the core of
the new economic elite (Niblock 2006, 76). This takes place through government
procurement by contracting selected clients, representation of foreign companies, land
distribution by the king to royal princes or his confidants, and government support for
industrial development (Luciani 2005, 150-55). This gave rise to ‘assabiya capitalism
creating a “predominantly Najdi, bureaucratic-business elites and networks based on
family and other personal contacts, and wasta” (Champion 2003, 76).
The oil revenue increased the financial and political autonomy of the regime
contributing to the monopoly mechanism in Saudi Arabia. The shift augmented the
‘Najdization’ of politics bringing back tribal elements into state society relations.
Through oil income and its redistribution (Chaudry 1997, 147), the regime has been
able to diffuse socio-economic protest and demands for political change. However, has
economic development in Saudi Arabia generated new social forces? First, the
emergence of a national bourgeoisie,22 which is estimated to be to be around 500,000
constituting 3-4 percent of the population (Luciani 2005, 165) have hitherto been
politically passive but influential in economic issues. With the decline in oil revenue in
1986, the business class showed resistance to certain economic policies. A major socio-
political concern for the regime has been the high unemployment, which in 2004 was
estimated to be around 15-20 percent (Niblock 2006, 117). This led to the initiation of
22 In the Saudi case the bourgeoisie is the class of owners of capital. As opposed to Europe in where this
class was in contraposition to a feudal aristocracy, in Saudi Arabia this class was formed by the Saudi
regime as a result of oil rent. For definitions see, (Luciani 1995, 145)
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‘Saudisation’ programs aimed to replace foreign workers with Saudi nationals.
However, as this strategy contributed to increasing costs on business, opposition from
the business class and the effect it left in the economy, the program failed. Given that
the state’s economic policies are friendly to private enterprise, the national bourgeoisie
has otherwise abstained from direct political activity. There is a mutual dependence
between the regime and the bourgeoisie: the state relies on business to offer new
economic opportunities, expertise and investment, while business understands the
regime strength and hence is hesitant to engage beyond political ‘red-lines’: “The
‘dependent bourgeoisie’ at the highest level remains close to the state and its
leadership” (Hertog 2005, 127).
A second factor limiting the political consequences of economic change is
migrant labour. The vast modernisation program initiated in the early 1950s required the
importation of migrant labour, which grew from 115,000 in 1963 to 1,347,000 in 1979
(Niblock 2006, 54). According to 2003 figures, the kingdom hosts around 5- 6 million
foreign workers. Where in other cases workers have been crucial in democratisation
processes, in Saudi Arabia workers are politically immobile: “the socio-economic and
ethnic/cultural composition of Saudia Arabia’s labour force..meant that there was no
grouping which could cohere together, acting as a politicised Saudi working class”.
Finally, due to the large expansion of the bureaucracy in the last six decades a
new middle class has emerged. Although, many would consider the middle class to
constitute an important vehicle for political change, the middle class in Saudi Arabia
was, similar to its business counterpart, dependent on the state, which in 1979 had
employed 26 percent of the Saudi labour force (Ibid., 55).
As we can see, the socio-economic structure of Saudi Arabia continues to foster
a state-led development, but as opposed to East Asian cases, it is the oil rent—a wealth
generated from outside the Saudi economy—that drives this economy. This means that
oil rent demobilises potential socio-economic forces who could challenge Saudi power,
as economic growth did not generate new forces—such as an indigenous working
class—or the state does not need to extract tax and hence disrupt its relations with
society. This implies that social forces emerging from the material structure haven’t
been able to politicise their social agendas and break the Saudi monopoly by making
political claims.
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5.3. External Factors of State Survival: Reproducing the
External Neutralisation
The aim of this section is to examine how Saudi external relations contribute to keeping
the Saudi state intact. In the previous sections, I examined how the regime reproduces
itself in the face of potential threats emanating from both the cultural and material
structures in the Saudi social field. I have showed that the Saudi regime has been able to
monopolise the political structure through the cooptation and repression of potential
threats. Further, I showed that the introduction of the oil factor into the process of Saudi
state formation has strengthened the regime giving it more autonomy in its social field.
The monopolisation over coercive power, economic decision making, and religious
interpretation of Islam, as we saw above, provided the regime with strong autonomy
making it difficult for challengers to revise the system. To understand Saudi state
behaviour in the international sphere, the departing point should be this domestic
political autonomy. How can we explain Saudi state behaviour using the theoretical
framework presented here?
External neutralisation—indifference to the inner politics of Najd—contributed
to the indigenous attempts at political centralisation in the Arabian Peninsula. Ottoman-
British competition, made Ibn Saud’s revisionism attractive for the British. Domestic
power monopoly after the emergence of the state system, gave the Saudi regime the
power to project itself outside its territory in attempts to preserve its internal
domination, becoming a status quo state that aims to maintain and reproduce the
external neutralisation that made it possible for it to emerge in the first place. Therefore,
it is not only external factors that contribute to state or regime survival in Saudi Arabia
but also how this regime (agent) is active in reproducing the environment (regional
structure) it is embedded in. Why and how does this take place?
The Saudi regime, which was the actor behind the emergence of a Saudi realm,
seeks above all survival (Gause 2002, 193), of which state survival is a direct
consequence. Accordingly, power monopoly at the domestic level is a necessary
condition, but not a sufficient one. It is a necessary condition to facilitate another
condition which is external neutralisation. The sections above focused on how the
Saud’s monopolise power internally. In this section, we will look at how it reproduces
structures at the regional level. It is these two faces of the Saudi state that explain its
survival.
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In reproducing the external neutralisation, Saudi Arabia attempted to: (1)
counterbalance any actor that seeks to revise the existing order; (2) ally itself to
international powers that share the same aim; and (3) to activate cultural components
existing at the regional structure to achieve its political ends. This behaviour served to
consolidate Saudi power domestically as it reproduced the regional structure. In its turn,
the structure, composed of different states, contributed directly (regional and
international support) and indirectly to keeping the Saudi regime and, consequently, its
territorial state intact.
As we have three levels to deal with, domestic, regional and international it is
important to make the following argument. In reproducing the external neutralisation,
Saudi Arabia’s second most important arena is the regional. It is here where the
kingdom attempts to balance two regional powers and thus neutralise their potential
effect on the kingdom. The less international powers sought to engage in Middle East
politics, the more Saudi Arabia sought to activate this strategy sometimes clashing with
international patrons (UK and US). Once again, and similar to the domestic arena, the
emergence of oil rent consolidated and strengthened the Saudi regime’s survivability
but did not determine it. Patterns of Saudi external behaviour would find the regime
following the above three strategies before the emergence of oil as a factor. The oil
factor increased the Saudi capacity to reproduce external structures, especially as we
will see below, during the Cold War.
To illustrate these points, I will examine three phases that will see the Saud’s
balancing against the Hashemite, Nasser, Communism, republican Iraq, and Islamic
Iran.
5.3.1. Foreign Policy in Pre-Cold War Period
With the emergence of a state-system in the Middle East, Saudi main concern was a
Hashemite encirclement of the kingdom by Jordan and Iraq. This may be viewed as a
continuation of the process of state formation when, after driving the Hashemite out of
Hejaz and having monopolised power in the Saudi Arabia, the Sauds continued to fear a
Hashemite incursion to topple the Saudi regime. An agreement was signed with Britain
in 1927 (Treaty of Jeddah) to guarantee that both parties abstain from encroaching
against each other (Safran 1991, 59).
The run up to WWII, the ensuing of the war and the decline in the number of
pilgrims coming to Mecca made the Saudi regime financially weak and politically
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vulnerable internally: “Ibn Saud’s financial anxieties and his basic security concern
were one and the same thing” (Ibid., 60). Desperate for financial support, Ibn Saud
granted Standard Oil of California (SOCAL) a concession to develop his kingdom’s oil
resources, guaranteeing him an annual rent and a loan for the first two years. The
outbreak of the war however nearly led to the financial collapse of the regime lead
Britain and (under the influence of SOCAL) the US to come to the assistance of Ibn
Saud. Diplomatic recognition between the Kingdom and the US took place six months
after SOCAL secured a concession from the Saudis. In 1939, US representation
extended to an ambassadorial level.
Similar to developments in WWI and the emergence of the third Saudi state, the
US entry in WWII made Saudi Arabia important as a strategic partner for the latter
“largely from a realisation of the strategic importance of Saudi Arabia’s oil now that the
United States had joined the war against Germany, Japan and Italy” (Niblock 2006, 37).
In 1943, President Roosevelt stated that ‘the defence of Saudi Arabia is vital to the
defence of the United States’. The US accordingly became a major supplier of aid to the
Kingdom.
From this time on an interregnum begins in regional politics, which is
theoretically telling in regards to Saudi behaviour. The US emerges as a major
international player largely replacing Britain and bidding for influence in the Middle
East, only to be augmented further with increased Soviet competition there. US
replacement of the British in the region was gradual. During the interregnum Saudi
Arabia sought US protection against the Hashemite alliance and also to balance British
influence. In the post-war period, Britain’s influence in the Middle East decreased and,
due to domestic opposition, it aimed to grant independence to Iraq and Jordan on one
hand and to increase cooperation among Arab states.
In addition to British policy, Transjordan’s Abdullah aimed to integrate Syria,
Lebanon and Palestine in his ‘Greater Syria’ scheme, while Faisal of Iraq wanted to
establish the ‘Fertile Crescent’ including the above countries and Iraq. For Ibn Saud
these schemes threatened his own polity and fear of British neutralisation saw him
moving in two directions. He both sought a regional ally to balance the Hashemites and
the US to balance Britain. In one way, what Ibn Saud was actively engaged in avoiding
was the emergence of a regional hegemon that may end what has been described here as
an ‘external neutralisation’ and hence threatening the territorial integrity of Saudi
Arabia, a scenario similar to that of the collapse of the first Saudi state. As Safran
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contends, “to protect himself against the dangers he perceived, he [Ibn Saud] strove to
bring in the United States as a counterweight to Britain and as a substitute buttress for
the Kingdom’s security” (1991, 63; emphasis added).
The strategy involve regularly calling the US to increase its assistance to the
kingdom, arguing that Britain’s policy had “cooled down and its interest had deflected
to Iraq and Transjordan” and that a Communist threat was emerging particularly in
neighbouring countries. In inter-Arab politics, Saudi Arabia tried to strengthen its
relations with King Faruk of Egypt, Syria’s President Shukri al-Kuwatly (overthrown in
1949), and other politicians in Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon (Ibid., 67). All these attempts
aimed at weakening Hashemite power.
American strategy to contain Soviet expansion culminated in the 1955 Baghdad
Pact, which involved a defence alliance under US patronage including Iran, Pakistan,
Britain, Turkey, and Iraq. Against such a backdrop, the Saudis, under King Saud, sought
an alliance with Egypt, now ruled by the Arab revisionist regime of Nasser. Fearing that
the military assistance to the Hashemites in Iraq would increase their threat to the
kingdom, it sought to appeal to Arab masses in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria to woo them
against joining the pact.
The Middle East cultural structure—specifically the Arab core—is composed of
different cultural elements that may be activated and politicised such as Arab
nationalism, Islamism, and national state identities. At this stage, given its political-
strategic position, Saudi Arabia “did not hesitate to emulate the tactics used by
revolutionary Egypt of appealing to the publics of Iraq, Syria, and Jordan over the heads
of their governments and inciting them to disobedience” in addition to “the more
congenial methods of discreetly trying to buy off politicians and supporting opposition
groups in those countries” (Ibid., 68). Arab National identity was activated.
Saudi Arabia’s alliance with Nasser saw the Saudis support Egyptian-Soviet
Arms treaty, reject American Point IV allotment in 1954 to and later ordering the aid
mission to leave the country, and inviting an Egyptian military mission to train Saudi
forces alongside the American mission. The nature of the two regimes varied however.
While Nasser had a revisionist plan for the region including the weakening of British
influence by extending his power through appealing to other Arab countries, the Saudis
had a more limited and pragmatic aim: to contain Hashemite expansion.
The 1956 Suez crisis and Nasser’s appeal to Arab masses raised Saudi concerns.
The blockage of the Suez Canal led to gross loss in revenue for the Sauds. In 1956,
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thousands of demonstrators took to the streets when Ibn Saud visited Aramco facilities
protesting against “imperialism”. Nasser’s visit in the same year however showed his
influence in Saudi politics (Ibid., 67-81). Nasser’s anti-British policy in Yemen and
Oman and increased Soviet-Egyptian cooperation further increased Saudi and US fears.
5.3.2. Saudi Behaviour in the Cold War
These Saudi fears led King Saud in 1957 “to try to revitalize the American connection
as a security asset against Nasser, to reverse his relationship with the Hashemite
monarchs from one of hostility to one of cooperation” (Ibid., 82). The new Saudi
strategy fit well with the Eisenhower Doctrine, which sought to contain Soviet influence
in the region and more importantly to roll back Nasser’s Soviet-supported Arab
nationalist policy. In this regards, Saudi Arabia, given its strategic position and appeal
to Muslims in the region and beyond it, became pivotal as a counter-force to Arab
Nationalism. The activation of the Islamic identity became pivotal.
We recognise here Saudi Arabia’s role in maintaining the status quo fits in with
regional international strategies (be it Britain or US) and this tells us more than focusing
on the role of oil, Islam or the strong relations with the US. All these factors contribute
to understanding Saudi behaviour but do not explain long-term patterns of maintaining
external neutralisation. Illustrations from the Cold War are noteworthy. Saudi attempts
to draw US support materialised during WWII when Ibn Saud permitted Britain and the
US to over-fly his territory. The Dhahran airfield was particularly important as a
“staging point” in the event of war with the Soviets (Bronson 2005, 378). The US
further had a strategic interest in the flow of cheap oil to contribute to Europe’s
reconstruction and to contain Soviet expansion there. Saudi Arabia’s regime identity
was attractive to the Americans in their fight against Communism, while the Wahhabi
establishment further limited the choices of the Saudi regime: alignment with the Soviet
would have endangered the regime’s survivability at home.
In this regards, the Saudi regime differed from others in Iraq, Syria or Egypt
who had progressive political claims to power. The Hashemite threat was abated given
Iraq’s containment in the Baghdad Pact and Jordan neutralised in its own political
instability. Increased insecurity within each regime in the Middle East and the
vulnerability of the state to external penetration saw different regimes plotting against
each other. To end the Egyptian-Syrian union, Saudi Arabia plotted a coup in Syria in
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1958. This came a year after Saudi police unveiled a plot to assassinate Saud by
Palestinians coming from Egypt (Safran 1991, 84).
The union between Egypt and Syria and the Iraqi coup of 1958 that brought a
revisionist regime with Soviet inclinations created security dilemmas for Saudi Arabia.
Dealing with Nasser divided the Saudi elite. Similar to today’s conflict between US and
Iran, the conflict in the 1950s was between the US and Nasser. While today the Iranian-
Syrian axis coupled with regime change in Iraq raises fears in Saudi Arabia, in 1958 the
Arab union and the Iraqi coup raised similar predicaments. The Saudis abstained from
public support of the US and British interventions in Lebanon and Jordan, respectively
in 1958. The choice taken by Crown Prince Faisal, who conflicted with King Saud, was
to appease Nasser in contradiction with US and British interests. This continued until
Egypt and Iraq collided leading the Saudis to pursue an ‘independent’ Saudi policy
based on ‘neutralisation and Arab nationalism’ (Ibid.,87). Appeasing Nasser came to an
end when a coup in Syria ended the union with Egypt.
These regional developments led Saudi Arabia to conclude a treaty with Jordan
in 1962 that aimed to buttress both regimes against Egypt and Iraq. In the same year
Arab Nationalists carried out a coup in neighbouring Yemen and was that followed with
Egyptian paratroopers coming to its support. The coup posed major threats for the Saudi
regime which feared that the revolutionary regime would provide a model for domestic
dissidents, especially the ‘Free Princes’ within the monarchy. Egyptian support for the
new regime in Yemen and the presence of Egyptian troops there aggravated Saudi fears
(Ibid., 94). Saudi support for loyalists under Imam Muhammad al-Badr in northern
Yemen saw the country enter into a civil war intermittently until 1970. The war not only
reflected Saudi-Egyptian struggle at a regional level but was also part of the Cold War
between the US and the Soviet Union.
During the crisis, King Hussein of Jordan sent a brigade in support of the
Saudis, however, Faisal knew that both Jordanian and Saudi forces cannot match
Egyptian forces and that the US would intervene only if Egyptian forces invaded Saudi
Arabia23; this led him to fight the Egyptians by proxy, which was made possible by the
increased oil income, and to seek British assistance. Unlike the US, Britain had an
interest in constraining Egyptian influence in Yemen to protect its position in Aden.
However, American growing disagreement with Nasser led them to join forces and
assist Saudi Arabia, under the Operation Hard Surface, which included the deployment
23 American support came in a ‘demonstrative’ manner in 1962 when planes based in Dhahran flew over
cities to raise the “morale of the population and ostensibly to warn the Egyptians.” (Safran 1991, 96)
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to the Kingdom of eight fighter aircraft and a command support aircraft (Bronson 2006,
87).
To counterbalance Nasser’s pan-Arabism, Faisal aimed to activate Islamism in
western-friendly countries in 1965 and 1966, at the time when Nasser was, with Soviet
assistance, gravely involved in the Yemeni war (Ibid., 93). In 1960s “Saudi Arabia
asserted that the organising principle of regional politics should be Islam, not Arabism,
trying to draw into the regional mix friendly non-Arab states like the Shah’s Iran and
Turkey” (Gause 2002, 198). This came in contrast to the emphasis on Arab Nationalism
of the previous phase when the Hashemites constituted the major threat. Another
cultural element activated during this time was Saudi patriotism, which was poised
against the “menace of the alien Egyptians” (Safran 1991, 98). Saudi efforts were
bolstered under President Johnson’s administration increasing Nasser’s fear of a
regional alliance, under the banner of Islam. The 1967 Arab defeat by Israel, however,
weakened Egypt’s regional ambitions and contributed to ending the Yemen war.
The end of Nasser’s pan-Arab strategy gave the Saudis more leverage in
regional politics. In addition to the oil income which increased in the 1970s, ‘Egypt
First’ policy under Sadat, which contracted Egypt’s role in the Middle East, and Assad’s
‘realist’ strategy, saw Saudi Arabia emerging as the most powerful Arab state. Iraq’s
domestic instability, as we shall see shortly, further kept it neutralised. These factors not
only contributed to neutralising any threat to the Saudi regime, but also gave the Saudis
leverage to resist its international patron and to be active in the broader Cold War.
A major challenge for the Saudis in the 1970s was the hurdle represented in the
Arab-Israeli conflict and the effect this causes on Saudi image in the Arab and Muslim
worlds and, more importantly, its relations with the US. US unequivocal support of
Israel led Faisal, given the changing factors stated above, to financially support Syria
and Egypt in their war effort against Israel (Ibid., 154). The 1973 Arab-Israeli war,
however, saw Saudi Arabia using oil as a weapon hesitantly and only two weeks after
the start of the war. Faisal’s decision had been determined by two major factors. First to
placate Arab opinion and second, given the timing of the decision of the embargo, to
attempt once again to affect US policy as the military situation was tilting towards Israel
after the US secured an airlift military assistance to Israel. The total destruction of the
Arab armies would, as a result of Arab popular dissent, have had negative implications
for the Saudis. Had Arab armies achieved a victory or had a ceasefire been successful,
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the Kingdom’s decision to impose an embargo wouldn’t have been taken.24 The
disagreement on the war (and its implications) led, according to several observers, to a
change in Saudi-US relations, changing from one of dependence to that of
interdependence. Safran observes that:
the previous simple client-patron connection gave way to a much
more complex relationship of interdependence involving shared as
well as divergent interests between the two parties and therefore the
potential for adversarial bargaining as well as agreement, antagonism
as well as cooperation. (1991, 172)
Among the reasons for such a change include the US reaching its full capacity as an oil
producer increasing its dependence on the Kingdom’s and the recycling of petrodollars
into the US economy. In 1974 alone, the US paid $1.7 billion for Saudi oil, while $8.5
billion of Saudi funds flowed into the US (Bronson 2005, 380-1). Accordingly, Gause
describes the Kingdom’s political-strategic position and its integration in world
economy as one of “asymmetric interdependence” (Gause 2002, 198).
Revenues from oil increased Saudi capacity to resist and, in certain areas,
challenge the power of international patrons. However, as we saw above, Saudi Arabia
challenged British and US interests in its alliance with Nasser against the Hashemites
before oil became pivotal. Interdependence between the Saudis and external patrons
started as we saw above as early as the formation of the third Saudi state. The role
played by Ibn Saud in his quest to monopolise power on the Arab peninsula developed
before, and later in tune with, British attempts to weaken the Ottoman Empire. Later,
the emergence of the Soviet Union as an actor in the Middle East made the Saudi role in
that region pivotal for the US and Britain, as it weakened the Soviet’s allies—such as
Nasser and other revisionist states.
In the latter half of the Cold War, Saudi behaviour transformed from one of a
passive status quo power to an active one. Oil income contributed to Saudi efforts to be
part of an international strategy confronting Communism in different areas extending
beyond the Middle East. These operations extended from Morocco, across Africa and
the Middle East eastwards to Asia. Examples include the support of anti-Communist
movements in Africa (Congo, Angola) and others closer to home (Ethiopia, Somalia,
Djibouti), financially assisting Egypt to free it from Soviet influence and others in Latin
America such as the Contras fighting in Nicaragua.25 In Afghanistan US-Saudi
24 Saudi Arabia had opposed a proposal of a total embargo on the US in the Kuwait conference that took
place three days into the war. (see Ibid., 151-171)
25 Bronson (2005, 383) argues that “Saudi Arabia was particularly valuable in areas where Congress was
hesitant to fund [foreign operations].” The Iran-Contra involved the Saudis providing around $32 million
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cooperation reached its pinnacle. The entry of Soviet troops to Afghanistan in 1979 to
protect its ally there and the increasing of Soviet influence in the Horn of Africa, South
Yemen and the Soviet naval influence in the Indian Ocean formed an ‘arc of crisis’
encircling the Gulf (Niblock 2006, 145). American strategy to contain the Soviet’s
presence there converged with Saudi fears. Saudi money, which matched that of the US
(‘dollar for dollar’), its Islamic Wahhabi guidance, and the encouraging of Saudi
fighters to fight in Afghanistan, was able to match and later to defeat Soviet influence
there (Coll 2004).26
The Islamic Revolution in Iran, which brought to power an Islamic regime
opposed to US, Israel and their allies in the region, saw Saudi-US relations
strengthening. As a result of the revolution, the US lost a major ally in the Middle East.
From a Saudi perspective, the revolution had major implications on its security and the
configuration of regional politics. Once again, regime change in Iran brought a
revisionist state that countered Saudi status quo strategy. The revolution’s Islamic
credentials challenged those of Saudi Arabia, especially in their ability to shape politics
in Iraq and other Gulf states while presenting an Islamic alternative in countries like
Egypt and Pakistan.
Although the Islamic revolution in Iran created challenges, it also generated
opportunities for the Saudis. As we shall see later, while Syria saw Islamic Iran as a
revisionist state and as a potential ally against others, its Baathist counterpart in Iraq
viewed the revolution as a threat to its domestic dominance. It is here where three major
states—Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and US—had an interest to abort the revolution before it
consolidates. Saudi Arabia encouraged the US ‘dual containment’ strategy relating to
Iraq and Iran: “There was a widespread perception that if Iraq were to suffer defeat, the
Kingdom would be the next domino to fall.” Accordingly, during the course of the war,
some $25 billion of Saudi grants and loans were diverted to Iraq (Niblock 2006, 146).
The Iranian Revolution motivated the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) in 1981. During the war, the Kingdom, just as the Baathist regime in Iraq,
emphasised Arab identity in the face of ‘Persian threat’, as it was difficult to legitimise
support against a Muslim (and Islamist) country. Saudi support for Iraq did not
to the Contras at the request of the White House. The money in question were the profits gained from an
international deal involving Iran buying arms secretly from the US through Israel and funded by Saudi
Arabia. For details see, Said K. Aburish (1994, 269-270).
26 The US and Saudi Arabia invested more than $3 billion each in the campaign (Bronson 2005, 383).
According to some sources more than 30,000 Saudis joined the anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan ( Al-
Rasheed, 2005, 203)
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contradict its support, in another arena, of Syria who supported Iran in its war against
Iraq.27 In that way, the Saudis maintained during the 1980s and 1990s a strategy that
neutralised any potential hegemon in tune with the strategy of the US.
5.3.3. Saudi External Behaviour in the Post-Cold War
The major change taking place internationally two years after the termination of the
Iraq-Iran war was the collapse of the Soviet Union.. For the Saudis, the post-Cold War
period brought relief in that the burden of the cold war (war in Yemen, Nasserite threat,
instability in Oman, rise of revolutionary regimes, Soviets in Afghanistan, and the
ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict) has receded. The 1990s saw Saudi Arabia achieving
progress in most of its external dilemmas: to cope and balance against revisionist states,
seek a settlement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and to maintain close relations with the
US. While Syria (and Lebanon) and the Palestinians have strategically agreed for a
settlement with Israel, Iraq was in chaos and under UN sanctions but still acted as a
buffer against an Iran.
However, just as the new structure of international politics brought relief to the
Saudis, it brought with it new challenges. It was about time for countries exhausted of
the Cold War, such as Russia, or because of their own war such, as Iraq and Iran, to rise
in quest for influence in the Middle East. Two instances require emphasis here. The first
involves Iraq’s early resurgence after its war with Iran leading to the second Gulf war.
The second involved the collapse of the Iraqi regime under the invasion of the US. On
one hand the end of the Cold War diminished to a large extent the external
neutralisation that Saudi Arabia, as we saw above, tried to activate. US hegemony in the
region placed limits on this external neutralisation and weakened the Saudi ability for
resistance. On the other hand, the post-Cold war period did not totally eliminate the
Kingdom’s regional threats, which made the Kingdom more dependent on its
international patron, somewhat reversing the ‘interdependence’ relationship discussed
earlier. Iraq in the late 1980s and early 1990s represented such a threat, while Iran after
the collapse of Iraq became a threat pushing Saudi Arabia to become more dependent on
the US.
27 In the Arab-Israeli political arena, Saudi Arabia as a junior partner of the US in the region, sought to
advance peace initiatives, especially after Egypt signed its own treaty with Israel. One example was the
Fahd Peace Plan in 1981 and later the Crown Prince Faisal Plan in 2000. For history of these plans and
the reasoning behind them, (Kostiner 2005, 352-371).
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Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, which directly threatened the
kingdom’s oil fields “once again threw the United States and Saudi Arabia into each
others’ arms” (Bronson 2005, 385) when the Saudi government decided to allow more
than half a million US troops to be deployed on its territory. Most of the attacks on Iraq
through the 1990s were carried out from Saudi territory, while the kingdom contributed
$30 billion out of the $54 billion war cost. Although the US withdrew its troops from
Saudi Arabia after the war keeping 5000 military personnel, the US “was now
intimately involved in political and strategic developments in the Gulf region, using
Saudi territory and resources to pursue there” (Niblock 2006, 151-2).
In 1994, Saddam Hussein threatened Kuwait again dispatching a division of the
Republican Guard, leading the US (36000 ground troops), France, and Britain to send
their forces to the support of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In this round, however,
“American force levels inside and around Saudi Arabia rose steadily” (Bronson2005,
387). Iraq, nevertheless, continued to be an obstacle in US strategy in the region. UN
sanctions and later the imposing of a no-fly on Iraq’s northern and southern zones
weakened the Iraqi regime. These changes in Iraq, the new world order, and the
September 11 attacks, facilitated US invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003. Just as the
Nasserite revolution in Egypt, the 1958 coup in Iraq, and the Islamic revolution in Iran,
the collapse of the Iraqi regime had several security implications for the Saudi regime.
Perceptions of the Iraqi threat not only divided the American administration but
also created tension with its Saudi ally. For Saudi Arabia, the status quo in Iraq, and
between it and Iran, neutralised threats emanating from the Gulf region. On the other
hand, the US was beginning to move beyond the dual containment policy in
consideration of its energy needs and its place in the post-Cold war international system
(Aarts 2005, 416-9). Saudi Arabia, as opposed to its behaviour in the second Gulf war,
was reluctant to support US plans to invade Iraq (BBC Online 2008). Several scholars
have attributed this to the deteriorating relations between the two countries after the
attacks of September 11, given that 15 of the 19 hijackers came from Saudi Arabia.28
This fact has been exacerbated by calls within the US to change course with Saudi
Arabia or toppling the regime there (Aarts 2005).
28 Bronson, Understanding US-Saudi Relations, pp.389-91; In addition to these factors, Niblock argues
that relations soured because of Saudi Arabia strategic perception of US military presence in the region
and its aim to avoid being “seen as the springboard from which the United States attacked other Muslim
countries making the country a target for intensified Islamist anger.” Saudi Arabia, p.167
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However, although most of these factors might explain Saudi reluctance, as the
analysis here has unfolded, I am more inclined to argue that the position of Saudi
Arabia emanates from its fear that US presence in Iraq might diminish its role, as it
would end the external neutralisation that maintains its regime and state. The kingdom,
as we saw above, has traded its role (including oil) for maintaining its security. The
Saudis might have calculated that US presence (if stable) would decrease their relative
power in the region, if not threaten their state directly. American presence in Iraq and
the Gulf would diminish Saudi power. Already in 2003, disagreement about Iraq led to
US shifting its Combat Air Operations Centre to Qatar (Niblock 2006, 167).29 On the
other hand, should American invasion fail, Iraq might succumb into civil war or the
majority Shiite would (with Iranian support) rule the country. In both cases, Saudi
Arabia wouldn’t have been keen on a US invasion of Iraq. Although this might sound
hypothetical especially since we lack at the moment any evidence of such perception,
the course of Saudi behaviour after the invasion and the collapse of the Iraqi regime is
telling.
US failure in Iraq, mainly in stabilising a post-Saddam (democratic) regime and
projecting power outside Iraq into Iran and Syria, have once again brought different
challenges to Saudi security. The coming of Iraqi Shiites to power, after the failure of
more secular and US friendly politicians such as Iyad Allawi, saw the Dawaa party on
top of the Iraqi government and the country in chaos. US failure meant increased
Iranian influence in Iraq, which led Saudi Arabia to face a dilemma: supporting Sunnis
there to counterbalance the Shiites (and Iran) meant disabling US strategy in Iraq, while
remaining passive as the US is failing meant a handing of Iraq to Iran.30 As F. Gregory
Gause III observes “any Saudi effort to establish direct patron-client relations with Arab
Sunni groups or factions in Iraq might place them in the very uncomfortable position to
supporting people who are killing American” (Gause 2007).
Saudi primary threat came from Iran and accordingly the Saudis, just as US
allies in Iraq, fear American withdrawal from Iraq. A quick look at the map would see
Iran linking what scholars have considered two ‘arenas’ of Saudi security concerns in
the Middle East. Iran with its strong presence in the Gulf, influence in Afghanistan and
Iraq, and its alliance with Syria and Hizbullah in Lebanon and Hamas in the occupied
29 Qatar’s relations have been sour with Kingdom for over a decade. Al-Jazzeera, the Qatar-based Arab
satellite channel, has been very critical of the Saudi regime leading the Saudis to establish Al Arabia news
channel, which has large audience and sympathises with Saudi policy.
30 Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal announced that because of US strategy “we [Saudi Arabia and US] are
handing the whole country [Iraq] over to Iran without reason" (Robert Gibbons 2005).
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territories left this country with strong power, not only to disable US strategy in the
region but also to weaken Saudi Arabia.
Balancing against this threat became Saudi policy in the Middle East. Although
some scholars believe that the “artificial honeymoon is over” (Aarts 2005, 403) between
Saudi Arabia and the US, the failure of the latter to isolate Iran, Syria, and their allies
have brought the US and Saudi Arabia back to their traditional alliance. Just as the
Saudis tried to revitalise their relations with the US in 1957 and to create an Islamic
alliance, supported and encouraged by the US, as we saw above, in 2007 the US
attempted to create an Arab coalition against the Iranian-Syrian-Hizbullah axis
(McElroy 2007). Two cultural elements provided options for the Saudis to activate:
Sunnism and Arabism. This time round the Saudis first ventured with the Sunni
element, and later, due to the sensitivity of the former, emphasised Arabism.
As we saw above, the Israel-Lebanon war of 2006 saw Saudi Arabia activating
the sectarian divide to de-legitimise the Shiite military resistance of Hizbullah. This was
followed by remarks from another two states allied to the US: King Abdullah of Jordan
who spoke of an emerging ‘Shiite Crescent’ and President Mubarak of Egypt who asked
Shiites ‘to be loyal’ to their states. However, the sectarian divide threatened Saudis own
Shiite population and other Shiite communities leading them to turn to the safer cultural
element of Arabism. Accordingly, US, Saudi Arabia and their allies in the whole region
began to speak of a ‘Persian threat’ penetrating the Arab ‘regional system’. Syria along
with Hizbullah and Hamas are (at the time of writing) accused of facilitating this
penetration. Civil war in the occupied territories and the ongoing conflict in Lebanon
are reflections of the current Syrian-Saudi standoff.
Many have considered the current Saudi-Syrian deterioration of relations to be
caused by the conflict in Lebanon; however, it would be more appropriate to consider
the sour relations a part of the regional struggle between the US and Saudi Arabia and
its allies on one hand, and Syria and Iran on the other. At the time of writing, like in the
previous century, Saudi Arabia is trying with an international patron (the US) to
counterbalance a regional threat (Iran) as it seeks to maintain its security, and hence
survival.
Conclusion: Theoretical Implications of the Saudi Case
What does the Saudi case tell us about state survival during late formation? We realise
from the analysis above that the two theoretical conditions that explain state survival
during late formation—domestic power monopoly and division in regional structure of
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power—have been present in causing Saudi state survival. When one (or both) of these
conditions was absent, as in the case of the first two Saudi states, we observe Saudi state
collapse.
How and why is domestic power monopoly established? We observe in the
above case that there is a high level of cultural homogeneity in Saudi Arabia, which has
given the agents of monopolisation a strong cultural—religious and tribal—to establish
authority. Regime nature in Saudi Arabia reflected the cultural context from which it
was born. The regime had tribal ingredients to it that were buttressed by the universal
idea of Islam, with its Wahhabi interpretation. Regime formation, in other words, did
not go against existing socio-cultural structures but through them. Regime nature and
formation have, on the other hand, defined possible opposition to the regime, which
emanated from tribal forces, Islamic groups, or a mixture of the two. The regime’s
dealing with these oppositions emanated from its nature—tribal and Islamic—and from
its monopoly over means of violence. Timing of regime formation—the monopolisation
of violence after World War II—has been crucial in the Saudi case which converged
with the emergence of the state system in the Middle East.
The third variable which Saudi Arabia scores high on is the economic resources
of a regime. The influx of oil income to Saudi Arabia it was argued throughout this
chapter has reinforced Saudi power monopoly over religion and coercion. The oil factor
has a strong effect given, as opposed to the Iraq case discussed below, the cultural
homogeneity of Saudi Arabia, which does not provide strong basis for opposition
political mobilisation. These three factors—cultural homogeneity, regime nature, and
economic resources—have contributed to establishing a political structure in a kingdom
maintained and monopolised by the Sauds.
What about the second condition of regional division of power? The first
variable under this condition is the geographical position of a state. We realise that
Saudi Arabia’s geographical location and the role it could play in maintaining or
revising a status quo has been crucial to understanding not only its state formation but
also its survival. The analysis showed the role taken initially by Ibn Saud to weaken the
Ottoman Empire and then by Saudi Arabia to maintain the post-Ottoman regional order.
Due to its geographical location, Saudi Arabia’s socialisation in the state system started
early and, as shown above, contributed to its state formation, and later, its survival. As
domestic power monopolisation started before the emergence of the state system in the
Middle East and as this mechanism was completed with the carving of the region’s
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borders, the Saudi regime was able to project its power externally to upset any revisions
of the regional order.
The third variable—the structure of regional order—contributed to keeping the
Saudi state intact. In the theoretical framework presented earlier, I argued that the more
a regional structure is divided the more opportunities a late forming has in its quest for
survival. In the case of Saudi Arabia, domestic power monopolisation coupled with
divisions in regional state system not only contributed to the survival of the Saudi state
but also gave it the ability to shape the regional order. As we saw above, in allying itself
with status quo powers, Saudi Arabia contributed to sustaining the regional system and,
as a consequence, its own state. Where the division in regional order contracted, as with
the attempt for US hegemony in the 1990s and during the second Iraq war, we saw
Saudi Arabia resistant.
The Saudi case, accordingly, satisfies the two conditions proposed as
requirements for state survival during late formation. What does this analysis finally tell
us about the prospects of Saudi regime and state survival? Economic integration and the
fluidity of state ideology with a lack of cultural or material elements with the potential
to politicise continue to sustain the Saudi regime at the centre of an increasingly
interdependent social field. Business reliance on the state and imported labour shows
low prospects from these classes to endanger the regime. Islamic opposition has been
influential but the regime was able on several occasions to dilute its power through
either incorporation, repression or both. One major threat to the regime’s survivability
may come from splits from within the monarchy, which in turn can be exploited within
Saudi Arabia or by external actors. This prospect might be less likely if a clear
succession of power is maintained. The emergence of five circles of power within the
monarchy might complicate or disrupt a smooth succession beyond Ibn Saud’s sons,
who are ageing.
At a regional level, the rise of Iran and with Egypt now attempting to regain its
regional position31, this would continue to provide opportunities for Saudi Arabia to
maintain and activate the external neutralisation. Internationally, the increasing shift
towards a multi-polar world with Chinese expansion , Russian resurgence and a
European Union (especially France) ready to increase its role in the Middle East would
provide the kingdom with increased opportunities to limit its dependence on the United
31 Egypt has been trying to increase its influence in ‘arenas’ that are infiltrated by Iran such as Iraq, the
Palestinian territories and Lebanon (Al-Akhbar 2008). Especially as the US is loosening its grip in these
areas.
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States.32 These prospects in regional and international orders may prove crucial for
domestic power monopoly in Saudi Arabia and, consequently, state survival there.
What does the above theoretical and historical analysis of state formation in
Saudi Arabi tell us about political change in the kingdom? If we account for lateness in
state formation and the role of oil in that process, Saudi state formation and future
trajectories resemble Elias’ description of European state formation. In that trajectory,
we would expect to see on the long term increasing political and economic
interdependence tied together by the monarchy with power gradually diffusing to other
Saudi social forces. Elias describes the process as the following:
The more people are made dependent by the monopoly mechanism,
the greater becomes the power of the dependent, not only
individually but also collectively, in relation to the one or more
monopolists. …Whether it is a question of land, soldiers or money in
any form, the more that is accumulated by an individual, the less
easily can it be supervised by this individual, and the more surely he
becomes by his very monopoly dependent on increasing numbers of
others, the more he becomes dependent on his dependents. …The
privately owned monopoly in the hands of a single individual or
family comes under the control of broader social strata, and
transforms itself as the central organ of a state into a public
monopoly.
(2000, 270-1; emphasis added)
To manage the increased flow of oil revenue, to provide jobs for Saudis, to maintain its
security, the Saudi regime will have to rely on more and more of its people. In doing so,
power relations would shift. The shift in Saudi Arabia is most likely to be slow, and not
radical, largely orchestrated by the Saudi regime leading to intended and unintended
outcomes.
32 The year 2008 has seen increased economic cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia (see al-
Zayani 2008). In the same year Saudi Arabia attempted to increase its ties with Russia, first to influence
the latter’s relations with Iran and Syria and second to widen its relations with a growing competitor to
the US.
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Chapter Six
Iraq: State Formation and Deformation
The state is not the reality which stands
behind the mask of political practice. It is
itself the mask which prevents our seeing
political practice as it is. It is, one could
almost say, the mind of a mindless world, the
purpose of purposeless conditions, the opium
of the citizen.
—Phillip Abrams, Notes on the
difficulty of Studying the State
State Survival in Iraq: The Literature
The nature and causes of Iraqi politics and state formation have attracted a great deal of
scholarly attention. Although, few studies, if any, in the literature examine the factors
behind the territorial survival of the Iraqi state, many studies focused on the causes
behind regime survival, authoritarianism, or political change. As opposed to students of
the Saudi case who are beginning to look outside the state to explain regime survival,
Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian composition and its oil wealth have led several scholars to
attribute Iraqi politics to predominantly domestic factors. Further, scholars differ on the
appropriate conceptual tools—class, culture, ideology—required to explain Iraqi
politics.
Similar to the Saudi case and the Middle East in general, Iraqi politics have been
seen in light of political culture and political economy approaches. Culturalist
explanations emphasise Iraq’s ethnic composition (Kedourie 1992) or the violent nature
of its politics (Khalil 1989). Political economy approaches focus on rentier state theory
(see Chapter Two) and examine the role of oil revenues in buttressing regime autonomy
and strength (Abdullah 2001; Abd al-Jabar 1995; Stork 1982). In addition to oil revenue
and the violent means available for successive Iraqi regimes, patrimonialism—the
network of patron and client relationships crosscutting Iraqi society—has been crucial
to explain state formation in Iraq and state-society relations (Tripp 2000).
Another model focuses on the role of the ‘strong’ state in destroying civil
society in Iraq (see Saad el-Din Ibrahim’s introduction in al-Jabar 1995). Still other
approaches focus on how successive Iraqi regimes reproduced historical memory to
maintain power in the highly diverse Iraqi society (Davis 2004) or through the use of
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different discourses (class, Arabism, Islamism or secular) by certain organisations, such
as the Baath long before it captured the state (Allawi 1992).
As we can see from the above, most of the studies on Iraq have focused on
domestic factors to account for Iraqi politics. Although many scholars account for the
role Britain played in creating the Iraqi state, few would extend this analysis to explain
state formation and deformation trajectories in Iraq. The domestic-external nexus in the
Iraqi case is crucial to understanding the dilemmas this late forming state faces.
Shortcomings in this regards have not only limited our understanding of Iraqi politics
but also affected how policymaking towards Iraq—as in the removal of the Saddam
Hussein regime—have been shaped. Many argued, especially in the build-up to the war
on Iraq, that one of Iraq’s impediments to political change lie in the nature and violence
of its Baathist regime.
This chapter will show that Iraqi state formation shows regularities crosscutting
its different regimes and that the Hussein regime differed in its degree of
authoritarianism not in the nature of its rule. Based on the two conditions defined for
state survival—domestic monopolisation and external neutralisation—and the six
accompanying variables explicated earlier, I will argue that problems in achieving the
monopoly mechanism at a domestic level have increased with external penetration in
Iraq, which in turn increased the security dilemmas of its successive regimes increasing
their authoritarian drive and narrowing their power base. The narrower the power base
of a regime, the more the state was deformed and the more Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic
divisions became salient.
Another divide in the literature on Iraq regards the conceptual tools needed to
study that case. While, as we saw above, some scholars have examined Iraqi politics by
looking at its ethnic and sectarian make-up, others have presented persuasive class
analysis (Batatu 1978) on political change there. While class analysis of the Iraqi case
has raised several theoretical and empirical questions (Tripp 2000; Slugglett and
Slugglett 1991), it was ethno-political analysis that was rejected by many students of
Iraqi politics (Davis 2004; Dawood 2003; al-Jabar 2003; Fattah 2003; Slugglett 2001).
The collapse of the Baathist regime and the emergence of sectarian-and-ethno politics in
Iraq, raised doubts for some on whether ethno-political analysis can be avoided
(Stansfield 2007).
Based on the theoretical framework in Chapter Three, section 6.2 will contribute
to that debate and argue that the emergence of sectarian and ethnic boundaries in Iraq
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has been gradual. I will focus on how regime techniques of survival contributed to the
politicisation of cultural identities as different political entrepreneurs aimed at activating
these identities during the course of their political struggles. By helping us to map Iraqi
politics, these cultural boundaries provide a strong basis on which to analyse political
dynamics within and between different ethnic and sectarian groups and how these form
or deform the Iraqi state. In explaining the conditions of state survival and collapse, this
chapter contends that whilst domestic conditions for regime survival are necessary, it is
external factors that determine the survival or collapse of the Iraqi regime and territorial
state.
6.1. Geographical Position and the Origins of Iraqi State
The state of Iraq is composed of three former Ottoman provinces: Basra in the south, Baghdad in
the centre, and Mosul in the north. These provinces came together between 1914 and 1932 to
form Iraq. Iraq’s geographical location is precursor to explain not only how domestic power was
moulded and remoulded over time but also, and more importantly, how this power was projected
externally. While, as we saw above, Saudi Arabia emerged under “relative international
isolation” (Chaudry 1996, 44), Iraq or Mesopotamia “has been a frontier zone of empires,
defined by the rivers that run through it and the desert that surrounds it on the west and south”
(Simon and Tejirian 2004, 2). In this regards, Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul resemble Hejaz more
than Najd. One exception was the Abbasid Caliphate (750-945 AD), which established Baghdad
as its centre giving it the capacity to project power externally (Stansfield 2007, 21).
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries what is now Iraq began to be
incorporated into the Ottoman Empire, with Baghdad, Basra and Mosul falling to
Ottoman rule in 1534. Charles Tripp succinctly explains the political situation during
this time, which also reflects patterns of continuity in Iraqi state formation until our
times:
It was here that the Ottoman sultans were extending their own
domains during these years and trying to check the ambition of the
Safavid shahs of Persia. Imperial and doctrinal rivalries between the
Sunni Ottomans and the Shi’i Safavids touched the histories of the
peoples of these frontier lands, requiring strategies of
accommodation or evasion from their leaders and affecting them in a
variety of ways. The political world that resulted was a complex and
fragmented one. Centres of power existed in many cases
autonomously, interacting under shifting circumstances that gave
advantage now to one grouping, now to another, and in which the
control of the central Ottoman government in Istanbul gradually
diminished. Instead, initiative and power lay with those who
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command the forces needed to defeat external and internal
challengers alike. (2000, 8)
The three provinces culturally and commercially gravitated in different
directions with Mosul looking to Anatolia, Baghdad to the Arab centres in Damascus
and Beirut, and Basra to the Persian Gulf (Ibid., 11). Two main Ottoman interests
shaped local power structures in these provinces; tax collection and the prevention of
Safavid penetration (Stanfield 2007, 24). At the core of the power systems in the three
provinces stood the Mamluk33 pashas. The Mamluks formed alliances with local
networks of power. In the centre and south, major tribal confederations of the Muntafiq,
the Khazail, the Zubaid and the Banu Lam and other major tribes such as al-Bu
Mohammad and Shammar formed the social base of the Mamluks. These tribes
“commanded forces that could often prove more than a match for the pashas of
Baghdad and Basra”. In the north the local Jalili dynasty formed power autonomy over
Mosul and other quasi-independent Kurdish principalities (2000, 9).
The weakening of the Ottoman Empire amidst European expansion to the
Middle East, growing resistance in Christian parts of the Balkans, increased European
involvement in Mount Lebanon, rise of provincial autonomous powers as in
Muhammad Ali Pasha’s Egypt, and, as we saw above, the expansion of the Saudi-
Wahhabi power to Hejaz and later to Najaf in Iraq worried Ottoman authorities. The
Ottoman ‘defensive modernisation’ saw Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul as important
centres of reforms (Tanzimat). These geo-political threats led the Ottomans to remould
local social structures to suit imperial interests. The reforms involved attempts to extend
Ottoman direct rule over peripheral provinces having direct effect on the socio-political
structure of Iraq.
Two principal laws shaped the new reforms. The first—Land Law of 1858—
reasserted Ottoman state ownership of land and aimed to rationalise agricultural
production to increase revenues. The new land tenure granted title deeds to those in
possession of land providing them with ownership rights and introducing private
property. As a result a new propertied class emerged within the Ottoman regime: “it
was now in their interest that the writ of the central state should be in the lands from
which they stood to profit.” In addition to their ability to maintain order by controlling
their tribes, tribal leaders now became property owners (Ibid., 16-19).
The second law—the Vilayet Law of 1864—aimed to demarcate Ottoman
provinces and specified the legal rights and obligations of governing officials with the
33 The Mamluks were Christian boys taken from Georgia and converted to Islam.
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populations in their spheres. The fiscal crises that faced Ottoman authorities and the
unrest the empire was witnessing in addition to divisions at the core between the Sultan
and the Young Ottomans led the latter to pursue a‘re-tribalisation’ strategy. The new
strategy aimed to consign power to tribal leaders given their capacity to establish order
and act as adjudicators in tribal deputes. The Young Turks movement brought to an end
the universal power of Islam as an ideology guiding the empire and generated
ideological responses varying from national identities such as Syrian Nationalism or
Lebanese nationalism to universal identities such as Arabism and Islamism.
The systemic developments that made the emergence of the Saudi state possible,
shaped the formation of the Iraqi territorial state. The effect left on each emerging state
differed, however. Similar to Saudi Arabia, in the provinces of Iraq local demands for
autonomy became salient with the emergence of external neutralisation—weakening of
Ottoman Empire and the increased British influence. The fate of these demands
nevertheless was determined by the competition among European powers, namely by
Britain’s attempts to carve out a state to protect its interests against its competitors.
As we saw above, British policy towards the Middle East altered during WWI.
An outcome of this change saw Britain moving northward to the three Ottoman
provinces. Britain’s interests “ranged from preventing hostile power from dominating
the head of the Persian Gulf and maintaining Baghdad as a key link in the imperial air
route to India to the protection of the Persian oil fields” (Dodge 2003, 17). Given Iraq’s
strategic location, these interests not only carved the boundaries of the current Iraqi
state but also shaped local power structures, as we shall see below. This in turn
disrupted local attempts to start an indigenous process of state formation, as in the
Saudi case. The main player here is Britain, always structured by its competition from
other European powers and the accommodation and resistance from local ones.
According to the analysis here, just as Ibn Saud did not, on his own, ‘invent’ Saudi
Arabia, Britain in its turn didn’t ‘invent’ Iraq. It is the external interactions between
European powers operating in an anarchical system that made the Iraq as we now know
it possible. Before I show how external forces determined that process, it is important
to shed light on the origins and limits of indigenous attempts of state formation.
Systemic developments provided new opportunities for local actors who sought
to increase their independence and started a process of adaptation. Similar to Ibn Saud
and Sheriff Hussein who sought British support to neutralise Ottoman influence,
different social forces representing different cultural and socio-economic interests made
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their bids for autonomy. These indigenous claims, which continued to shape political
dynamics in Iraq, emanate from the ethnic, sectarian and national elements present in
the Iraqi cultural structure: a Kurdish attempt to establish autonomy for the Kurdish
people, an ideological attempt by Arabs—both Sunni and Shiite—to form an Arab
state, and a Shiite attempt to form an autonomous rule or British protectorate in Basra.
The weakening of Ottoman centralised power led “some Kurds to make a case
for Kurdish self-determination, based on a Kurdish linguistic nationalism.” Although
the loyalty of many Kurds was oriented towards their clan or religious leaders, “the
disintegration of former power centres and the intrusion of Great Britain as the
dominant power obliged them to make new calculations about how best to secure the
future of their localities” (Tripp 2000, 35-6). In its turn, just as it sought to empower
Sheriff Hussein and Ibn Saud in its war with the Ottomans, Britain rallied Kurdish
support for the same reasons. The main leader in that rally was Sheikh Mahmoud
Barzinji, who had a history of fighting the Turks. During the war, Sheikh Mahmoud
negotiated with both the British and Russians “believing that they would support
Kurdish autonomy” (Stansfield 2007, 40). Initially, the Kurds welcomed British forces
landing in the north, as we shall see below, however British interests did not converge
with local ambitions leading to a revolt against the emerging order, against Iraq as a
state.
In Basra, the failure of Ottoman reforms including the creation of an
institutional framework to represent the cultural plurality in the empire led many to
despair. As we saw above, it was as early as 1899 that Britain secured a protectorate for
Shaikh Mubarak of Kuwait, and the emerging autonomy of Ibn Saud and others in the
Persian Gulf and the Arab Peninsula provided a model for ambitious leaders in Basra to
establish a domestic power base for themselves. One of these leaders was Sayyid Talib
al-Naqib “who was intent on carving out for himself a virtually unassailable position in
Basra” (Tripp 2000, 8). In 1913, he founded the Reform Society of Basra calling for
provincial autonomy, for Arab soldiers to defect, and criticised Turkification policies of
the Ottoman government. Although, initially agreeing with his requests, the Ottomans
reversed their policy amidst local opposition to Sayyid al-Naqib. After the Ottomans
ordered his arrest in 1914, al-Naqib asked the British “to make him sheikh or amir of
Basra under their protection” (Ibid., 26).
Iraqi responses to systemic changes in Baghdad were ambivalent. The founding
of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in Istanbul saw many liberal Arab
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intellectuals attracted to a forum through which they can maintain their cultural heritage
and voice their political opinions. Initially, political debates in Baghdad focused on
reforms within the empire. The CUP coup d’état of 1913 increased the fear of
Turkification as the CUP began to show authoritarian tendencies and generated a
nationalist sentiment by Arab intellectuals and soldiers in the Ottoman army. This led to
the establishment of clubs, newspapers and political movements aimed at preserving
and promoting Arab identity. The most important of these movements was the secret al-
Ahd, which was founded by Arab officers in Istanbul. The movement had branches in
the three Ottoman provinces and sought to protect the rights of Arabs within the empire.
At this stage members of the movement didn’t have a clear political ideology or state
project (Ibid., 28-9). When British forces arrived in Baghdad in 1915, members of the
movement in the Ottoman army began to defect.
The ethnic, sectarian and ideological responses to systemic changes would
further develop when the boundaries of Iraq were drawn and would begin to gravitate
towards the emerging regime in Baghdad. However, the point to be made here is that
these domestic political claims and ambitions failed to materialise due to the location of
Iraq and the high intensity of regional power struggle over that country. In 1914, after
the Young Turks coup in Istanbul, Turkey joined the war along with Germany and
Austria against Britain, France, and Russia. For Europeans, the old ‘Eastern Question’
has resurfaced and that Middle East’s “post-Ottoman political destinies would be taken
in hand by one or more of the European powers” (Fromkin 2004, 136). To be precise it
was to be determined by the interaction of European powers. The British were
concerned of the German influence on Istanbul with the presence of German advisors
there and the construction of Baghdad-Berlin railway: “as the World War I began,
Mesopotamia was at the intersection of three declining empires—the Ottoman, the
Persian, and the Russian—and was the object of desire of three European empires just
reaching their zenith—the British, the French, and the German” (Simon and Tejirian
2004, 9).
Negotiations during the war between France, Britain and Russia had set the
framework for which states were to emerge in the region. In the Constantinople
Agreement, Russia made a claim to annex Constantinople and the straits of the
Bosporus. As mentioned above, although promises were made to the Arabs under the
Sheriff Hussein-McMahon negotiations, secret negotiations were taking place among
Britain and France leading to the Sykes-Picot Agreement. In this agreement the British
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got Basra and Baghdad and ceded the oil-rich Mosul to France to provide the former
“with a shield against Russia. France and Russia would balance one against the other,
so that the French Middle East, like the Great Wall of China, would protect British
Middle East from attack by the Russian barbarians in the north” (Fromkin 2004, 143).
However, the coming to power of the Bolsheviks in Russia and their subsequent
withdrawal from WWI led the British to reverse their policy over Mosul and to return it
to their sphere of influence—the future state of Iraq. The opportunity rose when France
asked for British support against a German rearmament in Europe. In return Britain
made claims for Palestine and Mosul (Greun 2004, 118).
The drawing of borders in the Middle East was largely determined by the geo-
political struggles. In the beginning of the war, Britain moved quickly to strengthen its
position in the Persian/Arab Gulf by occupying the Fao peninsula and Basra in 1914,
Baghdad followed in 1917, and Mosul in 1918. The surrender of the Ottomans in 1918
led to the placing of the Armistice line on the boundary of Mosul (Stansfield 2007, 33-
4).
The formal result of this war and the secret agreements accompanying it were
announced in the San Remo conference in 1920 where the ‘Mandate for Iraq’ was given
to Britain. At least in theory, “the mandate system marked the beginning of the end of a
world order organized by European imperialists—by territorial annexation and a
domination based notion of cultural and racial superiority” (Dodge 2003, 5). Three
formal agreements identified the borders Iraq: Muhammara (1922), the Uqair (1923)
and the Baha (1925) identified the border, as we saw above, with Najd; the border with
Kuwait was demarcated in 1923 and Treaty of Lusanne (1923) accepting de facto
British rule over Mosul in 1925 (Stansfield 2007, 45-6).
6.2. Constituting the Iraqi Social Field
Iraq’s cultural heterogeneity, which is composed of several Islamic sects, ethnic and
tribal groups on the one hand and its socio-economic structure on the other leads us to
raise the question on how can we map the Iraqi politics to make sense of its complex
political reality? Before I describe the Iraqi cultural structure, I will focus in some detail
on this question.
In the Saudi case, we realised that under international relative isolation, a tribe
was able to monopolise power by defeating other tribes, through war, intermarriage,
and by institutionalising a universal idea—Islam. Analysis of the Iraq case has centred
on a division of the country into three spheres: Shiites in the South, Sunni in the centre
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and Kurds in the north. Several scholars however protest against such divisions.
“Largely under the influence of Middle East ‘experts’,” argues Hosham Dawod “a
highly simplistic image of Iraqi society has appeared: on the one side, the ‘Sunni Arabs’
supporting the ‘Sunni’ regime of Saddam Hussein, on the other ‘the Shiites’, somehow
‘not quite real Arabs’..in hot opposition, with the Kurds located somewhere else
entirely” (2003, 113).
Similarly, Falah A. Jabar observes that “Shi’ism, Shi’is and Shi’ite Islamism
figure almost as one and the same thing, as if they were… a homogenous, monolithic
sociocultural entity.” Iraqi “reality is far more complex..the tribe, the clan, extended
families, urban guilds, status groups, city neighbourhoods and city solidarities all split
religious spaces and cut across such totalizing categories as Sunnis, Shi’is or even
Kurds” (2003, 33-4). Slugletts further adds that the “notion of the heterogeneity of Iraqi
society is another theme that needs further definition and refinement” as “as neither the
communities nor the sect constitute homogeneous or monolithic single entities” (quoted
in Ibid., 35). Hala Fattah contends that the idea that “Iraq is a new-old nation-state that
was “cobbled together” after World War I from different provinces of the Ottoman
Empire” is “damaging”. Referring to Iraq’s population according to their sectarian and
ethnic belongings led to “keeping the term “Iraqi” in abeyance” (2003, 49; for the
debate see Stansfield 2007, Chapter 3).
On the other hand, studying the ‘old social classes’ of Iraq for instance, Hanna
Batatu observes the difficulty of using class as a concept accepting “the view that a
class need not—and in fact does not—at every point of its historical existence act or
feel as a unit…it need not be an organized and self-conscious group” (1978, 7). This is
not because class is not a useful social category to study but because it takes time for a
social class to develop and consolidate itself as a social force: “The process of the
crystallization of a class into a relatively stable, sharply identifiable, and politically
conscious social entity, that is, into a “class for itself” is, of course, very complex, and
depends on the concrete correlations of circumstances” (Ibid., 8).
Similar to these social categories the state, as argued above, is not born as
monolithic social force. Just as social classes take time to crystallise, states in their turn
require time to consolidate and this process is not linear as these entities may deform as
we shall see in the case of Iraq. Iraq as a state, as this thesis shows, is not a social
category, which we can assume to be a coherent entity that behaves in a uniform
manner. For that reason, this thesis chooses to use the concept of ‘social fields’ to
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describe these spaces on which states form and deform. Accordingly, the utilisation of
certain social concepts cannot be divorced from the aim or the problem of particular
research. For the purposes of this research, the question is not whether this or that
concept is a social category or not, rather it is about the usefulness of certain categories
to examine political phenomena (state survival). Accordingly, just as this thesis argues
that boundaries of states in the Middle East are porous and that the survival of states
there is determined by both internal and external factors, I argue here that the second
layer or social sites to examine in the case of Iraq are the three spheres that divide the
country: Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds (Batatu 1978, 36-43). This will demand the
examination of these spheres as social boundaries that form, transform, activate, and
deactivate in the course of political struggles (see Chapter Three above).
Like the social field of Iraq as a whole, these social spheres are not social units
that behave in a uniform manner. Ottoman Iraq “consisted to no little extent of distinct,
self absorbed, feebly interconnected societies” (Batatu 1978, 6). More than a century
later, in the post-Saddam era, Stansfield argues that “with a resurrected or rediscovered
communal political system dominating Iraqi political life, analyses of Iraq’s political
system and social structures that place the emergence and consolidation of a
cosmopolitan secular Iraqi nationalism above all other patterns of socio-political
organization need to be critically reviewed” (Stansfield 2007, 54).
The period dividing these two distinct epochs is telling to understand the
formation and crystallisation of social boundaries. This crystallisation involves attempts
to form political domination by the monarchy and post-monarchical regimes—the
monopolisation of coercion, universal idea, and economic resources—which generates
resistance from oppositional groups. It is these interactions that confine and divide
social boundaries (just as an industrialisation process under the dictates of the market
increases the ‘antagonism’ between capitalist and worker demarcating their spheres and
interests).
In studying state formation, this should not be surprising. Iraq is not peculiar.
We shall see that competition takes place within each of the spheres—Shiite, Sunni, and
Kurdish—and between them. The absence of state institutions with the ability to
incorporate all these different sectarian and ethnic groups meant that regime tactics of
survival—attempts to reproduce domination—involved strategies of reproducing
certain power balances within these social boundaries to avoid power monopoly within
them; a power that could potentially threaten the regime.
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In arguing that competition for power takes place within these three spheres, we
are thinking of yet other social layers and boundaries that shape and are shaped by
political struggles and political entrepreneurs. These could be tribal struggles, struggles
among families within these tribes, class conflict, or urban-rural divides. To introduce
the complexities of these different social boundaries in the case of Iraq, it is useful to
examine the identity of the country’s long-term dictator Saddam Hussein. This is
important to understand how regime security dilemmas contract the political, which
devolves power, and deforms the state. Hussein, for instance, at once belonged to
different groups and, as we shall see, power circles ranging from his Albu Khattab
family, which belongs to the Beijat clan, which in turn is part of the Albu Nasr tribe,
which is one of the Takriti tribes that is also part of the ‘Sunni triangle’34 where major
tribes such as Dulaim, Shammar, Ubayd or Jubur have strong influence, and which also
forms part of the Arab population of Iraq (as opposed to its Kurdish part) and which, at
least according to Baathist ideology, is a region (qutr) of the Arab world.35
All these social boundaries and, hence relations, were activated at one stage or
another in the process of domination and resistance.36 As argued above and for
analytical purposes, these structures will be treated as latent. The activation and
deactivation of these identities is determined by political struggles. Before we examine
regime formation in Iraq and sources of resistance to it, we need to describe these three
broad categories that form the three social sites in Iraq. I start with the Shiites.
The Shittes form the majority of the Iraqi population and are geographically
reside in all the provinces to the south of Baghdad which are: Kut, Hilla, Karbala,
Diwaniya, Mutafiq, Amara and Basra. All these provinces, which are mostly ethnically
Arab, fall around or between the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. In Basra and Nasiriya
there are Sunni minorities. Karbala and Najaf have important symbolic meaning for the
Shiites. It was in Karbala where Hussein, son of Ali and grand son of the prophet was
killed (and is buried) by Yazid’s forces of the Umayad caliphate in 680 starting a
schism between Sunnis and Shiites in Islam and in Najaf where Ali is buried.
Although ruled by Sunni-dominated governments such as the Ottomans (1534-
1917), these regions maintained the Shiite character thanks to the sanctuaries in Najaf
34 What came to be known as the ‘Sunni Triangle’ forms the area inhabited mostly by Sunni Arabs
ranging from near Baghdad on the eastern side of the triangle, Ramadi on the west side and Tikrit on the
north side.
35 The analysis on Hussein’s multiple identities is based on (Jabar 2003b) and (Dawood 2003).
36 The “activation of a boundary consists of its becoming more salient as an organizer of social relations
on either side of it, of social relations across it, or of shared representation on either side. Deactivation
consists of a decline in that boundary’s salience” (Tilly 2003, 144; see Chapter Three).
179
and Karbala and to the religious schools (Hawzas) there that developed Shiism as
theological thought and Jaafari School of Law, which wasn’t recognised by the
Ottoman authorities. These schools played and continue to play an important role in
defining the Shiite identity. It is this historical background that sets the frame to
understand the emergence of social sites and social boundaries. In the emerging state, in
the new social field, the way Shiites will respond to new political realities reflects their
multiple identities—Arab, Iraqi, and Shiite—and the multiple authorities within their
sect.
The vast majority of Sunnis inhabit the Arab area of the Euphrates above
Baghdad and the Tigris between Mosul and Baghdad. As opposed to the Shiites of Iraq,
Sunnis have been the politically dominant ruling group regardless of which social class
came to represent this dominance (Anderson and Stansfield 2004, 139). Although the
Sunnis represent a minority in Iraq, their majority status in the Arab and Muslim worlds
have shaped their political perception. The focus on Arab identity, at least as successive
regimes in Iraq constructed it, helped buttress the position of the regime by relying on
the Sunni base, weakening the Shiites and restraining the Kurds: “the association of
Sunnis,” argue Anderson and Stansfield, “with governance and Shi’a with
disenfranchisement later became an institutionalised feature of the political psyche of
the population” (Ibid., 142).
The Kurds are the second major ethnic group who inhabit the landlocked
mountainous regions in the north and northeast of Iraq and are in their majority (75%)
non-Arab Sunnis. The population of Kurds in the Middle East is around 25 million and
the division of the region into states left this community dispersed in Iraq (5million),
Turkey (12million), Iran (6million), Syria (1million) and in former Soviet republics
(1million) (Ibid, 159).
Kurdish presence in mountainous regions contributed to maintain their cultural
and linguistic identity. Like their Arab counterparts, the major social unit that organised
Kurdish social life was the tribe. Under the influence of external forces and
modernisation, the two major urban cities of Irbil and Suleimaniya generated political
parties who politicized the national aspirations of the Kurds. It is these cultural,
geographical and political backgrounds (usually taking place within the social boundary
separating the Kurds) that form the relationship of this group with other communities in
Iraq. In the nascent Iraqi state, the Kurds, like the Shiites, constitute the group that is
always in a state of “revolt” (Gunter 1992).
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6.2.1. External Regime formation and Indigenous Resistance
The British occupation of Iraq generated both ambivalent and conscious
responses from different sectors of Iraqi people. For instance, while the leading figures
and merchants of Basra quietly accommodated British occupation, their counterparts in
the mid and lower Euphrates had ambivalent response; some accepted the Ottoman
declaration of war against the British but others like Ayatollah Kazim Yazdi declined to
endorse it. In Baghdad, while some members of the leading families remained quiet, the
Al-Ahd movement began to desert from the Ottoman army. This situation intensified
when Amir Faisal, son Sherrif Hussein, entered Damascus as part of the allied forces
against Ottoman power. In Kurdish territories, the British were initially welcomed, as
mentioned above, until British goals diverged from the autonomy-seeking Kurdish
elements.
These ambivalent responses were met by the British—like subsequent regimes
in Iraq—with either cooptation or violent repression. In 1918, after Britain’s occupation
of Najaf and Karbala, the Society of Islamic Revival including notables and religious
scholars called for defending Islam against occupiers (Ibid., 33-34). The 1920 San
Remo resolution to grant Britain mandate power over Iraq resulted in a wide-spread
rebellion, which came to be called the 1920 Revolt. Wrongly called thawra (revolution)
in Arabic, the revolt was an uprising of different sectors of Iraqi society against the
newly imposed British political order.
The revolt exemplifies the path the Iraqi will pursue: attempts to construct a
political order are opposed from different Iraqi forces leading to a regime repression
conditioned by Iraq’s geopolitical location. Triggered by the British arrest of Ayatollah
al-Shirazi’s son, the revolt invited religious and tribal elements and by July most of the
mid Euphrates region was in the hands of the rebels (Ibid., 43). The rebellion later
spread to other regions of Iraq enrolling the Al Ahd (Stansfield 2007, 41) and the Kurds
who captured several towns on the Persian border without any coordination with their
Arab counterparts. There were “three interrelated cores to the revolt, these being Arab
nationalist, a Shi’i ulama-led component and disaffected tribal groupings” (Ibid., 42).
The revolt reflects not only lack of coordination between the ‘cores’ but also the blurred
boundaries of the spheres. Lasting for four months and costing the lives of 6,000 Iraqis
and 500 British and Indian soldiers, the revolt was a precursor of locally perceived
resistance to an emerging political order.
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The Shiite driven revolt did not only threaten British control in Iraq but also
raised fears of Sunni notables in Baghdad, Al Kut and Amara: “They and their
extensive landholdings had been recognised by the British authorities and they were
clearly unwilling to place these gains in jeopardy” (Tripp 2000, 44). The British
eventually suppressed the revolt using the Royal Air Force to bomb rebellious regions
bringing it to an end by October 1920.
The short-term effect of the revolt meant that the British had—like their
American counterparts decades later—to revise their position in Iraq terminating the
military administration and establishing a Council of the State presided by Abd al-
Rahman al-Kaylani. The Cairo conference in 1921 set the “three pillars” of the Iraqi
state: the monarchy, Anglo-Iraqi treaty, and the Iraqi constitution (Marr 2004). King
Faisal was installed as king of Iraq. Lacking an Iraqi constituency, Faisal relied on a
group of Sharifians. As opposed to Ibn Saud who had a social base to support his
regime, Faisal was largely resisted by Iraqi society. As an Arab, the Kurds were
unconvinced by Faisal, and as the Sunni, he wasn’t attractive for many Shiites. Further,
Sunni sayyids saw him as an outsider who came to meddle in their affairs. The
monarchic regime had to base its rule on Arab nationalists and ex-Ottoman army who
were predominantly Sunni (Stansfield 2007, 45).
One of the major outcomes of World War I in the Middle East was its
reorganisation into territorial states. By 1925 an Iraqi social field was born
incorporating the three provinces of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra and structuring
political dynamics within it and orientating them towards a new centre in Baghdad. This
triggered a process of state formation. In different cycles of domination and resistance,
identities were activated and deactivated, institutions constructed and deconstructed and
the state formed and deformed. To comprehend these processes, I will first examine the
constitution of that field looking at its cultural structure and its material and political
structures in light of regime formation, domination and resistance in the following
section.
In Iraq, the cultural structure includes multiple ethnic, religious, tribal and
sectarian identities. There exist four major ethnic groups: Arabs, Kurds, Assyrians and
Turkmen; three religious groups: Muslims, Christians, and Jews; and two major
sectarian groups: Shiites and Sunnites. With establishment of the state, 56 percent of the
population were Shiites, 36 percent were Sunnites, and 8 percent were non-Muslims.
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Approximately 25 percent of the population was Kurdish (Anderson and Stansfield
2004, 143).
Where political monopolisation in Saudi Arabia took place in relative
international isolation and where regime formation coincided with the emergence of
state boundaries in Iraq, the external engineering of state boundaries and the repression
of indigenous attempts for state making saw a regime forming as an extension of that
engineering. Three dimensions need to be clarified here; first, the emergence of a
boundary—a social field, second, British regime formation, and third indigenous
accommodation and resistance to the boundary and regime formations. In the new
social field, “the Iraqi state became a new centre of gravity, setting up or reinforcing the
structures that would shape a distinctive Iraqi politics” (2000, 30). This new centre of
gravity began to attract forces to it as it sought to generate power across the field.
The British instalment of Amir Faisal served three main goals. First having
participated in the aborted Arab Revolt during the war he enjoyed legitimacy at least in
the eyes of the Arabs, second he had good relations with Britain and finally, “he was
available following his unceremonious eviction from the abortive Syrian Kingdom by
the French” (Anderson and Stansfield 2004, 14). Additionally, given that the appointed
king lacked a constituency of his own, he “appeared open to British manipulation”
(Dodge 2003, 19).
Like all subsequent regimes in Iraq, in attempting to consolidate its power and
to portray an image of a patron state, the monarchy engaged in political struggles that
threatened its domination. These struggles reinforced existing structures and laid the
foundations for continuous attempts to reconstruct the state by different Iraqi factions.
The main player however remained the British. To increase the king’s legitimacy a
plebiscite was arranged in 1921 showing the king having the unrealistic support of 96
percent of the Iraqi population.
Although according to the British-drafted constitution, the king had the powers
to appoint cabinet members, dismiss parliament, approve laws, and call for elections, in
reality the British were the final arbitrators. The 1921 Anglo-Iraqi treaty assigned the
British a decisive role in the financial, security, and foreign relations of Iraq (Tripp
2000, 53). In aiming to buttress his power, Faisal was at the crossroads of internal
opposition and external restraints emanating from British geopolitical considerations.
The two sources which could have augmented Faisal’s powers—anti-British feelings
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and Arab Nationalism—contradicted Britain’s interests (Anderson and Stansfield 2004,
17).
British occupation and the Anglo-Iraqi treaty generated strong Iraqi opposition,
which became salient in Shiite areas of the south and mid-Euphrates region. The Shiites
main worry was that the treaty would legitimate British control and consolidate a
regime they formed no part of. In 1923, religious scholars issued fatwas against
participation in the elections. Other Shiite elements working in political parties such as
the Watani (Patriotic) Party and the Nahda (Awakening) Party, accommodated the new
order and aimed to pursue strategies that reflect the new Iraq (Tripp 2000, 54-5). These
reflected the balance of forces existing within this sphere and what political
entrepreneurs perceived as the most viable strategy to pursue given the new political
opportunities.
Although King Faisal had his reservations over the treaty, he felt threatened by
Shiite religious opposition. The survival strategy of the king involved the arrest and
exiling of Ayatollah al-Khalisi37 and also aimed, like all future regimes in Iraq, to de-
monopolise power emanating from the Shiite sphere. This was facilitated by the British
re-tribalisation strategy that aimed to ensure the representation of tribal leaders in
parliament: the “powerful seduction of the state, with its position, patronage, and
resources” contributed to isolating the Hawza (Tripp 2000, 57). The British policy
however reinforced tribal organisations that maintained arms and weakened state
attempts to recruit tribesmen for the military (Davis 2005, 60). Other potential political
competitors to the Hawza included lay and secular politicians and activists who would
later contribute to Arab nationalist and communist movements.
Sunni political activists had reservations over the treaty but “felt alienated by the
overt Shi’i discourse emanating from the mujtahidis and preferred the establishment of
a secular state, with strong Arab nationalist credentials, which could even exist under
temporary British control” (Stansfield 2007, 48). Sunni fears were further aggravated
when Turkey made claims to Mosul. After a Turkish incursion into Kurdish areas, the
British decided to release Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji to contain Turkish influence. It is
important to remember that the Kurds enjoyed two years of autonomy (1918-1920)
before this was suppressed by British power. To encourage Sheikh Mahmud, the Kurds
were promised a provisional government in Kurdish regions. From a British
37 Khalisi’s deportation was made under the pretext of an amendment of a law of immigration, which
differentiated between those who had Ottoman nationality before 1924 and others who held Iranian
nationality including many Arab Shiites who aimed to escape taxation and conscription in the Ottoman
army (Nakash 2006, 86).
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perspective, in addition to the oil potential of Mosul, the mountainous regions of
northern Iraq provided a topographic defence against a potential Turkish or Russian
intrusion (Ibid., 46). From the Iraqi regime’s perspective, the loss of Mosul would mean
a state with an overwhelming Shiite majority that would threaten the integrity of the
existing regime (Tripp 2000, 55). After it became clear that Sheikh Mahmud was
preparing for a genuinely independent Kurdistan however, the British using the RAF
repressed this possibility and by 1924 Iraqi forces occupied Suleimaniya and Sheikh
Mahmud fled to the Persian border.
The combination of domestic monopoly attempted by the regime and regional
position of the state kept Iraq intact in the initial period of its formation. The British
ability to use coercive power—made possible with an indigenous 5000 strong army of
Assyrians and the RAF (Anderson and Stansfield 2004, 16) 38—on several occasions
curbed any attempts at revisionisms in Iraq. Britain faced, nevertheless, dilemmas that
handicap states during late formation. Anderson and Stansfield observe that the
“extensive British use of chemical weapons against rebellious Kurdish tribes during the
1920s provided the model for the Anfal campaign” (2004, 23). The 1918 rebellion in
Najaf, which led to the assassination of a British officer, led to the siege of the city for
six weeks, the execution of 11 people and the deportation of 123 to India (Nakash 2006,
75). In 1922, when it became apparent for the British that Faisal was trying to appease
anti-British activists, Percy Cox, the British High Commissioner, decided to arrest the
nationalists, ban newspapers and political parties, and suspend state institutions in 1922.
Dodge observes the British dilemma:
During the war and its aftermath the British saw the nationalist
movement as a positive tool to deploy against the Ottoman Empire
… But as the movement grew in power and its demands increasingly
constrained the ability of the British to act ….tensions between
control and devolutions at the core of the British approach to
Iraq…By his actions..the High Commissioner threatened to alienate
the very people to whom power was to be devolved and to
undermine the institutions that were supposed to assure the viability
of Iraqi sovereignty. (2003, 22-23)
This dilemma (regime control versus political incorporation) would face
subsequent Iraqi regimes and the US in the post-occupation period and acts as the
cornerstone of Iraqi political dynamics. In these dynamics we will first observe an
expansion of the political structure that provides new opportunities for different forces
to make political claims. Second, these claims are made against a regime which keeps
38 The Assyrians became a part of the Iraq Levies, which was a unit organised within the British army to
guard military facilities (Davis 2005, 61).
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the structure intact and which begins to form its own strategies of survival. Third, at the
core of this regime we observe intra-elite struggles for power leading to the use of
coercion as a political tool with the military taking a pivotal role. Fourth, these
struggles lead to the contraction of the political structure, resembling the Saudi regime,
which alienates different Iraqi forces and exacerbates state deformation.
The main divisions in Iraqi politics centred on state identity, state role in
economic development, and the relations with the British. Two contending visions
relating to the nature and identity of the Iraqi state shaped political struggles in Iraq.
The first vision emphasises Iraq’s pan-Arab identity, accentuates Iraq’s Arab past
predating the Islamic empires and stresses the glories of the Abbasid Empire. The
political implications of this view lie in considering Iraq to be but an integrated part of
the Arab world—its ‘eastern flank’—and form the basis of Arab Nationalist ideologies,
which be predominant in republican Iraq. The second vision emphasised Iraq’s
nationalist characteristics (dating those to the Mesopotamian times) and the modern
Iraqi nation based on the current political boundaries, without necessarily rejecting
Iraq’s Arab past (Davis 2005, 13).
Although both Sunnis and Shiites debated these visions, broadly speaking
Sunnis support pan-Arabism, which integrates them to Sunni majority in the Arab
world, balancing against their minority status in Iraq. The Shiites initial vision as
advocated by Shiite religious scholars in the 1920s was to establish an independent Iraq
with an Islamic government. This vision contested with the Hashemite plan for an Arab
state including Jordan, Syria and Lebanon (Nakash 2006, 73). That said however, the
Shiites, depending on existing political opportunities and constraints, supported
political trends fluctuating between these two visions. While some supported (secular)
Arab nationalist trends in the aim of assuaging the Sunni-Shiite divide in which they
formed a subordinate part39, others were attracted to the Iraqi nationalist vision and
backed the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP). In the late 1950s Shiite political parties with a
religious agenda begin to emerge.
As for the Kurds, the choice was limited to an Iraqi nationalist vision as this put
them on par with their Arab compatriots. The aim of establishing their own state,
however, continued to shape the politics of the Kurdish national movement leading, as
we shall see shortly, to conflicts with Baghdad. But in choosing between the two
visions, the Iraqi vision fitted more with the non-Arab community.
39 The Shittes as will be shown below were among the founders of the Baath party (Nakash 2006, 83).
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Unlike Saudi Arabia, whose universal idea of Islam contributed to the
monopolisation process there, in Iraq these different political identities have constrained
the monopoly mechanism creating security dilemmas not only between different
communities but also intra-elite struggles among the Sunni-dominated state. In Iraq,
each regime initiates its power by portraying an image of an omnipresent state that aims
to incorporate and represent all its warring factions. However, as the new regime aims
to survive in power it enters into struggles that endanger this image opening the way for
bids for power by other actors who come to reconstruct the state using their own vision
of history and establishing their networks of patronage. The trend that we need to pay
attention to here is the process of monopolising coercion, especially as this a
precondition for political survival. Let’s examine these dilemmas.
The British-installed regime (and its clients) aimed to augment its power
through the acquiring and granting of lands creating a patronage system where “the
organs of the state were dominated by men whose prime interest was increasing the
yield of their landholdings” (Tripp 2000, 69). The Land Settlement Law of 1932
strengthened the powers of the landlords, who avoided paying taxes. The image of a
constitutional state that tolerates political activity, on the other hand, led in the initial
period to the expansion of the political structure with the emergence of different
political parties, professional associations, and numerous publications reflecting
different political trends (Davies 2005, 72-3). One example is the inter-sectarian Hizb
al-Ikha al-Watani (Brotherhood Patriotic Party), which brought together Yassin
Hashimi, who drew his support from the Sunni community and Ja’afar Abu al-Timma,
whose main support came from urban Shiites (Tripp 2000, 70) . The party formed an
opposition to the government of pro-monarchy and pro-British Nuri al Sa‘id, who
dominated parliament.
We realise here that when the rules of the game are set in place, the sectarian
divide becomes less salient as actors attempt to exploit existing channels to make their
political claims. However, these conditions change when status quo factions are
threatened. As the “independence” of Iraq approached in 1932, political claims
intensified. In Kurdish areas the forces of Sheikh Ahmad of Barzan forced the Iraqi
army out of the area leading Nuri al-Sa’id to seek the support of the RAF to hunt down
the rebels. The Assyrians fearing that their British connection might endanger their
survival sought British protection. British assurances, however, did not prevent the
campaign led by General Baqr Sidqi, commander of the northern region, which
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systemically massacred hundreds of Assyrian villagers (Anderson and Stansfield 2004,
25).
In 1933, King Faisal attempted to form a consensual government including in its
ranks members of the Ikha Party and Nuri al-Sa’id. By incorporating the Ikha, the
regime diluted the former’s rejection of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty40and by isolating Ja’afar
al-Timman the party disintegrated a few years later. This, in the eyes of the Shiite elites,
“reinforced the impression of a Sunni-dominated state as members of the Sunni Arab
elite accepted office at the expense of their erstwhile allies” (Tripp 2000, 79). The
Sunni- dominated regime is reflected by the fact that between 1921 and 1936 only 5 out
of 57 ministers came from either the Kurds or Shiites and, until the revolution of 1958,
prime ministers and ministers of interior, defence, finance and foreign relations were
predominantly Sunnis (Stansfield 2007, 47). Similarly, commanders in the army, such
as the ‘circle of seven’ and the ‘golden square’, who as we shall see below began to
shape politics in Iraq, were mainly Sunnis.
Centralising attempts by the regime such as introducing conscription were met
by opposition from both Shiites and Kurds, who refused enrolment in the army. The
government of Ali Jawdat aimed to weaken the Ikha and Shiite tribal sheikhs in the
parliament. This was met with opposition in the mid-Euphrates region leading to the
Shiite notables and sheikhs to produce the Mithaq al-Sha’b, a people’s charter that
expressed Shiite grievance and called for proportional representation and free press and
elections (Tripp 2000, 82). The rebellion then spread to southern regions. When the
army led by Taha al-Hashimi—brother of Yassin Hashimi—refused to stop the
rebellion, the government had no choice but to resign. This story reflects emerging
trends in Iraqi politics where intra-elite struggles exploit popular resentment to solve
conflicts and also displays the crucial role of the army and its control in shaping Iraqi
politics. Yassin al-Hashimi was then asked to form a government “having effectively
carried out a coup d’état against his rivals” (Ibid., 83).
In 1935, in the Kurdish areas local feuds developed into a rebellion against
conscription, reflecting constraints on the monopoly mechanism. Regime tactics of
survival led al-Hashimi in the 1935 elections to incorporate Shiite tribal sheikhs in the
parliament and maintained a Shiite block divided between the Hawza and tribal
elements that would otherwise threaten the regime. This nevertheless did not stop
40 The Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930 prepared the ground for a legal basis between the ostensibly sovereign
country of Iraq and the British. Although the treaty granted the Iraqi government power over its internal
security and defence, it maintained British right to use Iraq’s facilities in the case of war and to maintain
two bases in Habbaniya near Baghdad and Shu’aiba close to Basra (Tripp 2000, 66).
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Hashimi reacting ruthlessly towards the rebellions in the Kurdish areas or in southern
Shiite areas. Hashimi further strengthened the police and intelligence agencies
introducing military training under Arab nationalist leaders and, through his brother
Taha, aimed to block the promotion of threatening army chiefs. These measures
targeted Hashimi’s Sunni competitors in the regime. Fearing an alliance between his
competitors in the centre and tribal forces, he suppressed all provincial dissent, closed
opposition publications and repressed protests in Baghdad (Ibid., 88).
As we observe here, attempts to centralise power took place at both intra-elite
(within the Sunni boundary) and inter-communal levels. Security dilemmas drove Iraqi
politics in authoritarian trajectories with violence, reflected in the increasing role of the
army becoming part of politics. This phase is important to understand and situate the
Baathist regime under Saddam where, ruthless as it was, it differed in degree rather than
content. In 1936 Baqr Sidqi carried out the first coup in Iraq (and the Arab world)
against the Hashimi brothers and asked the king to install Hikmat Suleiman, who was a
member of the Ikha party, as prime minister. The instigators of the coup—Baqr Sidqi
and Hikmat Suleiman—were of Kurdish and Turkish origins respectively. The
government of Suleiman led by an Iraqi nationalist vision included more Shiites and
Kurds in its ranks and sought, as we shall see later, greater cooperation with Iran and
Turkey as opposed to pan-Arab visions.
In addition to receiving support from leftist movements and minorities, the new
government gained the support of the Ahali group, which supported political and social
reforms including land redistribution and protection of Iraq’s minorities.41 The coup
“reflected the deepening struggle between the two primary definitions of political
community, and was exacerbated by the tensions between control of the state by
political cliques and the efforts of leftists to enact social and economic forms” (Davis
2005, 65).
Faced with numerous political claims—land reform, democratisation—the new
government resorted to repression to maintain power (Tripp 2000, 91) once again
signifying the increasing role of the army. The assassination of Sidqi in 1937 brought a
Sunni clique of officers (‘circle of seven’) with a pan-Arab vision for Iraq contracting
the political arena to a few officers: “the political world had become equated ever more
41 Jama’at al-Ahali was a group founded by Iraqi students in the American University of Beirut in 1920s.
The main political principles of the Ahali group were based on British Fabianism and combined social
democratic principles and political independence of Iraq (Sluglett and Sluglett 1991, 122).
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narrowly with the restricted circles of officials (and officers) who dominated the state
from the capital” (Ibid., 96).
The start of WWI in 1939 and the initial German victories led to a rift in the
circle of seven who sought to break with Britain with the formation of the ‘golden
square’.42 While Abd al-Ilah, the regent, and Nuri al-Said advocated a pro-British stand,
the younger officers, with the support of Arab nationalists supported Axis Powers
believing that they would be victorious. In 1941 the Golden Square carried a coup
removing the regent and Prime Minister Taha al-Hashimi. The British saw the coup as
targeting the monarchical system and their interests in Iraq leading Britain to occupy
Basra and Baghdad and to reinstall the previous regime. Kurdish and Shiite refusal to
resort to resistance facilitated British occupation (Tripp 2000, 100-3).
6.2.2. Revolution and Republican Iraq
As opposed to the one family rule in Saudi Arabia, the Iraqi monarchical regime—
given that it lacked an Iraqi constituency—ruled in alliances with the (landowning)
politicians tempered domestically by the Iraqi army and externally by the British. The
regime was Sunni at its core. The main social forces are composed from ideologically
oriented movements—Communists, Arab Nationalists, Kurdish national movements—
and broadly speaking Shiite and Kurdish opposition.
The period between 1948 and the 1958 revolution in Iraq formed the last
attempt by the British and its allies in Iraq to consolidate their power. This period saw
more than 20 cabinets coming to power (Slugglets 1991, 18)43, economic disparities
worsening due to the lack of political will and interest of the regime to tackle it, and
higher levels of politicisation with different political factions calling for socio-political
reforms and independence from Britain. The revolution of 1958 would begin a new era
in Iraqi state formation.
The period preceding the 1958 revolution shows the regime’s inability to
incorporate different political forces or to produce social reform or to deal with the
increased opposition to a genuine national independence from Britain. These issues
were politicised and articulated by different political forces and civil society groups.
42 The golden square was composed of four colonels led by Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh who advocated a
pan-Arab vision more extreme from the regime and which called for Arab ‘ethnic purity’ and ‘cultural
authenticity’ (Davis 2005, 68)
43 The period between 1932 and 1958 saw 45 cabinets forming. On average each of these cabinets
remained in power for seven months (Batatu 1978, 176).
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During this period the National Democratic Party (NDP) and the Independence Party
(Istiqlal) reflected the main political divide —Iraqist versus pan-Arabist respectively.
Both parties called for social and political reforms and independence from Britain,
while the Istiqlal party emphasised Iraq’s pan-Arabism (Tripp 2000, 114). Leaders of
the NDP were associated with, and some like Mohammad Hadid and Kamal al-Chdirji
were founders of, the Ahali group. Pan-Arabist thought and movements perceived the
NDP and the Ahali group as ‘regionalist’ or ‘Iraqist’ (Slugglett and Slugglett 1991,
125).
Although the 1958 military coup is similar to its predecessors, we call it a
revolution because it altered social relations and ended British power in Iraq. It will be
argued here that material conditions provided objective factors for political change, the
timing of the revolution, however, needs to be understood by taking into account shifts
in regional and international structures of power enabling the coup to become a
revolution. The 1958 revolution, as we shall see, will invite new political claims
emanating from Iraq’s cultural and material structures increasing the new regime’s
security dilemmas before it is defeated by factions in the army. Intra-elite struggles will
narrow the political divide further eroding the revolution’s initial goals, leading
eventually to the deformation of the Iraqi state and alienation of its rulers from the
populace. In this section, I will examine this process. In the next, I will consider the
external determinants that structured these internal processes.
As a reward for their support to the British in the interwar period, landed tribal
sheikhs’ power increased in the Iraqi state. This power proved crucial for regime
survivability before the 1958 revolution. In examining the underlying causes of the
revolution, Batatu makes two arguments. First, he observes a polarisation taking place
between the landed classes and peasants in the period between 1920 and 1958.
Although we had intra-elite struggles, the growing opposition to the regime unified the
ruling elite against revisionist forces. Second, rural conflict between peasants and the
landed class was displaced to urban centres leading the regime to try to consolidate the
power of the latter. Sluggletts, on the other hand, believe that the timing of the
revolution cannot be “deduced” by material conditions preceding it and point out the
political and ideological context of the Middle East in 1958 and the role of the middle
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classes (Slugglett and Slugglett 1991, 118).44 They further argue that democratic deficit
in Iraq and regional politics were conducive for regime change there (Ibid., 138-9).
Batatu observes that during this period 72.9 percent of all landholders owned
less than 50 dunums, while less than 1 percent of all landholders and mallaks controlled
55.1 percent of all privately held land. In 1958, 49 families owned 16.8 percent of all
agricultural land (1978, 53-58). Out of a total rural population of 3.8 million in 1957,
around 600,000 rural heads of households were landless and 64 percent of landowners
held only 3.6 percent of cultivated land (Slugglett and Slugglett 2001, 32). The
industrial sector was predominantly concentrated in 23 rich families engaged in finance,
industry and trade. In 1958, these families controlled “assets amounting to the
equivalent of not less than 56% of the whole private, corporate, commercial and
industrial capital of the country—a concentration enhanced by the pattern of marriage
alliances” (Batatu 1978, 31-3).
The growth of cities, particularly Baghdad, provided peasants with the freedom
of mobility away from agriculture to urban life: “When the cities stood again on their
feet and began themselves to provide the needed security..the Sheikh once a protector
became an economic burden” (Batatu 1978, 73). Between 1922 and 1947, the
population of Baghdad doubled. Although industry accounted for only 8-10 percent of
employment in the period preceding the revolution, as most of the economic activity
continued to be concentrated in agriculture, a growing labour force of under half a
million began to emerge in the transport and services such as the railway, electricity and
water companies, and Basra port, while around 100 thousand workers were employed in
small industrial enterprises. The oil industry employed around 15 thousands (Slugglett
and Slugglett 2001, 36-8).
These socio-economic changes provided objective conditions for political
mobilisation. In addition to the licensing of mainstream political parties, the
governments of Hamid al-Pachichi and Tewfik al-Suwaidi granted licenses to 16 labour
unions, 12 of which were controlled by the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) (Ibid., 38).
The ICP was founded in 1934 and briefly supported the Ahali group and the
government of Hikmat Suleiman in 1936-7, given the latter’s initial aims of social
reform. In 1941, after supporting Rashid Ali’s opposition to Britain, the party was
suppressed, nevertheless (Slugglets 1991, 126; for a biography of the ICP see Batatu
1978, 465-709). The ICP became one of the most organised political organisations in
44 Slugglets point out the omission in Batatu’s analysis of a broad sector between his polarised picture of
Iraqi society: the ‘invisible social classes’ (Ibid., 132-133).
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Iraq. Thanks to a large percentage of intellectuals inclined to leftist causes (Davis 2005,
Chapter 4) the ICP was able to politicise worker’s movements using different media
outlets, demonstrations, and strikes.45
Socio-economic and sectarian rifts made the ICP with its universal Marxist
principles attractive to different dissenting forces in Iraq. The effect left by this
mobilisation changed the nature of rural rebellion from revolts controlled by Sheikhs to
revolts against them. Political claims for reform and change made Socialism, which
Batatu observes was not differentiated from Communism in Iraq of the 1950s, a norm
that even political parties associated with the Right used to mobilise workers and
intellectuals. Batatu gives an example of the Istiqlal party who “spoke and grumbled in
Marxist way” and how Salih Jabr, Iraq’s first Shiite prime minister, who was backed by
landowners, named his party the Socialist Party of the Nation (Batatu 1978, 466). As
we shall see below, the ICP power would contribute to shape Shiite political Islam.
Another emerging political trend was the Baath Party found in 1952. Combining
Arab Nationalism with Socialist ideals46, Baath built on an existing intellectual
framework to promote its Arab nationalist goals. The Baath presented a more radical
form of Arab nationalism from that of the Istiqlal party while articulating ideas initially
developed by Sati al-Husri (a Syrian Arab Nationalist)47 and in civil society groups,
such as the Muthana Club. The 1952 Free Officer’s revolution in Egypt and its Arab
nationalist orientation provided a strong impetus to the Pan-Arabist movement in Iraq.
The period preceding the 1958 revolution led to the expansion of the political
arena. As Zubaida observes for the case of Iraq, “the political field itself plays a crucial
part in the formation of political forces and socio-economic interests” (Zubaida 1991,
206). Facing such dissenting forces, the regime used both cooptation and coercion in its
strategies for survival. Here we need to note that inter-elite cleavages provide
opportunities for dissenting forces to capitalise on to reach power. Yet, in their turn
these cleavages intensify the security dilemmas of the ruling elite causing intra-elite
struggles.
The inability of the regime to cope with pressures emanating from both the
material and cultural structures on the one hand and the inability of different political
forces to enact reforms set the basis for the army, whose role had receded after 1945, to
45 Examples include Sawt al-Kifah (Voice of Struggle), Ittihad al-Ummal (Workers’ Union) or Jamiyat
Tahrir al-Fallahin (Society for the Liberation of the Peasantry).
46 Hasan Alawi observes how the Baath party long before it came to power used socialist discourse to
counter ICP claims (1992, 13).
47 Al-Husri played a pivotal role in influencing school text books in both Iraq and other countries.
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step in to impose these changes. The main statesman in this period continued to be Nuri
al-Said who competed with abd-Ilah the regent and the young King Faisal II. Under
both horizontal and vertical oppositions, attempts to monopolise power continued
unabated. The rise in oil revenue (30 percent of Iraq’s income in 1951), which was seen
as a potential tool for economic development and as an alternative for radical socio-
economic reform, seduced Nuri al-Sa’id who, with the support of Salih Jabr and tribal
leaders, sought to make his Constitutional Union Party the only legal political
organisation in Iraq (Tripp 2000, 127-138). Mounting opposition to Nuri al-Said by
those among the regime and others outside it, made his developmental plans
impossible. Within the regime, opposition began to grow from Taha al-Hashimi who
united forces against Nuri al-Sa’id and later from Salih Jabr. Jabr’s growing influence
began to elicit signs of resentment from the Sunni elite. This resentment, argues Tripp,
emerged “whenever a Shi’i held a senior ministerial post and were much less
prominently or consistently raised when Sunni Arabs held the same posts” (Ibid., 128).
In his aim to increase his influence, Jabr tried to mobilise forces within his
Shiite constituency leading Nuri al-Sa’id to support another Shiite, Fadhil al-Jamily to
form a government. We realise here attempts by political entrepreneurs to activate
Shiite identity amidst intra-elite struggles. Nuri, for instance, was increasingly worried
about the rising resentment among urban and educated Shiite’s who were attracted to
both forces in the regime and more radical parties such as the ICP. The al-Jamily
government represented the highest proportions of Shiites yet to be included in an Iraq
government. In one way this was an important symbolic act of incorporating the Shiites
in the state’s institutions, in another way the reforms that al-Jamaly’s government
proposed were constrained by interests associated with landed sheikhs on one hand, and
by Sunni solidarity against the increasing role of a Shiite prime minister. In the eyes of
the opposition, the reforms proposed by al-Jamily were insufficient. The narrative here
aims to show how sectarian contours begin to emerge and how political struggles
activate and deactivate these boundaries.
Under both horizontal and vertical pressures the regime resorted to repression to
maintain power. For instance the labour strikes calling for higher wages in the railways
and the port—both under British control—in 1945 and 1947 were met violently by the
regime (Sluggletts 2001, 39). In 1947, Jabr arrested Yusuf Salman Yusuf, leader of the
ICP and other leftist parties were banned. Yusef and other members of the ICP were
executed in 1949 under the government of Nuri al-Sa’id. In 1948, an Anglo-Iraqi
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treaty, aiming to prolong British influence for a further twenty years, was met by mass
protest, called al-Wathba or ‘leap’, leading another Shiite Prime Minister Mohammad
al-Sadr, who was chosen by the regent to sensitise sectarian grievances and to weaken
Nuri, to discard the treaty. The protests led to the death of 300 to 400 people and
reflected the power of the ICP in mobilising the masses and the retreat of mainstream
parties such as the NDP. In 1954, Nuri dissolved parliament and all political parties
including his CUP. Political contraction reached its peak during this period uniting all
opposition groups such as the Istiqlal, NDP, ICP, and the Ba’ath against the regime.
Ideological divides separating these movements were temporarily put on hold as they
all aimed at removing the regime.
The ideas these movements in civil society represented had to a large extent
penetrated the army. On July 14 in 1958, the army exploiting a new Middle East
regional configuration of power, carried out a coup d’état bringing an end to the
monarchy and starting a new phase in republican Iraq. The new phase, as we shall see,
is not new, rather, it is a continuation of the previous era.
6.2.3. Political Contraction and State Deformation: The Qassim
Regime
It is to be recalled here that political means to change the status quo have been limited
given “the government’s monopoly of the means of coercion, and the fact that it was
impossible to bring in a government with fundamentally different (that is, anti-British)
policies through the ballot box.” The spread of nationalist and Communist ideas within
the army, the demonstration effect of the Free Officers revolution in Egypt and the
union between Egypt and Syria in 1958 encouraged the younger generation of Iraqi
officers who came from poorer social backgrounds to carry out the military coup of
1958 (Sluggletts 1991, 131).
Although predominantly Arab and Sunni and sharing resentment of the existing
regime, these officers had no common political principles or notions of the type of
system that would replace the monarchy.48 Ideological and political divisions among
them became salient a few months after the coup. The principle division defining Iraqi
political struggle and discourse relating to the state identity and role in regional
dynamics came to the fore once again. While the emerging leader (1958-1963) Abd al-
48 For the social background of the 1958 military coup leaders, see (Batatu 1978, 809-814).
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Karim Qassim favoured an Iraqi nationalist strategy, his Arab Nationalist and Baathist
colleagues, particularly Abd al-Salam Arif, favoured a pan-Arabist orientation.49
The main rift occurred a few months after the coup on the question of whether
Iraq should unite or federate with the United Arab Republic (UAR). This created a
major dilemma for the nascent regime, which would frame the political struggles during
the Qassim period. Security dilemmas facing the regime would, as with the monarchy,
accumulate oppositional forces against it leading to its overthrow in 1963. Nasserite
appeal to Arab masses in general and Iraqi Arab Sunnis in particular contributed to
polarising Iraqi politics. While the NDP and the ICP supported Qassim’s Iraqist
orientation, the Baathist and Arab Nationalists formed the main polar opposition to the
Qassim regime. The ICP, although sympathetic to Arabism, feared that union with
UAR might bring its organisation to an end in accordance with the Egyptian anti-
Communist laws. Michel Aflac’s50 visit to Iraq to encourage it to join the UAR raised
fears for Qassim who “had no particular desire to play second fiddle to Nasser” (Batatu
1978, 828). The ICP further called for “Federal Union and Soviet Friendship”.
Arif’s visits to Syria and his support for union led Qassim to arrest and sentence
him to death only to pardon him in 1959. An opposition made up of Arab nationalists,
Muslim Brothers, and Shiite scholars began to unite against Qassim accusing his regime
of leading a ‘communist conspiracy’. Qassim however, although relying on the ICP as
his ‘natural’ ally given the political weight of his party, wanted to check the power of
the communists to increase his regime’s autonomy. He, with the exception of a few
appointments, refused to enrol the communists in government or to legalise the party.
Ironically, the ICP was legalised under the Baath in the 1970s. In attempting to
counterbalance the appeal of both communism and Arabism, Qassim established the
Ministry of Guidance, starting the first systemic attempt to re-write Iraq’s history
focusing on pre-Arab and Islamic civilisations and focusing on Iraq’s national heritage
(Davis 2005, 110-111).
Qassim’s economic strategy did not aim to confront the upper classes. The land
reform initiated in October 1958 defined a high ceiling on individual landholdings of
618 acres for irrigated lands and 1,236 acres in rainfall areas, while confiscated land
was redistributed to landless peasants in small plots. In the shanty towns that developed
around Baghdad due to peasant migration, Qassim build Madinat al-Thawra (The
49 The coup proclamations presents interesting indications of these rifts (Batatu 1978, 802-805).
50 Aflac is the ideologue and co-founder of Baathist Arab Nationalism. In 1958, he was the secretary
general of the Baath Party.
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Revolution City) with low-cost housing for its dwellers. For the middle classes housing
associations were established to provide low-interest loans for the buying of property
(Sluggletts 2001, 76).51 Qassim initiated a five-year economic place in the period of
which investment in the public sector almost doubled in the period 1957-1960.
The main problem for the regime remained its political opposition, mainly those
emanating from officers in the army with pan-Arab persuasions. This was made clear in
the failed coups of Arif and Rashid Ali in 1959. Qassim’s main support came from the
ICP, which had an interest in regime survival. In trying to maintain his autonomy,
Qassim exploited the bloody clashes between Arab Nationalists and Communists in
Mosul and Kirkuk in 1959 to curb the power of the latter. Although the ICP had no
strategic interest in overthrowing the regime, Bathists and Arab nationalists intended to
overturn the tide to their side by attempting to seize power. The opportunity arose on 8
February 1963, when a group of Baathists and nationalist officers, of whom Ahmad
Hassan al-Bakr was the most prominent, carried out a coup ending the Qassim regime.
Political change once more was to come from above and specifically from the army.
This we have seen from the earlier stages of Iraqi state formation where the locus of
power was shifting to those who held coercive power.
Like its predecessors, the Qassimite regime brought opportunities and despair
for different political factions in Iraq, who all shared the interest of overthrowing the
monarchy. The ICP’s aim of pushing for democratic reforms stumbled in the political
polarisation against Arab nationalists and by the regime’s aims to curb its power. As for
Baathists and nationalists, the Qassim regime not only aborted their aims of achieving
Arab unity, regardless if that was a real option, but also weakened their own grip on
power in his attempts to become the ‘Sole leader’.
The 1958 revolution and the military coup of 1963 are a continuation of
processes initiated earlier. By shifting power to the military and through the
intensification of inter-elite conflicts two processes emerge. First, inter-elite conflicts
augment the aim of monopolising coercion, which leads to the narrowing of the circle
of those who control coercion and subsequently the political management of the
country. Second, the contraction of the political arena activates social boundaries
existing in the Iraqi cultural structure, which in turn alienates the regime from society.
For instance, although Qassim aimed to accommodate the Kurds in his regime
and the Kurds saw the 1958 revolution as an opportunity to advance their interest for
51 This city was later to be called ‘Saddam City’ under Saddam rule and ‘Sadr City’ under the post-
Saddam regime.
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recognition and autonomy, by 1963 Kurds turned against him. Initially, the regime
formed close relations with the Mulla Mustapha Barzani, who was exiled under the
monarchy, and Ibrahim Ahmad, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). The
KDP constituted a fragile alliance between Kurdish tribes of whom Mulla Mustapha
Barzani was the figurehead and urbanite intelligentsia from Suleimaniya and Kirkuk
and other major cities led by Ibrahim Ahmad and, later, Jalal Talabani. As in the rest of
Iraq, Kurdish tribal leaders gained ground due to support from the British in a policy to
indirectly rule Kurdistan. The Soviet revolution and the intellectual political ideas—
Nationalism and Socialism—of the period saw opposition emerge within the Kurdish
social boundary (Anderson and Stansfield 2004, 164-5).
Although, the new constitution recognised the Kurds as ‘partners in the Iraqi
homeland’ and that their ‘national rights are recognised within the state’, the Free
Officers had no clear solution for the Kurdish question (Sluggletts 2001, 80-81). The
Kurdish supported Qassim’s ‘Iraqist’ orientation against Arab unity. However,
differences became clear when Barzani presented Qassim with Kurdish demands for
autonomy in 1961.52 Under Arab Nationalist opposition, Qassim could not deliver his
promises for Kurds. Like other regimes in Iraq, Qassim sought to divide Kurdish efforts
by supporting certain tribes, as in the 1961 clashes which continued intermittently until
1975, between Barzan tribes and the KDP. Intra-elite divisions provided Barzan and
Ahmad with opportunities to exploit and form a politically predictable but ideologically
strange alliance with the Arab nationalist opposition. This strategy was the opposite of
the one pursued by the Left and ICP in particular. Although Qassim had clamped down
on the ICP and legalised another ‘fictitious’ Communist party, the ICP continued to
pursue a policy of ‘accommodation’ with Qassim (Slugglets 2001, 81).
Just as the new regime formed a new opportunity structure for the Kurds, most
Shiites regarded the Qassimite regime as Iraqist aiming to remould the Iraqi state. Shiite
scholars perceive Qassim to be a modest leader with no intention of building his own
network of patronage, but had the support of the Army, of which the Shiites constituted
a majority and of the Shiite poor in the Thawra City (Nakash 2006, 89-90). However,
this base of support is not reflective of the whole Shiite sect (Zubaida 1991, 204).
Qassim’s land reforms, for instance, generated different responses from within the
Shiite sect, as Jabar explains: “Different propertied and landed Shi’ite groups opposed
52 The petition demanded that Kurdish become an official language, the armed forces stationed in Kurdish
regions to be Kurdish, oil revenues from the Kurdish region was to be invested there, and more Kurdish
representation in central ministries in Baghdad (Gunter 1992, 12).
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land reforms in 1959 and the nationalisation and regulation of trade in 1964 and 1970
on communal grounds, as a drive to weaken the Shi’is, while in the nationalist or
Marxist jargon, the policies figure in the form of etatisme or non-capitalist progressive
measures” (Jabar 2003, 68-9).
The spread of communist ideas and growth of the ICP,53 however, not only
threatened Shiite propertied leaders, but also provided challenges to the Islamic Hawza,
where new trends began to emerge with a political agenda that would rally support
within the Shiites and activate the social boundary of the Shiite sects in relation to
others in Iraq. This became clear in the emergence of the Dawa Party (The Call) in the
late fifties: “junior u’lama and Najafi merchants focused their energies on defining the
self, perspectives and discourse, and on propagating their new ideas.” The new party,
which aimed to found an Islamic state, aimed at its early stage “to create an ideology
matching Marxism” (Jabar 2003, 78). These aims, as is clear, would challenge not only
the Qassim regime and its Communist base of support, but also subsequent ‘secular’
Baathist regimes activating further social boundaries separating different entities in
Iraq.
The coup of 1963 brought to power as president Abd al-Salam Arif, who was
an Arab nationalist, and vice president Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, who was a member of
the Military Bureau of the Baath party. Just after the coup, the National Council of the
Revolutionary Command (NCRC) was formed. Similar to the 1958 coup,
disagreements and rivalries regarding Iraqi regional roles quickly came to the fore
between Nasserites who wanted unity with Egypt and Baathists who raised doubts
given the failure of the UAR. This situation was further intensified as the regime was
negotiating a settlement with Kurdish rebels in the north. As these disagreements were
unfolding, the new regime was settling its old scores with the ICP. Through the Baathist
National Guard a brutal campaign was carried out against the ICP and its sympathisers
leading to the killing of 3,000 followers (Tripp 2000, 171). The emergence of parallel
coercion-wielding organisations started earlier with the People’s Resistance under the
Qassim and with ICP having its own militia (Sluggletts 2001, 62). Fearing his own
regime’s security, Arif clamped down on the National Guard.
Political realities in both Iraq and the Middle East, as we shall see below,
showed Arab unity ambitions far more complicated to achieve. Regime security
53 Scholars differ on the extent to which Shiites figured in the communist movement in Iraq, while
Nakash (2006, 88) believes the majority of Iraqi communists were Shiites, Batatu (1978) and Zubaida
(1991, 204) argue that in the 1950s this wasn’t the case.
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dilemmas amidst internal and external conflicts led Arif, who was unconvinced of the
power of ideological loyalties to sustain his regime, to “monopolise power sharing it
only with those associates whom he trusted or thought worth placating”. He formed a
Republican Guard led by Colonel Said Slaibi, a member of his al-Jumaila tribe (Tripp
2000, 176). This initiated a process of political contraction.
Arif built his own network of patronage and aimed to dismantle the Baath,
clearing its cadres from the army and asking al-Bakr to retire. As a Nasserite, Arif
aimed to emulate the Egyptian experience, nationalising the major industrial firms,
banks and insurance companies in 1964 and founding a party on the lines of Nasser’s
Arab Socialist Union. However, Iraqi realities, such as its reliance on oil, religious
(both Sunni and Shiite) opposition against Arif’s socialist decrees, and the Kurdish
insurgency in the north, revealed the limits of emulating Egypt (Ibid., 179). The failure
of socialist decrees and the negative effect left on Iraqi-Kurdish relations because of the
pan-Arab unity plans of Arif, led him to change course moving to an economically
conservative policy domestically and ‘Iraq First’ policy externally.
As a regime’s power begins to erode, it resorts to social powers existing in the
social structure that act as stabilising intermediaries between the regime and society.
Like the monarchy, Arif sought to activate the power of tribal sheikhs in the
countryside, religious establishments, and entrepreneurial elements in towns. This form
of incorporation became possible with the increased income from oil. Externally,
similar to the regimes of Syria and Egypt, Arif moved away from a pan-Arab policy
towards a statist or ‘realist’ orientation driven by the logic of regime survival.
In 1966, Arif died in a helicopter crash. He was succeeded to power by his
brother Abd al-Rahman Arif. The younger Arif regime (1966-8) was weak and was
eventually overthrown on 17 July 1968 by three Baathist officers. Under Baath rule,
Hassan al-Bakr became president.
6.2.4. Political Contraction and State Deformation: The Saddam
Regime
The fall of the monarchy shifted power to revisionists: Iraqi nationalists, communists,
Arab nationalists and Baathists. Qassim’s overthrow shifted power towards Arab
nationalists and Baathists. Under al-Bakr and then Saddam, the shift initially moves to
Baathists and then develops to become a family rule, as in the case of Saudi Arabia.
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Signs of these processes, as I argued above, had been developing since 1920. Under
Arif, state institutions (particularly the security agencies) began to be constructed on
patrimonial and tribal a base, which reflects the intensity of the security dilemma at the
centre and the growing opposition from peripheral forces such as ICP, Kurds, and
Shiites.
Under al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein, this trend will intensify. Here the state,
which in theory or by definition should be the arena that brings together different social
powers in a particular social field, begins to be captured by one faction and to be used
to dominate over others. This process did not start abruptly but was moulded in stages
starting in 1968, which constituted the second rise of Baath, and 1979 when Saddam
Hussein ousted Hassan al-Bakr. This process, argues Abd al-Jabar, has led to the
‘Baathification’ of the state and the ‘Tikritizisation’ of Baath (1995, 59).
We observe here a move towards the centre of Figure 4.2 describing state
formation/deformation above, in where a dominant power within a social field is able to
monopolise coercion, the interpretation of a universal idea, and the socio-economic
factors necessary to do so. The main objective of the new regime of 1968 was to
neutralise the army, which has hitherto played a determining political role. This formed
the first phase of Baathification of the state by transforming military elites into
civilians. Another strategy involved the creation of parallel coercive agencies which in
turn neutralised the army.
Al-Bakr aimed to increase civilian elements in Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC), which became the highest decision-making body in 1968 (Baram 1989,
450-55).54 The first transformation of the RCC, which was exclusively composed of
army officers, took place in 1969 with the purging of non-Baathist allies Ibrahim
Dawood and Abd al-Razack Nayef from the RCC (Sluggletts 2001, 114). Further, this
period saw the integration of the Regional Leadership, which follows the RCC in order
of political importance, with the RCC. Saddam Hussein, who was installed by his
relative al-Bakr as Deputy Secretary General of RL in 1969, became in 1969 Deputy
Chairman of RCC (Baram 1989, 450-55).55
54 The RCC was the ‘supreme institution in the state’. Its chairman is also the president of the republic
and chief of the armed forces (Baram 1989, 448).
55 For a detailed analysis of these changes that took place in a series of Baath Party RL conferences
between 1968-79 see (Baram 1989, 450-55).
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A second strategy was to install Baathist elements in the military56 in the aim of
creating an ‘ideological army’ and thereby increasing their members from a few
hundred in 1968 to thousands by 1981 (Batatu 1978, 1078). The Military Academy
became restricted to Baath party members, which was seen as the only possible path to
maintain the “unity of the armed forces” (Khalil 1989, 27). To neutralise the army and
diffuse coercive power the General Security (overlooking internal political activities),
Police Force, Military Intelligence, Intelligence (anti-espionage in and outside Iraq) and
Special Security were established as parallel agencies. These agencies are linked to
departments in the Baath Party—Military Bureau, National Security Bureau—or the
state—Presidency, Army, Ministry of the Interior. Additionally the ‘Popular Army’ was
formed expanding from 50,000 in the 1970s to half a million in 1982 (Abd al-Jabar
1995, 72-3).
The second process involved the Tikritizasation of the party. Batatu observes
that this trend started in 1963 and is due to the “tenuousness” of ideological ties. Hassan
al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein57 control of the Baath since 1964 attracted many Tikritis
to the party. Out of the five members of the RCC during 1968-9, 3 were Tikritis, 6 out
15 in 1969-70, and 4 out 9 in 1973. Tikritis also held the portfolios of defence,
governorship of Baghdad, Habbaniya air base, Baghdad garrison etc.. “It would not be
going too far” argues Batatu, “to say that the Takritis rule through the Baath party,
rather than the Baath through the Takritis” (Ibid., 1084).
The more the regime felt threatened the higher the political contraction became.
After executing, purging or removing most of his opponents, the Baathist regime was
centred on Saddam’s family (al-Khalil 1989, 292-6). This trend, although increased by
the 1986 (Baram 1989, 457) intensified after the 1991 Gulf War, isolating the regime
both internally and externally. For example, Hussein’s cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid held
the Ministry of Defence, his son-in-law held the Ministry of Military Production, his
half brother Watban Ibrahim held the Ministry of the Interior, his son Qusay Saddam
Hussein held National Security Bureau, which overlooks over all security agencies, his
second son-in-law held the Security Agency (Abd al-Jabar 1995, 85).
56 The army in Iraq has seen continual growth since the time when King Faisal complained about its
weakness. This expansion followed a faster rate during Baath rule. In 1977, while the civil servants
composed 21percent of the labour force, the armed forces composed 11.7 percent in 1978. During the
Iraq-Iran war the percentage rose to 24 percent (Abd al-Jabar 1995, 72).
57 Hussein (as mentioned earlier) and al-Bakr belong to the al-Begat section of the Albu Nasir tribe.
Additionally, Saddam is the foster son, nephew, and son-in-law of Khairallah Tulfah who is the second
cousin of al-Bakr and governor of Baghdad and, later, took other major military positions (Batatu 1978,
1084).
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To understand why the regime aimed at concentrating power, it is important to
situate it in its context, the Iraqi social field. While as we saw in Saudi Arabia, intra-
elite conflicts were limited to those in the family, specifically in the 1950s as the ruling
family divided on how to deal with the Nasserite threat. Challenges to the Saudi regime,
whether from Islamists (Sunni or Shiite), were dealt with either through coercion or
incorporation, as we saw above. This was made possible given the nature of the Saudi
cultural structure, Saudi monopolisation of coercive force, oil revenue, and, above all,
geopolitical position of the Saudi state. In Iraq, the regime faced more challenging
threats. In addition to intra-elite struggles, which Saddam Hussein solved by
eliminating his enemies—perceived or real—the regime faced peripheral threats
emanating from Shiite and Kurdish social boundaries and the ICP.
As mentioned above, these boundaries did not produce unitary political response
because competition between different political forces within them not only limited this
possibility but also made it possible for the regime to ally itself with one faction against
the other and hence de-monopolising the social boundary. This formed incentives for
local powers to seek allies outside the Iraqi social field to balance against their domestic
competitors. In this way, the Iraqi state was deforming. Internal dynamics became part
of the regional configuration of power politics and, hence, Iraqi state survival needs to
be situated within these struggles. First, I will examine how the Hussein regime
behaved towards these threats and then move to examine Iraqi state behaviour in its
regional context.
Similar to several episodes in the history of Iraqi state formation, domestic
forces exploited opportunities in the regional power structure to improve their domestic
standing vis-à-vis the regime. In its initial phases of power consolidation, the Baathist
regime like its predecessors supported limited forms of Kurdish autonomy. After years
of Kurdish insurgency, in 1970, an agreement was signed recognising Kurdish national
identity, language, incorporation in central government, and predominant control over
regional administration (Tripp 2000, 200). The inability of the regime to devolve power
in Kurdish areas, however, brought the March 1970 agreement to an end. The 1972
Iraqi-Soviet treaty contributed to the breakdown of the March 1970 agreement with
increased support by the US and Iran to the Kurdish insurgency (Gunter 1992, 25-31).
After a full-fledged war between the regime and Kurdish insurgents supported by Iran
in 1974, Iraq and Iran signed the 1975 Algiers Agreement. According to the agreement,
Iraq accepted Iran’s claim that the Thawleg is the boundary separating the two countries
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in Shat al-Arab and that Iran would relinquish support of the Kurdish insurgency. This
agreement dealt a blow to Kurdish rebellion, leading Barzani, the KDP leadership, and
many of their followers to move to Iran. Further, the KDP divided into several factions
with a major rift taking place when Jalal Talabani formed his own Popular Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) (Ibid., 34; Anderson and Stansfield 2004, 168).
The Algiers Agreement weakened the Kurdish rebellion until the 1979 Islamic
Revolution in Iran, which provided new opportunities for the KDP. The Baathist regime
on the other hand supported the PUK.58 We see here attempts by the Iraq regime to de-
monopolise power in the Kurdish social boundary to divert KDP energies from the
centre. This process is very much similar to dynamics taking place at regional level.
Iran’s support of the KDP and, as we shall see below, for the Shiites, aimed to de-
monopolise Baathist power in the Iraqi social field as a whole. The deformation of the
Iraqi state—given the internal insecurity dilemmas and political contraction—made it
further vulnerable to external penetration and regional power dynamics. As the Iraq-
Iran War (1980-88) intensified, Iran’s strategy was to bridge the rift among different
Iraqi Kurdish factions to enable them to direct their efforts against the regime and,
hence, to weaken the regime’s efforts towards itself.
Iranian efforts to bridge Kurdish unity materialised with the formation of the
Kurdish Front in 1987 including different Kurdish factions aiming to overthrow the
Baathist regime and the creation of a federal democratic Iraq (Gunter 1992, 39-40). The
front—led primarily by the KDP and PUK—was able to carve for itself an autonomous
region where their social support was greatest. While the KDP, with about 12,000
peshmargas, controlled the region along the Turkish border from Syria in the west to
Rawanduz on the east, the PUK, with about 10,000 soldiers, controlled the southern
region in areas between Kirkuk and Sulaymania (Ibid., 40).
We realise here a shift to the left in Figure 4.3 above, as coercion in the Iraqi
social field is dispersing with the emergence of state-like organisations—a process of
state deformation—and as the Iraqi social field produces different responses to systemic
forces. This deformation process weakens the state, increasing external penetration and
augments the regime’s insecurity increasing its authoritarianism. The Baathist regime’s
answer to Kurdish unity and increased Iranian (also Libyan and Syrian) intervention
generated the Anfal Campaign aiming to repress Kurdish insurgency. In 1987, Saddam
Hussein made Ali Hassan al-Majid, who hitherto was the head of the state security
58 The Iraqi regime extended its patronage to different tribal leaders and aimed to incorporate Kurds into
the growing Iraqi bureaucracy. (Tripp 2000, 229 and 234)
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service, his viceroy in the northern region. Pursuing a scorched land policy and using
chemical weapons, the Iraqi army cracked down on Kurdish resistance wherever this
existed, killing inhabitants and destroying villages. In one case, more than 4000 people
where killed in Halabja after Iranians captured the town in March 1988 (Anderson and
Stansfield 2004, 169-70). The campaign led to the flight of around 60,000 Kurdish
refugees across to the Turkish border and to the relocation of Kurds—a policy which
started earlier—to the central and southern provinces and to replace these by Arab
settlers in certain oil-rich towns such as Kirkuk (Gunter 1992,45-48). After the Iran-Iraq
ceasefire in July 1988, Hussein brought the whole Kurdish region under his control. By
the end of the campaign, 80 percent of villages had been destroyed and around 60,000
people lost their lives (Tripp 2000, 245).
Similar to the Kurdish threat, another developing rival of the regime emanated
from the Shiite social boundary. The relationship between the Baath regime and Shiite
political movements developed from protest to violent confrontation and centred on
several areas of contention. Baathist secular orientation conflicted with Shiite religious
establishment and the ideologies of the main Shiite political parties. Security dilemmas
at the centre weakened Shiite representation at the state level increasing their alienation.
Finally, these domestic areas of conflict were shaped by regional political changes,
namely the tense relations between Iran and Iraq (Jabr 2003, 201).
The failure of Shiite political representation in national parties in the earlier
period and the ideological conflict with Baath and ICP formed a strong basis for the
emergence of Shiite political Islam. The Dawa was the first political organisation
expressing this shift. The Dawa, following the theories of Grand Ayatollah Mohammad
Bakr al-Sadr, aimed to articulate political claims and to specify the particular phases on
which an Islamic state would eventually be founded. As in any religious discourse,
there are disagreements among Shiite scholars on the role religion should play in
politics, let alone the political strategy to be undertaken in particular circumstances. On
a general spectrum, Khomeini’s wilayat al-Fakih (rule of the jurisprudent) represents a
political model giving the jurisprudent authoritarian powers in an Islamic state. On the
other end of the spectrum, Mohammad Mehdi Shamsdine and Mohammad Hussein
Fadlallah represent ‘liberal’ political notions, largely influenced by Lebanon’s multi-
sectarian political life. In Iraq, al-Sadr represented the middle way in Shiite political
theory, arguing for the separation of the right to govern from the juristic role of the
jurisprudent (Ibid., 20).
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Before political ideas materialised into organised political activity, conflict
between the regime and Shiite religious schools (and community in general) erupted in
the late 1960s, reflecting trends emerging as early as 1924. To put pressure on Iran, the
Baathist regime decided to deport Iranian nationals in Iraq in 1980 (around half a
million according to national figures) in addition to the confiscation of funds aimed at
establishing a university in Kufa, deportation of Arabs of Iranian origin, restrictions on
Shiite religious schools (such as the abolishment of military exception to religious
students) and the nationalisation of foreign trade leading to the frustration of Shiite
notables and merchants. These measures led to mass protest leading Ayatollah al-
Hakim to raise a petition calling for freedom of speech, a halt on property confiscation
and for permitting any Muslim to reside in holy cities (Ibid., 205).
While Hakim’s demands were balanced, Dawa was more confrontational in its
strategy. With Hakim’s death in 1970, political allegiance shifted to al-Sadr given
Grand Ayatollah Abu Qassim al-Kho’i’s apolitical approach. The growing influences of
Dawa led the regime to arrest and execute hundreds of its members in 1974. In 1977,
the Dawa exploited Ashura (commemoration of the death of Hassan and Hussein) to
organise “perhaps the first urban-based mass political demonstration” (Ibid., 208) which
took the security services by surprise. The resulting riots in Najaf and Karbala led to the
death and arrest of thousands and to desertions from the army. Trying to cope with
Shiite political Islam, the regime used Islamic rhetoric to neutralise Shiite Islamic
challenge and to extend its network of patronage to members of the Shiite community
(Tripp 2000, 216-7). A different strategy was to incorporate Shiite members, whose
presence in the RL of the Baath Party in 1977 increased (Baram 1989, 453).
The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran aggravated the relations between the
regime and Shiite political parties. Encouraged by the events in Iran, Dawa began a
violent campaign against Baathist symbols and members leading the regime in its turn
to intensify its repressive campaign against the movement’s members, placing its leader
al-Sadr under house arrest. Protests spread in Najaf, Kufa, Karbala, and Madinat al-
Thawra in Baghdad. Dawa was joined later by the Islamic Action Organisation (IAO)
(for origins of the IAO see Jabr 2003, 216-244) and Jund al-Imam (Soldiers of the
Imam), who resorted to violent means to overthrow the regime. In 1980, the regime
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made membership in Dawa punishable by death, executed al-Sadr and his sister, and
deported more than 40,000 ‘Iranian Shiites’ (Tripp 2000, 229-30).59
After the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war in 1980, most of the Shiite political
movement moved its headquarters and resources to Iran. Iran, similar to its relations
with the Kurds, tried to unite different Iraqi Shiite forces under different
organisations—Assembly of ulama for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, The
Revolutionary Army for the Liberation of Iraq etc.—without much success. In 1982,
Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim established the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic
Revolution Iraq (SAIRI), an umbrella organisation for all Islamic movements in Iraq:
“the Iranian effort to unseat the Iraqi regime was in dire need of an all-representative
Iraqi body of which Iraqi Shi’ite militant Islam fell short.” Under Iranian sponsorship,
training and guidance, Badr Army was established and included Iraqi deportees to Iran
and prisoners of war (2003, 235-55).
The regime used a counter-strategy from that attempted by Iran and tried to
create a wedge between Iranian and Shiite Iraqis on the one hand and divisions within
Shiites on the other. Using its propaganda machine, the regime stressed Iraq’s Arab
identity, its Mesopotamian history, and the regime’s Islamic and Shiite symbols and
rituals to distinguish Iraqi Shiites from those of Iran.60 In Shiite religious schools, the
regime extended its patronage network among certain scholars, while expelling scholars
of Iranian origin. Further, all religious centres—appointments, sermons, shrines and
mosques—were brought under government control (Tripp 2000, 234).
The shifting of the war from a defensive strategy by Iran to an offensive one
against Iraq alienated Shiite movements aligned with it, particularly as the bulk of the
Iraqi army conscripts were Shiites, with a growing number of Shiites being promoted to
high positions. The opportunity provided by the Islamic Revolution for both the Kurds
and Shiites did not materialise with a defeat of the Baath. The survival of the regime in
the end of the war led the Kurds to repair relations with the regime to maintain their
survival (abd al-Jabar1995, 185). Two main regional developments would provide new
opportunities for domestic opposition to overthrow the regime, the first followed Iraq’s
59 The execution of al-Sadr had no historical precedent in the history of regime-Shiite relationships in Iraq
(Alawi 1993)
60 The regime called the war ‘Qadisiyyat Saddam’, referring to the Arab victory against the Persians in
A.D.636. Representing the war as a cultural struggle between Arabs and Persians, the regime
distinguished between ‘good’ Shiites, who were seen as followers of Ali, and ‘bad’ Shiites who were
considered ‘sectarian’ and ‘extremist’. (Nakash 2006, 90-91).
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defeat after its invasion of Kuwait and second following the US-led coalition’s invasion
of Iraq in 2003.
For reasons that will be elaborated on below, the Iraqi regime invaded Kuwait
on 2 August 1990 triggering a war, which saw the US leading an international coalition
to liberate Kuwait from Baathist grip. The war ended on 27 February 1991 with the
regime’s defeat and humiliation. Both Kurds and Shiites saw this, once again, as an
opportunity to rise up and get rid of the regime. For the regime, “it was less the loss of
Kuwait that mattered than what else might be lost in the losing of it” (Tripp 2000, 255).
Securing the internal political order by the strengthening of the security agencies
became a priority for regime survival.
This proved crucial with the uprisings in the southern and northern parts of Iraq.
In the south, a few days after the ceasefire, Iraqi opposition groups captured and killed
Baathist members, their families and supporters. The uprising in the south was
spontaneous, involving Iraqi soldiers deserting from the army and mass protests.
Amidst the chaos, local leadership emerged in different towns associated with Baathist
leaders, clandestine Islamic organisations such as Dawa and thousands of the Badr
Brigades sent from Iran. While in the south “it was clear that there was no overall
leadership or direction of the rebellion” (Tripp 2000, 256), in the north Kurdish
movements showed a politically conscious and systemic form of revolt involving the
neutralisation of the Salah al-Din Brigades—a pro-regime Kurdish army—combined
with popular demonstrations carrying a specific slogan: ‘Democracy for Iraq,
Autonomy for Kurdistan’. The Shiite movement, particularly the Islamists, raised the
banner of ‘Islamic Rule’ (Jabr 2003, 270).
Once again the regime was swift in its response. In Shiite cities, the Republican
Guard repressed the uprising resurgence causing massive destruction and deaths in a
matter of two weeks.61 In the north, both Sulaymania and Kirkuk were recaptured by
the regime raids causing the loss of lives of thousands and the refuge of hundreds of
thousands to the Iranian and Turkish border. The limits of the US operation to the
liberation of Kuwait meant that external conditions for regime survival remained intact
particularly with the international coalition having no clear plan for a post-Hussein
regime and Turkish and Saudi opposition to his removal.
The second option for the international coalition was to weaken the regime
while keeping territorial Iraq intact. In 1991, the UN Security Council passed resolution
61 Sluggletts (2001, 289) puts the figure of people killed at 300,000 killed as a result of the regimes
operations. Jabr (1995, 168) provides a conservative estimate of 20,000 killed.
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688, which established a ‘no-fly zone’ north of the 36th parallel enforced by the US and
Britain. In 1992, a similar no-fly zone was imposed south of 32th parallel. Further,
other UN resolutions imposed economic sanctions on Iraq, freezing Iraqi financial
assets, banning import and export of goods—with the exception of food stuffs and
medical supplies—until Iraq complied with definite conditions, as we shall see below.
The arrangement of no-fly zones permitted the emergence of de facto Kurdish
autonomous rule leading to the creation of the Kurdistan Regional Government led by
the KDP and PUK. The region the KDP controlled came from the Kurmanji speaking
north-west of Iraq, while the PUK came mostly from the Surani-speaking region of
north-east. The bitter political divisions between the two Kurdish factions invited
external intervention from the regime in Baghdad, Iran, and the US (which aimed to
unify the Kurdish Iraqi movement to weaken the regime) (Sluggletts 2001, 296-8).
Iraq as a state reached high levels of deformation with the emergence of a de
facto rule in the north, regime weakening in the centre, and external isolation of the
country as a whole challenging the nominal perception of Iraq as a ‘sovereign’ state.
For the regime, the defeat in Kuwait, the economic losses associated with it, the
sanctions imposed after it, and the effect all this left on its security apparatuses meant
that it had to resort to new strategies of survival. Of these the regime chose to revive (1)
the tribal social base of society to revive the decadent party structure; (2) its ideological
orientation; (3) its network of patronage to buy off opponents and divide enemies (Jabr
2002).
The regime aimed to reconsolidate its tribal base relying on a broad alliance of
Sunni clans and particularly the Beijat. The traditional struggle within the Beijat, which
until 1979 had centred on local power, took a national one with power struggles within
Hussein’s own family involving his sons (Uday and Qusai), his paternal cousins
(Majids), and his half-brothers (Ibrahims) (Baram 1998, 11). In 1995, the Majidi
brothers defected to Jordan (for details see Ibid., 8-9). By 2001, Qusai became the
‘presidential caretaker’ and supervised the Republican Guard.
The “retribalisation rapidly spread nationwide” after Hussein apologised for
earlier land reforms and promised reconciliation. This process—named by Jabr ‘social
tribalism’—revealed regime weakness but also the cultural elements a regime can
employ as it seeks survival (Jabr 2002). The regime further turned to Islam:
“Wahabism” penetrated Iraq’s borders “while the security services turned a blind eye.
This ideological newcomer was seen as a desirable alternative to Shi’ite militancy”.
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The above factors explain regime maintenance but the determining factor for
regime survival in Baghdad involved the presence of external status quo powers
unwilling to remove the regime but using “the instruments of status quo—sanctions,
overflights and explicit support for Kuwaiti and Saudi security—to keep in place its
policies of containment and deterrence” (Tripp 2007, 270). This will come to an end
with the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Before we analyse this phase, I will first examine
the external conditions of Iraqi state survival.
6.3. External Factors of State Survival and Collapse
The above examination has so far focused on internal dynamics of state formation in
Iraq. We observe that attempts to monopolise power in Iraq, as opposed to the Saudi
case, have been difficult due to the cultural structure of the Iraqi social field. This
section will examine more closely the interaction of domestic and international factors
and how this interaction determined prospects for state survival and collapse in Iraq. It
will show that Iraqi state survival and collapse is a function of the country’s geopolitical
position. Domestic strategies of survival are not sufficient to understand why Iraq
remains intact or collapses as a state.
The factors needed to explain Iraqi international behaviour have to do with
Iraq’s geographical position, timing of its socialisation in the state system and the
regional order. The process of exogenous state (and regime) formation in Iraq have
placed limits on the Iraqi predominantly Arab-Sunni regime to revise the system. In
examining Iraqi international behaviour, we observe patterns cutting across several
regimes regardless of their identity. Like Saudi Arabia, Iraqi regimes’ first circle of
security is the domestic arena. The main enemies are internal actors who, from the
perception of different regimes, can be used by external players to endanger their
survival. Therefore, the main pillar in examining Iraqi foreign policy is regime survival.
These structural constraints will face all subsequent regimes in Iraq.
The idea that Iraqi foreign policy shifted in the 1970s with the emergence of
“stronger state institutions” to “one aimed at securing and enhancing national
sovereignty” and conforming to Neorealist theory (Mufti 1996, 9) is misleading.
Regime consolidation in Iraq, as I argued above, has led to state deformation, where
foreign policy reflected regime interest and was one of multiple foreign policies
emanating from the “multiple character of the Iraqi state” (Tripp 2002, 167). This
pattern started in the initial phase of state formation and continues until now without
major changes.
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The second pattern observed is that as different regimes seek survival and
regardless of their identity (be it Arabist or Iraqist) they do choose policies that
eventually aim to maintain the status quo by choosing an ‘Iraq First’ policy. By ‘Iraq’
we read ‘regime first’ policy. This pattern, which is similar to Saudi Arabia, is shaped
by discursive factors of Arabism, Islamism, Iraqism, Kurdism etc..These identities do
not determine the pattern identified here but provides a cultural pretext to justify them.
As Mufti argues “only two pan-Arab unity projects ever got beyond the talking stage:
the UAR from 1958 to 1961..and the latest Yemeni experiment initiated in 1990” (1996,
8; emphasis added).
6.3.1. Foreign Policy in Pre-Cold Period
Studying Iraqi foreign policy in essence means examining the foreign policies of
different factions within Iraq. While King Saud, as we saw above, pursued a status quo
foreign policy aiming to consolidate the territories he conquered in 1902-1932 and
accepting the limits imposed by the regional system, King Faisal of Iraq faced a
different dilemma. Having lost Mecca to the Sauds and seen his ambition of a unified
Arab state eroding, Faisal pursued a revisionist pan-Arab policy to unite Transjordan,
Syria, Lebanon and Palestine and if possible regain Hejaz. Two factors however
constrained these ambitions. Although Faisal saw a pan-Arab state as a solution to his
inferior position in a predominantly Shiite and Kurdish Iraq (Mufti 1996, 30), this
contradicted with his domestic aims of state building and with the geopolitical position
of Iraq. Second, his pan-Arabism faced hurdles from status quo powers in the region,
especially Britain, who saw such schemes as destabilising.
The external engineering of the Iraqi state and regime saw Britain repressing
indigenous attempts of state formation, as during Sheikh Mahmoud’s attempts to
establish Kurdish autonomy or during the 1920 Revolt. Britain also restrained the
abilities of King Faisal who voiced resentment against the restrictive Anglo-Iraqi treaty
proposed in 1922 culminated in 1930. British-French coordination in the Middle East
placed limits on revisionist regional plans (Ibid., 30).
After the coup of Baqr Sidqi of 1936, and given that the regime represented the
non-Arab-Sunni face of Iraq, oriented more towards Iran and Turkey. In 1937, two
decades before joining the Baghdad Pact, Iraq signed the Saadabad Pact with Turkey,
Iran, and Afghanistan aiming to contain Soviet influence in their region (Tripp 2000,
91). Under the government of Nuri al-Said, however, the idea of the Fertile Crescent
emerged publicizing al-Said’s drive to restore Palestine (Ibid., 98). This was facilitated
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by the authority of pan-Arab officers and King Ghazi’s sympathy to Arab causes and
criticism of British policy in the Middle East. In 1939, King Ghazi deployed troops and
attempted to unify with oil-rich British protectorate of Kuwait. British threats and Saudi
troop deployment kept the king at bay (Mufti 1996, 35).
Ghazi’s move was seen by the British as a German attempt to destabilise their
presence in Iraq. Polarisation in international politics during WWII provided new
opportunities for local actors. In Iraq this led to divisions in the ruling elite regarding
the direction the country should follow. While Abd al-Ilah and Nuri al-Said were
hesitant to turn against the British, Prime Minister Rashid Ali al-Kilani supported by the
Arab nationalist colonels sought alignment with the Germans. In April 1941, the
colonels staged a coup and reinstated al-Kilani leading the British to re-occupy Iraq in
May restoring Abd al-Ilah and al-Said rule (Tripp 2000, 101-105; Mufti 1996, 35-6).
British victory in WWII sustained its place the Middle East regional order,
although this began to weaken with the emergence of the Soviet Union and the United
States. Iraqi foreign policy (and indeed domestic politics) during this period reflected
this international interregnum. In the period 1941-58 we observe Iraqi foreign policy
trumpeting pan-Arabism on a regional level but, under domestic and regional
constraints, pursuing a Iraqist policy aiming to secure regime survival. In 1942, al-Said
tried to unify with Transjordan under the Fertile Crescent plan but this clashed with
Transjordan’s King Abdallah’s Greater Syria scheme. In both cases this led to the
polarisation of Arab politics with Saudi Arabia allying with Egypt and Syria to prevent
any Hashemite unity projects.
The monarchy’s search for Arab unity may be seen as a way to assuage its
domestic weakness (Mufti 1996, 7-9) because weak regimes aim to neutralise domestic
enemies by attempting to ‘unite’ with external allies (see also David 1991, 233-256). In
the case of Iraq, however, we observe the reverse of this strategy. Both the monarchy
and republican regimes faced structural constraints leading them to abstain from
engaging—beyond rhetoric—in pan-Arab projects. Al-Said’s suspicion about the
possibility of union made him a partner to the establishment of the Arab League, which
virtually institutionalised state sovereignty in the Arab world. Further, his (unrealistic)
proposal for the Arab-Israeli conflict and which all parties rejected provided him with
the pretext to withdraw Iraqi troops from Palestine in 1948.
The emerging divide during the Cold War saw al-Said moving closer to Western
countries, without necessarily abandoning Iraq’s relations with other Arab countries. As
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opposed to the dynastic pan-Arab ambitions, which he believed had “limited utility”, he
saw Arab Nationalism as “potentially divisive”:
He knew that pan-Arabism complicated central control of the
Kurdish region. Equally, he was aware that many Shi’a regarded
Arab nationalism and Arab unity schemes as attempts by the
dominant Arab Sunni minority in Iraq to itself to a greater Arab
Sunni hinterland…Nuri could see the peculiarly debilitating effect of
pan-Arabism on Iraqi political society. (Tripp 2000.140)
As we shall see below, when Arab nationalists came to power they didn’t divert from
al-Said’s behaviour. As the Cold War was looming and the power of the ICP increasing,
al-Said got closer to the western powers, Saudi Arabia and countries of the ‘northern
belt’ (Turkey, Iran, Pakistan) culminating in the signing of the Baghdad Pact in 1958.
The pact aimed to limit Soviet southward penetration, ensure British support (and
ending the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930), and enlisting the US as a major international
patron. This led to a major confrontation between Nasser and Nuri al-Said with the
former seeing the Soviets as a potential ally to promote Arab causes and the latter
perceiving the Soviets as threatening to his regime (Ibid., 140-1).
6.3.2. Iraq Foreign Policy during the Cold War
The Cold War—the bi-polar world structured on the interactions of the Soviet Union
and the US—provided opportunities for Iraq, as well as to other states in the system, to
advance their interests. The ideological division underpinning the Cold War did not
directly affect Iraq (Tripp 1997, 186-7). As we saw above, the Middle East political
order (1920-45), maintained by Britain and France, prevented regime change and
determined state survival in Iraq. The Cold War provided regimes and their enemies
with opportunities to advance their political claims. For Saudi Arabia, whose
monopolisation process was completed before the emergence of the Cold War, the Cold
War gave it opportunities to bolster its domestic authority and, hereby, to contribute to
maintaining regional order. In Iraq, the absence of power monopolisation or political
institutionalisation intensified the process of state building creating both inter-elite
struggles and, eventually, state deformation. The socialisation of Iraq in the bi-polar
international structure, therefore, made it difficult to talk about a consistent Iraqi foreign
policy.
Once again the weight of history, particularly the external engineering of the
Iraqi state formation, would leave its effect on the choices taken by successive Iraqi
regimes. The 1958 revolution, made possible with Britain’s inability to save its allies in
Iraq, left Qassim in a strategic dilemma. His ‘Iraq First’ policy in post-monarchical Iraq
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left him isolated in the region. He could not maintain strong relations with his eastern
neighbours—Turkey and Iran—as this would have meant subordination to the British.
In 1959, he abrogated the Baghdad Pact and restored relations with the Soviet Union
(Tripp 2000, 164). Westward, the emergence of the UAR and the growing influence of
Nasser after the Suez war threatened Qassim’s regime, who, as we saw above, was
facing a growing opposition from Arab nationalists.
Qassim’s drive for domestic power monopolisation was countered by status quo
states such as the US, Iran, and Israel who saw in the Kurdish insurgency a potential
ally to weaken the regime, contain Soviet influence, and to divert its attention away
from the Arab-Israeli conflict (Gunter 1992, 26-31; Rubin, 1982, 110-2). Further,
Nasser’s subversion tactics and the alleged support he offered for a coup against Qassim
soured relations between the UAR and Iraq, a confrontation which augmented different
perception of the US and Britain on whether to contain or accommodate Nasser (Mufti
1996, 131). Here, we don’t only observe multiple foreign policies emanating from the
Iraqi social field, but also attempts by external actors to de-monopolise power
internally, thus shaping processes of state formation and deformation.
The dilemma Qassim faced was further aggravated by his decision to
incorporate Kuwait in 1961 after the abrogation of its 1899 treaty with Britain. This
move, practically, united all Gulf and Arab states against him. At Kuwait’s request,
Saudi and British troops came to the rescue of the emirate. In September, these troops
were replaced by Arab peacekeeping troops from Jordan, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, UAR,
and Tunisia (Niblock 1982, 132-133). Given Iraq’s western and eastern isolation,
Qassim’s move southward was seen as a potential move to improve Iraq’s influence in
the region, to control the Kuwaiti islands of Warba and Bubian, which blocked the Um
Qasr, and to divert the Iraqis’ attention from domestic issues (Tripp 2000, 165; Mufti
1996, 139).
Under Arifs, who fought Qassim for his ‘isolationist’ (or ‘regionalist’) policy
and called for immediate union with the UAR, Iraq, once again, pursued policies
dictated by regime survival. The conflict between Arif and the Nasserites and the
Kurdish insurgency in the mid 1960s saw the latter move “increasingly towards an ‘Iraq
first’ position, tutored in its requirements by the experience of governing a country
where the pan-Arab idea could seriously alarm significant sections of the population”
(Tripp 2000, 182). We recall from the earlier section that within Iraq Arif also adopted a
strategy built on tribal backing overriding ideology and the party. The ‘Iraq first’ policy
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manifested itself in the Gulf region with Iraq recognising Kuwait’s increasing
cooperation with Iran because “the coherence of the Iraqi state stood in danger should
Iran extend support to the Kurdish insurgents” (Niblock 1982, 138). This policy was
also extended to other gulf sheikhdoms and Saudi Arabia.
This pragmatist policy continued under Hassan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein.
Regime foreign policy was determined by its position in the domestic balance of power
and by changes taking place at a regional level. The Baathist regime under al-Bakr and
Hussein cultivated relations with the ICP and the Kurds internally, buying itself time
during the initial stages of its formation and facilitating the 1972 Iraqi-Soviet treaty.
The treaty aimed to counter-balance the US support for Iran in the Persian Gulf after
British withdrawal in 1971, to facilitate Iraq’s nationalisation of the Iraq Petroleum
Company (Tripp 1997, 203-204), and to gain Soviet military support needed to counter
the Kurdish insurgency (Tripp 2000, 211).
The treaty temporarily alleviated the regime’s fear of isolation; however, it came
with a cost as it generated additional support for the regime’s domestic enemies,
especially the Kurds, as mentioned above. This led Hussein to denounce the Soviet
Union for failing to stop Iran’s support of the Kurds and to provide the Iraqi regime
with sufficient weapons to defeat the Kurdis insurgency. Further, the rise in Iraq’s oil
revenue, increased trade relations with the West and Japan, and the availability of arms
from outside the Soviet Union all increased the regime’s autonomy in the international
sphere (Tripp 1997, 206). The main threat to the regime emanated from the Kurdish
insurgency and Iran. This led Baghdad to seek a regional security agreement with Iran
culminating in the Algiers Agreement of 1975 (Niblock 1982, 142). Although Iraq had
no diplomatic relations with the US, under Hussein relations improved as Soviet-Iraq
relations deteriorated and as a growing need for oil markets emerged (Ahmad 1984,
161).
Strategically, the regime had an interest to being ‘non-aligned’ with either of the
two superpowers. Cooperating with the Soviet’s generated reactions from Iran and the
US. The regime tried to assuage this by improving relations with Iran, neutralising the
Kurds and permitting Iraq to send an armoured division to help Syria in the 1973 war.
Disagreements about the ceasefire declared by Syria provided Iraq with the pretext to
withdraw its troops from Syria (Tripp 2000, 210). By 1979, thanks to oil revenue, the
regime had consolidated itself internally ensured its eastern border with Iran and was
ready to project its power in the Arab world and the Middle East in general. Egypt’s
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withdrawal from the Arab-Israeli conflict—and Arab affairs— and Syria’s isolation
contributed to Iraq’s bid for influence. In the Gulf region, Iraq improved its relations
with Saudi Arabia (Ehteshami and Nonneman 1991, 38; Niblock 1982, 144) until a
change took place within Iran.
The Islamic Revolution in Iran constituted a domestic regime change that
generated a new regional configuration of power. The revolution changed Iran’s foreign
policy choices providing new opportunities for both states, such as Syria who perceived
Iran as a potential ally in the absence of Egypt, and claimants for power within states,
such as the Kurds and Shiites in Iraq (as we saw above) or the Shiites in other countries
like Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain or Kuwait. Although in theory the Islamic
Revolution in Iran should have provided Iraq with additional autonomy, particularly as
it defined the US and Israel as enemies and refused to align itself with either east or
west, the threat it imposed on Iraq’s delicate balance of power (see above) saw the
regime aiming to contain and defeat the revolution in Iran.
At a regional level, the Iranian revolution “heightened the need for the
construction of pro-Iraqi axis, to include all anti-Iranian forces” (Ehteshami and
Nonneman 1991, 39; emphasis original). External conditions also were conducive for
such an act. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan saw the Carter administration trying to form
bridges with Iraq to contain further soviet expansion but also to lure the oil-rich and
militarily strong Iraq, especially after the fall of the Shah in Iran (Rubin 1982, 115).
Hussein’s plan of a short war to defeat the revolution failed with Iran’s defiance
and counteroffensive in 1981. Iraqi state formation and deformation processes were at
the centre of events before and during the war. As we saw above Iran extended its
support to Shiite and Kurdish organisations aiming to de-monopolise Hussein’s rule.
This, however, was countered by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and, occasionally, other Gulf
monarchies who feared that regime collapse in Iraq would under Iranian influence
threaten Iraq’s (and their) territorial integrity.
The Iraqi regime—driven by Saddam Hussein—was one organisation among
other organisations competing for power in Iraq. In addition to the oil revenues
accumulated before the war (38billiion), which the war had consumed, regime survival
during the war was bolstered by external assistance amounting to billions of dollars and
‘war relief’ crude oil supplied by Saudi Arabia (see above), Kuwait and others
(Ehteshami and Nonneman 1991, 44-48). The war, which came to an end in 1988, cost
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Iraq more than 130 billion dollars in addition to debts incurred to other (mostly Gulf)
states amounting to 65-86 billion dollars (abd al-Jabar 1995, 148).
6.3.3. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period
The emergence of the US as the only superpower limited Iraq’s foreign policy options..
Given its geographical location at the heart of the Middle East, it was not surprising that
the signs of a new era—‘a new world order’—emerged first in Iraq. It was in 1990, the
year that witnessed a transition to a new phase in international politics, when Hussein
ventured to invade Kuwait.
Disagreements with Kuwait over oil policy, borders and ‘war relief’ oil, which
was terminated by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in 1988 (Ehteshami and Nonneman 1991,
64-73) paved the way for Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. Like Qassim before him,
Hussein felt regionally and domestically isolated. Sour relations with Iran and Syria and
tension with the Gulf monarchies, led Saddam Hussein to move southward seeking
international recognition, money, a role in the Gulf, and an exit to divert the energies of
his internal enemies.
Miscalculations of invading Kuwait had several reverse reactions: Soviet Union,
Europe, and Arab states condemned the invasion, Israel remained neutral and Arab
public opinion had no practical effect (abd al-Jabbar 1995, 161; Ehteshami and
Nonneman 1991, 77). During the war, the regime attempted to get closer to Iran
neutralising a potential threat from its eastern flank and agreeing on Iran’s stated
conditions for peace—shared sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab, release of war
prisoners, and Iraqi troop withdrawal from Iran (Ehteshami and Nonneman 1991, 81).
Due to external factors, Iraqi defeat in Kuwait fell short of toppling the regime and led
to Iraqi isolation.
6.4. Military Occupation and State Collapse: The Internal-
External Nexus
Iraq remained a hurdle for the main political players in the Middle East. Lifting
sanctions might re-strengthen the regime while keeping sanctions proved horrendous for
Iraqis without affecting regime change. This continued until the US under George W.
Bush decided to reorder the Middle East. To be sure, the international structure of the
post-cold war world did not determine US invasion of Iraq, but did provide the enabling
conditions for such an act. Undeterred internationally, the US chose “ideological
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unilateralism” to pursue its strategy in the Middle East (Zunes 2006, 26-7). For Iraq, the
condition of External Neutralisation ceased to exist.
Reordering the Middle East, which means the subduing of enemies and friends
in the region and disciplining rivals outside it, saw Iraq an attractive target. The country,
as this case has shown, was weak and vulnerable to external penetration. The US
invasion was made under the pretext of Iraq’s possession of WMD’s, its relations with
al-Qaida, or as a ‘threat’ to world order. All these justifications proved to be false
(Ibid.). It was, on the contrary, Iraq’s weakness, potential wealth, and geographical
location that made it prey to external occupation. The irony of state formation in the
Middle East is that it is easy to invade countries there due to their inherent weakness—a
theme explored in this thesis—but this same weakness generates conditions for others to
intervene to disable the invader’s initial strategy. This is what the US discovered in Iraq.
In March 2003, 160,000 troops led by the US occupied Iraq and toppled
Hussein’s regime. By April 2003, Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul fell under allied
occupation. The fast pace of regime collapse should not, although it did for some
observers, be a surprise. The accumulation of opposition to the regime started since its
inception in 1968. Changing international conditions provided new opportunities for
local players who constructed strategies in the form of adaptation to new opportunity
structure. Regime collapse needs to be understood here as a collapse of an institution—
the Baathist, Tikriti, and Saddamite network of power—that kept Iraq intact largely
through coercion and incorporation of certain Iraqi elements.
This collapse—external occupation—forms what I discussed above as an
Exogenous Shock in a social field creating a new Political Opportunity Structure and
which activates Endogenous Responses. The removal of the Baathist regime shifts the
Iraqi social field leftwards on Figure 4.2 above to a ‘No State’ category of cases. What
emerged in such a situation are numerous state-like organisations trying to make
political claims for a new order. This led, under circumstances of instability and looting
of public institutions after the collapse of the regime, to the devolution of power and the
dispersion of coercion. This power devolution was not haphazard however but devolved
according to sectarian and ethnic social boundaries existing in the Iraqi social field.
With regime collapse and the absence of a clear state building design
accompanied by a regional political plan, Iraq slid into a full-fledged civil war.
Politicians, observers, and students of Iraq have debated the extent to which Iraq is or is
not in civil war (Tripp 2007, 303; Mazloum 2006). I say ‘full fledged’ civil war here,
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because, given what has been presented so far, Iraq was in a civil war since, at least,
1968. This ranged from selected assassinations by the regime—say of Dawa or
Communist parties or its own Baathist opposition—to full fledged repression of, such as
Kurdish insurgents during the Anfal Campaign or the 1991 uprisings. What we had was
one organisation—the Hussein regime—monopolising more power relative to other
organisations in society and having the ‘image’ of legitimate state. Regime collapse
created a power vacuum, which different forces came to fill by negotiating—through
dialogue and bloody confrontation—the possibilities of institutional building.
To understand Iraqi state collapse and the current political chaos there requires
first an identification of the major players, their interests, and their international
behaviour. The main player that made possible the change in Iraq is the US and, to a
lesser extent its, allies. The US had an interest to install a democratic regime that is
friendly and would not threaten its neighbours but would form a launch pad on which
US strategy in the Middle East would be based. This, it was conceived, would weaken
the power of both adversaries such as Syria and Iran and friends such as Saudi Arabia.
For this to work, the US had to engineer a stable regime. Other main players include the
Shiites and Kurds, who act as revisionist powers and the Sunnis who fear a revision in
Iraqi balance of power might weaken their historical stronghold on power if not
disintegrate the Iraqi state.
Here we observe (1) processes of power monopolisation led by the US and its
allies begin to take shape. Sunni insurgents initiate a strategy of de-monopolisation; (2)
power monopolisation takes place within different social boundaries among the Shiites
or Sunnis and between them and the Kurds. Struggles centre on the nature of the state
and relationship with the occupier; and (3) emerging public institutions—far from
having an independent life of their own and as the previous Baathist regime—begin to
reflect the new balance of power as each force dominates public office. Once again, the
three social boundaries provide us with strong analytical tools to understand the current
conflict in Iraq.
In designing a new political system the US relied on its Shiite allies such as
SCIRI, Dawa, Sadr Movement and politicians with weaker social base like the secular
Ayad Allawi or Ahmad Chalabi and the KDP and PUK from the Kurds. Although most
opposition to US occupation came from the Sunnis, The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) (an
outgrowth of the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood) accepted regime change and tried to work
within the new system. The presence of foreign troops in Iraq, increased Iranian
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influence there and the possibility of establishing a federal state, which could strip the
oil-poor Sunni provinces from any income provided impetus for resistance among the
Sunnis. These factors laid the framework for the emergence of the Iraqi insurgency.
To manage the transition the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was
established giving its governor L. Paul Bremmer, executive, judicial, and legislative
until June 2004 (Tripp 2007, 282). As head of the CPA, Bremmer issued two disastrous
orders. First, he dissolved the Baath prohibiting it high-level members from
participating in government. Second, he dissolved the Iraqi army and the security
apparatuses of the previous regime leaving more than 350 000 people unemployed and
potentially being ready to join the insurgency (Stansfield 2007, 167-8; Tripp 2007, 282-
3).
Just as the British eighty years earlier faced the dilemma of establishing their
interests whilst installing an Iraqi political system, the US faced a similar dilemma:
“whilst claiming to bring the benefits of democratic governance to the Iraqis” argues
Tripp “the United States was nevertheless reluctant to give up control of the process to
the Iraqis themselves” (2007, 283). This is the dilemma of late state formation. In July
2003, Ayatollah Ali Husseini al-Sistani the highest cleric in the Shiite hawza, who
became a very influential actor in post-Baathist Iraq (Rahimi 2007), issued a fatwa
imposing the need to resort to general elections before any constitution would be
drafted. Increase in violent resistance took place against coalition forces and anyone
collaborating with them. In August, the UN headquarters were bombed followed by the
assassination of the SCIRI leader Baqir al-Hakim. In 2005 the CPA was replaced by the
transitional Iraqi government and was tasked with the organisation of elections.
The saliency of ethnic and sectarian social boundaries increased as political
entrepreneurs began to make claims on the political process. During the drafting of the
‘fundamental law’ (transitional constitution), as the Kurds advanced their claim for a
federal and democratic state and the Shiite parties for an Iraqi law based on Sharia,
Tripp observes that “these moves by well-defined and self-confident ethnic and
sectarian organisations [even] pushed the Sunni Arabs of Iraq into an attempt to create a
united front” (2007, 286).
Under the authority of Ayad Allawi, the Iraqi government with its new
paramilitary units such as the Special Police Commandos led by his loyal and supported
by coalition forces, entered into violent confrontation with both the Sunni insurgency in
Fallujah and the Mahdi Army (the armed wing of the Sadr Movement) in Najaf. The
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Fallujah campaign, which aimed to ‘cleanse’ the city from (‘foreign’) insurgents, saw
more than 70 percent of its population fleeing and more than 5,000 dead leading the IIP
to withdraw from government and aggravated the Sunni-Shiite divide (Ibid., 294). As a
result the majority of Sunnis boycotted the 2005 elections while out of 55 members
tasked to draft a new constitution only two were Arab Sunnis.
The election results reflected the new power balance in Iraq and institutionalised
Iraq’s diversity. Out of 275 seats, the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), a Shiite based
coalition of Islamist parties led by SCIRI and Dawa, won 140 seats, followed by
Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan (75 seats) led by PUK and KDP, and the
Iyad Allawi’s secular Iraqi list (40 seats). The new parliament in effect saw the Sunni
community (representing some 20 percent of Iraqi population) unrepresented.
Similar to the Baathification of the Iraqi state earlier a similar process took
place in post-Baathist Iraq. Public positions came to represent the Iraqi diversity and the
underlying power balance: The presidency was given to Talabani with two Arab (Sunni
and Shiite) vice presidents, the house speaker to a Sunni Arab, and the premiership to
Shiite Arab. Iraqi politics began to resemble that of Lebanon. The executive branch was
headed by Ibrahim Jaafari of the Dawa party and had a majority of Shiites. The SCIRI
controlled the interior ministry, the Kurds under Hoshibar Zeebari took the exterior
ministry, and the defence ministry was given to a former (Sunni) Baathist officer who
promised to crush the insurgency. Lacking a social base of his own, the defence
minister “oversaw the colonisation of the ministry and the armed forces by Kurdish and
Shi’i officers” (Ibid., 297). Ministries “became partisan fiefdoms, farmed out to
powerful factions, made more powerful by their ability to command militias that were
used to terrorise political enemies and whole neighbourhoods or communities seen as
hostile to their sponsors” (Ibid., 277).
This state of affairs left most of the Sunnis in opposition to the new regime.
Although some factions decided to participate in the second elections held in December
2005 earning the third place, others supported insurgency such as Harith al-Darih of the
Council of Muslim Scholars, groups linked to the deposed regime including ex-military
officers, or radical Islamic parties such as the Partisans of the Sunna Army, Islamic
Army in Iraq and al-Qaida (Stansfield 2007, 180).
In February 2006 militants blew a sacred Shiite shrine in the predominantly
Arab Sunni town of Samara. In retaliation Sunni mosques were attacked throughout the
country ignoring calls for calm by Sunni and Shiite clerics. This spurred further
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violence, particularly in mixed cities such as Baghdad, Baakuba, and Kirkuk. Due to its
importance, Baghdad saw demographic transfers and sectarian assassinations as the
capital divided into sectarian neighbourhoods. By the end of 2006, it was estimated that
around 2 million Iraqis became internal refugees and more flee outside Iraq, particularly
to Syria and Jordan. During 2006, Iraq saw more than 100 civilians being killed every
day (Tripp 2007, 308).
Systematic resistance against coalition forces, particularly the US, reached to
over 4,000 deaths by March 2008. The increase in suicide bombers during Shiite
religious ceremonies and the killing of civilians led the government of Nuri al-Maliki,
another Dawa member, to respond with further violence exacerbating both the sectarian
conflict and the existing instability. As an Iraqi observer puts it: “The commandos of the
interior and the forces of the National Guards are (security) reserve guarantees for
organisations able (and ready) to enter the war in any moment not to prevent it, but, as
the composition of ministries is now based on sectarian distribution, to be part of it!”
(Mazloum 2006).
The collapse of the Iraqi state and the emergence of state-like organisations
aiming to monopolise power and attempts by others to derail these processes saw Iraq
fall into Hobbessian anarchy: “The Iraqi government”, according to one study became
“one of several ‘state-like’ actors” (Stansfield 2007b). As the government tried to
centralise and monopolise coercion its adversaries raised doubts on its legitimacy. The
al-Maliki government not only faced violent opposition from Sunni insurgents but also
from the Shiite Mahdi Army. Asked to dissolve its military branch, the Sadr Movement
replied that this would be possible when the SCIRI dissolves its own Badr Brigade
(Azzaman 2008). In support for the Iraqi government, coalition forces were employed to
bomb cities where Mahdi Army was present, particularly in the Revolution City, which
was relabelled ‘Sadr City’, where the US planned to build a separating wall to limit the
attacks targeting its troops originating in the city (Alakhbar 2007).
Like the general political landscape in Iraq, different Shiite groups—Mahdi
Army, Badr Brigade, Fadhilla Party (a militant group based in Basra)— fought over
territory, military control (Rahimi 2007, 14) while negotiating the nature of the federal
system, distribution of power in government and control over Basra. For example, the
SCIRI, which changed its name to the Supreme Islamic Council in Iraq (SICI), differs
from Fadhila party on how regions would be divided in a federal state and with al-Sadr
Movement on the principle of federalism. The Sunnis in their turn are against
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federalism and see this as the bedrock for the disintegration of Iraq (Alhayat 2007). Nuri
al-Maliki of the Dawa shares this view and believes that federalism should form the
basis for unity not disintegration.
In the on-going struggles taking place in Iraq, the Kurdish region remains the
most stable and autonomous. The PUK and KDP have designed and dominated over
state-like institutions in their region. While Mazoud Barazani presides of the Kurdish
region (removing the Iraqi flag from all public buildings replacing it with a Kurdish flag
(AlNahar 2006)) Talabani represents the Kurds at a national level. Since the regime
collapsed, Kurdish parties displayed a strong sense of political prudence —thanks to a
long (and bloody) history placing them at the crossroads of the Iraqi and the Middle
Eastern state system—in achieving their aims without generating opposition (a potential
Sunni-Shiite alliance) to their plans in Iraq or by seeking a full-fledged independence
and hence disrupting the existing state system.
In attempting to answer the question as to ‘why do Iraqi Kurds abstain from
expressing their desire for independence?’, the Kurdish Iraqi Nizar Agari observes that
the Kurds have so far abstained from this struggle not because of the “love to be part of
Iraq” but because of the ‘red-line’ imposed at a regional level and the role of the central
government in Baghdad (2007). The current division among Shiites and between them
and the Sunni have diverted any effort to curb Kurdish power in Iraq. Kurdish leaders
understand the new balance of power in Iraq and in the region, which can provide them
with numerous opportunities to maintain their autonomy.62 Memory figures high in the
strategies of the Kurdish parties, while the geopolitical position of Iraq continues to
save it as a territorial entity.
The inability of the current government to execute its policy in ensuring law and
order had, like the Baathist regime before it, to rely on mediators. In Sunni provinces
where it was deemed the al-Qaida had stronghold, the regime backed tribal forces such
as those of the Al Sahwa Council of Anbar (AL-Arabia 2007) and Dulaim tribes, who
oppose al-Qaida and are suspicious of the Iranian influence in Iraq.
Developments taking place in Iraq cannot be separated from regional dynamics
in the Middle East. US occupation of Iraq threatened regime interests in Syria and Iran
and raised fears for, as we saw above, Saudi Arabia and Turkey increasing their
intervention in Iraq (Stansfield 2007b, 8; Tripp 2007, 311-12). The rise of Al Sahwa
62 Talabani for instance refused to ratify the execution of Saddam Hussein keeping the Kurdish relations
with the wider Sunni community at a calm level. Further, the Kurdish leadership avoided confrontation
with Turkey when the latter decided to pursue PKK forces in northern Iraq.
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movement in the Sunni sphere is in one way an exit for Saudi Arabia’s strategic
dilemma in Iraq (see above). Syria saw American occupation of Iraq as threatening to
its “regime’s very survival” (Hinnebusch 2006, 129). For Iran, US presence in Iraq is
both a source of concern and opportunity. Iraq forms one arena of conflict between the
two with Lebanon, Afghanistan, and the Palestinian territories forming other arenas.
Iran’s concern involves a US stable presence that might threaten its regime while the
opportunity lies in Iran’s ability to weaken US presence there either by affecting the
policy of its allies in government or by supporting the insurgency.
Amidst these regional divisions Iraq generates multiple foreign policies. The
Kurds continue to support the US aiming to consolidate their autonomy and attempting
to preserve relations with Iran, Syria, and Turkey, including Israel. These views
contradict with Shiites—especially al-Sadr Movement—who are critical of both the US
and Israel (Mindalawi 2007).The government of al-Maliki takes a centrist approach
trying to balance forces between US and Iranian strategies. As opposed to the Kurds,
the Shiites are divided on the main issues leading sometimes to bloody confrontations as
those between the government forces and the Mahdi Army. This conflict took a regional
dimension when Iran decided to halt its talks with Iraq in protest, while Iraqi Nouri al-
Maliki sought Iran’s help to ensure stability in Shiite regions (Meyer 2008) and to fight
the insurgency.
Like the Shiites, the Sunnis are divided on the main political goals of post-
Baathist Iraq. While some support the insurgency refusing to deal with US and accusing
the current government of being the ‘agent’ of the US and Iran, others have sought to
accommodate themselves in the new political structure in Iraq. US strategy—supported
by friendly Arab regimes—aimed to incorporate the Sunnis to neutralise al-Qaida and
other militant Islamist groups by arming the tribes in major Sunni regions such as the
Anbar and to counter Iranian influence in Iraq.63
Conclusion: Theoretical Implications of the Iraqi Case
What theoretical insights on state survival can the Iraqi case offer us? To answer this
question I will conclude this chapter by examining the effect of each variable on Iraqi
state survival.
As far as the first condition—domestic power monopoly— is concerned, we
realise that Iraq’s cultural heterogeneity has constrained the monopoly mechanism. This
63 Condoleezza Rice believes that any US withdrawal will lead to increase Iranian influence there and that
Iraq should become stable the US can, with is allies, confront Iran (Al Hayat 2007).
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heterogeneity provided a basis on which political entrepreneurs can activate cultural
identities for political objectives. This in turn challenged the narratives different
regime’s advanced to survive politically. As an externally engineered state, regime
formation in Iraq brought to power a weak monarch with no social base. As opposed to
the Saudi case, the monopoly mechanism in Iraq started after the emergence of state
boundaries. As an externally engineered state, Iraqi regime did not rise from Iraqi
society but was in its turn externally installed by the British. This provided the basis on
which indigenous attempts at state formation were carried. Given the cultural
heterogeneity of Iraq, political struggles took a vertical (e.g. regime versus Kurdish
insurgency) and, as a late forming state, these conflicts had intra-elite dimension also.
These struggles formed the basis for the emergence of a violent authoritarian regime.
What about the economic resources of the regime? If the above analysis is right,
we can conclude by suggesting that the availability economic resources would weaken a
(authoritarian) state that is culturally heterogeneous and not strengthening it. In the case
of Iraq, the timing of the introduction of oil as a factor is important. Attempts at
political monopolisation in Iraq started before oil was introduced to the Iraqi political
scene. The above narrative defined patterns that cut across different regimes regardless
of their identities or the resources they possessed. While oil in the case of Saudi Arabia
came to reinforce existing power structures, in Iraq it contributed to the intensification
of existing divides. Simply put, oil augmented authoritarian drives, which started
earlier, contracting the political structure to unprecedented levels as in the case of
Saddam Hussein’s regime in the 1990s.
What does this tell us about the second condition—division of regional
politics—for state survival? Iraq’s geopolitical position has not only shaped its domestic
development but, as shown above, has caused its formation as a territorial state. Iraq’s
international behaviour is shaped by domestic impediments of monopoly formation.
While Saudi Arabia’s domestic monopoly helped it project power abroad to prevent any
revisionism in the regional order, Iraq’s multiple foreign policies emanates from
domestic attempts to establish power monopoly and resistance to this mechanism.
Given Iraq’s cultural heterogeneity, this caused revisionist factions to form alliances
with external powers to balance against the regime internally. As Figure 4.3 above
suggests, this increased the regime’s authoritarianism while deforming the state and
increasing Iraq’s external vulnerability.
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The vulnerability of the Iraqi state and the regional order interact in ways that
determine the possibilities of state and regime survival in Iraq. In the initial phase of
state formation when Britain and France regulated the regional system, domestic
attempts for regime change—as the attempt during WWII—were aborted. The
emergence of external neutralisation after the rise of Soviet and American influence in
the Middle East enabled regime change in 1958. Given Iraq’s cultural heterogeneity and
the low political incorporation there, the new regional structure provided opportunities
for the regime’s adversaries also. That regional order amplified the domestic security
dilemmas.
While in the Saudi case, a divided regional order contributed to reinforcing the
domestic power monopoly, in Iraq a divided regional order intensified the civil
conflict—first in the form of authoritarian repression and then in full-fledged civil
war—taking place there. When the cold war came to an end (eliminating the external
neutralisation), Iraq became totally vulnerable to regime change, which took place in
2003 by direct US invasion. By 2003 Iraq lacked both conditions (domestic power
monopoly and external neutralisation) needed for state survival.
The major implication of examining post-Baathist Iraq is that state collapse in
Iraq has increased this country’s vulnerability to systemic forces. The multiplicity of
political actors—coercion-wielding organisations—in Iraq and their multiple responses
to regional developments make Iraq’s stability, like that Lebanon of (Saouli 2006), very
dependent on regional developments. The inability of the US to isolate Iran either
through the breaking of the Iran-Syria-Hizbullah axis (the Lebanon-Israel 2006 war
provided a potential for this) or to confront Iran directly may see the US accepting the
status quo. This might lead to stability in Iraq. Should the US-Iran confrontation
intensify, Iraq might slide into instability once again.
To decrease Iraq’s vulnerability to systemic forces, active Iraqi factions
(representing its cultural multiplicity) need to be incorporated in the state. Political
incorporation would contribute to monopolising and institutionalising coercion and to
orientate different political forces towards Baghdad. These would lay the foundations
for an Iraqi unitary foreign policy that represents its multiple characters. It is more
likely that under a conducive regional order, Iraq would institutionalise its domestic
cultural diversity in public state institutions. The diffusion of power in the post-Baathist
era would make it unlikely that Iraq would retreat to authoritarianism. The
crystallisation of sectarian and ethnic social boundaries and the division in regional
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order would work to defeat any attempts to establish a domestic hegemony in Iraq.
Accordingly, stability in Iraq would fluctuate between order and instability as some
warring factions attempt to institutionalise power and other resisting these attempts.
There remains one question that this chapter has not answered: why, as a
culturally heterogeneous country that was externally engineered and is strategically
located in an oil-rich region, does Iraq continue to survive as a territorial entity?
Although Iraq has a different internal composition, it shares with Saudi Arabia the
dependent variable of state territorial survival. This question will take us to the
conclusion of this thesis, where I will argue that state survival during late formation is a
function not only of domestic factors but of regional systems in which states are
embedded.
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Conclusion
A theory arranges phenomena so that they are
seen as mutually dependent; it connects
disparate facts; it shows how changes in
some of the phenomena necessarily entail
changes in others.
—Kenneth Waltz, Theory of
International Politics
This Thesis
The main problem this thesis sought to examine was under what condition states stay
intact during late formation. This examination was applied to the case of the Middle
East in general and the cases of Saudi Arabia and Iraq in particular. Specifying these
conditions demanded first the treatment of the state as a ‘process’. Accordingly, the
state was not taken as a given but the core of this research was to examine the
conditions under which states form, deform, and survive. Second, this thesis presented a
critical review of the two main approaches to studying the state in the context of the
Middle East: The Political Economy and Political Culture approaches. I argued that this
literature raises both conceptual and theoretical problems to the study of the state in the
Middle East.
I argued that state weakness and authoritarian persistence in the Middle East is
not due to the political culture of the Middle East or Islam’s inability to absorb the
notion of the state. In fact, I showed that Arab and Islamic scholars have theoretically
debated the course of which political order can be established in the region with the
state being part of the debate. However, it was also argued that the state is not a mere
‘idea’ but a process involving political struggles and that linking the state to notions of
‘liberty’ or ‘democracy’—as is the case in the Western democracies—is not useful to
understanding state formation in the Middle East. Finally, I argued that political culture
is far too vague a concept to encompass political dynamics in the Middle East or the
developing world in general.
The political economy approach has advanced our understanding of the Middle
East by examining material structures, social forces and their politicisation to explain
state formation and resilience in the region. I showed, however, that this approach (like
its predecessor) relied on domestic factors to explain state survival and by limiting itself
to these factors had problems explaining variation in the outcomes of different cases in
the Middle East. Further, in the case of Rentier State Theory, the role of oil was over-
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stretched to explain authoritarian persistence or the rise of Islamism. These
explanations, for instance, have insufficient empirical backing as the cases of Saudi
Arabia and Iraq have shown. Both Islamism and authoritarian regimes existed before oil
became pivotal in the political dynamics of some states in the Middle East.
In Chapter Two, I examined general theories on state survival looking at both
international—normative and realist approaches—and domestic factors—cultural and
organisational perspectives. Although each of these works presents us with useful ways
to examine state survival, I argued that these works need to be bridged to understand the
complexities of state formation and survival in the Middle East. In Chapter Three, I
proposed a Historical Structuralism model that aims to situate political phenomenon
within cultural and material structures. By doing this I provided a specific definition of
culture, treating it as a context that makes understanding political behaviour
comprehensible. Further, the model examined the interrelations between cultural,
material and political structures highlighting the role of political entrepreneurs in
activating and de-activating these structures. These interactions, I argued, take place
within social fields, which form the arenas where politics takes place and where
distinctive histories are created shaping individual political behaviour.
This model provides a map of the political world paving the way to examine
state ontology during late formation in Chapter Four. Two generic conditions
characterise the ontology of the state in the developing world; first this state came late
to a pre-existing state system and second this state is at the early stages of formation.
The chapter then went on to examine the different stages a state passes through as it is
forming. By specifying the conditions of state formation in the Middle East, this thesis
resisted arguments that either treats the state in the region as ‘colonial fabrication’ or
others that treat it as a genuine indigenous entity. I argued that the extension of the
international anarchic system originating in Europe explains the drawing of state
borders in the Middle East. This however required that indigenous powers establish
strategies of ‘adaptation’ to external changes making the external strategies possible.
What emerged in the Middle East were social fields where states develop and where
political struggles are fought. These struggles centre on three main areas of state
formation involving the monopolisation of coercion, of a political idea, and resources.
These struggles are shaped by a social field’s cultural and material structures
The degree to which a social field is culturally homogeneous, the initial
conditions (possibilities) of regime formation and the availability of economic resources
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determine the nature and extent of the monopoly mechanism. The degree of domestic
power monopolisation determines the way a social field responds to systemic forces.
The higher the monopolisation process the more a social field will respond unitarily to
systemic forces and vice-a-versa. Understanding state behaviour in the Middle East
requires its situation in the process of state formation and deformation. As Figure 4.4.
shows above, the higher the degree of state formation—a movement to the right of the
continuum—the more a state will behave in a unitary manner and the less will be the
external penetration in that state. As states deform, they begin to respond in multiple
ways to systemic forces increasing external penetration in that state.
Security predicaments impose a dilemma on the late forming state. While
political incorporation—the process of institutionalisation—strengthens a state’s
immunity against external penetration, it weakens dominating regimes who strive to
maintain power. In the face of internal and external threats dominating regimes will
endeavour to consolidate their power by furthering the monopolisation process. This
forms the basis on which domestic opposition will resort to external powers to improve
its domestic standing and to balance against the dominating regime.
I argued that all Arab states are weak when it comes to political incorporation.
Between political incorporation and political survival, dominating regimes during late
formation choose survival. This not only weakens the territorial integrity of their states
but also erodes their political agenda and identity. Regime’s strive for survival in
different contexts—social fields—and hence under different circumstances. The more
culturally heterogeneous a social field is —as the Iraqi case indicates—the more acute
the dilemma is. The more culturally homogeneous a social field is, the less the critical
the dilemma is, as the Saudi case reveals. Further, the examination of the cases reveals
that while economic resources (oil income) have reinforced regime power in the Saudi
case and lessened the late formation dilemma; in the Iraqi case oil income asserted the
dilemma and constrained the monopolisation process.
This thesis aimed to theorise about state formation and survival in the Middle
East. In doing so, it showed the diversity and variation of state formation trajectories in
the region and the complexities of using cultural or political economy approaches to
study the state. By specifying generic processes of state formation and factors that
account for variation, this thesis laid the foundation for a comparative study of states in
the Middle East going beyond overarching perspectives that do not account for
differences within the population of cases or others that provide descriptive narratives in
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one-case studies. By bridging theory and history, this thesis aimed to situate the Middle
East in larger theoretical debates in Political Science and Sociology and to form the
basis on which knowledge on the region can be accumulated, developed or refuted.
A Bounded Theory of State Survival in the Middle East
In addition to laying these foundations, this thesis aimed to explain the conditions of
state survival in the Middle East. I argued that two conditions account for state survival
during late formation: domestic monopolisation of power and external neutralisation
(division in regional structure of power). These I argued are the theoretical conditions
that need to be present for a state to stay intact. The extent to which each of these
conditions is present varies among different cases, which sets the basis for comparison.
The degree of a state’s cultural homogeneity, its economic resources, its regime
formation, timing of socialisation in the state system, geographical position and regional
order all account for variation in state formation and behaviour outcomes.
The above two conditions reinforce each other as domestic power monopoly
contributes to a division in regional configuration of power and in its turn a divided
regional structure buttresses domestic power monopoly. How do these conditions help
us explain state survival both as a regime of power and a territorial entity? Domestic
monopolisation of power is a necessary condition but not a sufficient one to explain
regime survival during late formation. As shown above, theories of state survival in the
Middle East have focused on the domestic, cultural and socio-economic characteristics
of state to account for their survival. After examining the initial conditions of state
formation in the Middle East, the ontology of that state, and the conditions of its
survival, I conclude this thesis with the following argument: State survival in the
Middle East is a function of the anarchic nature of the international (and by extension
the regional) state system more than the domestic characteristics of individual states.
The inherent insecurity in the international state system causes great powers, in
attempts to preserve their independence, to expand their power to strategic areas of
which the Middle East is one. The ontology of the late forming state—as described in
Chapter Four—makes that expansion possible. When expanding states attempt to
augment their spheres of influence some contribute to indigenous monopolisation
processes, while other competitors contribute to opposite (de-monopolising) processes.
Competition in the international system puts pressure on late forming states to
monopolise power domestically. This could reinforce existing power monopolies (e.g.
Saudi Arabia) or provide opportunities for regime change causing instability or civil
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wars (e.g. Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, or Syria before 1970). Where monopolies are
reinforced this forms the basis on which power can be projected back to the system
contributing to its division. Saudi foreign behaviour provides an illustration of this
mechanism. By allying itself to certain external forces, the Saudi regime balanced
against any potential hegemony in its region while reinforcing its domestic hegemony.
This balancing act reproduces the anarchy in the international system. Where instability
or civil wars occurred, regional status quo and revisionist powers aimed to balance one
another within a particular territory (e.g. Yemen in the 1960s, Iraq or Lebanon). This act
of balancing aims to orientate a particular state in one direction (status quo or
revisionist) by supporting one faction against another.
In both cases we observe that the anarchic nature of the international state
system contributes to the survival of the territorial state. The geo-political position of a
state during late formation determines the extent to which the international state system
would condition its internal development. The more strategic64 a state is during late
formation, the less will its internal characteristics determine its survival. Because any
change taking place within a state would affect the balance of power in the system, great
powers in strategic areas would intervene through domestic forces to shape the ways
and directions a state pursues in its foreign behaviour. The cases of Saudi Arabia and
Iraq reveal that the geo-political position of these states determined their survivability as
territorial entities regardless of their domestic composition. Through external support—
financial or military—regimes were maintained in certain periods contributing to the
territorial integrity of the state. British support, for example, for Ibn Saud was crucial
for the emergence of the Saudi social field in the initial period, while the British subsidy
during WWII and later US financial support was crucial for the monarchy’s survival
before oil income became pivotal.
On the other hand, British geo-political interests did not converge either with
Kurdish or Shiite demands for autonomy in the initial stages of state formation leading
to the emergence of the Iraqi state as we now know it. Although Iraq’s internal
composition is culturally heterogeneous and political claims are made for separation or
division, the territorial entity there continues to survive. Although we should expect
Iraq’s fragmented society to contribute to its territorial division, it is this fragmentation
however that keeps the Iraqi state intact. As the division of Iraq would threaten the state
64 In the Middle East the two most strategic areas are the Gulf where oil is abundant and the ‘Near East’
where the Arab-Israeli conflict is taking place. The two areas have and continue to be pivotal for great
powers.
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system in the Middle East by, for instance, the Kurds providing a model for their
compatriots in Turkey, Syria or Iran or the Shiites for minorities in Saudi Arabia or
Kuwait, regional states will balance within Iraq against any such schemes. As we saw in
the Iraq case, Kurdish experience with that state system has curbed their drive for total
separation especially as they try to maintain their latest achievements in establishing
autonomy. The Iran-Iraq war provides another example, as Iran was supporting
opposition to the regime in Iraq, Arab states like Saudi Arabia and Jordan fearing
Iranian expansion supported the Baathist regime. In keeping it intact, the Iraqi territorial
state was maintained.
What about regime survival or change? One of the shortcomings of the literature
on state survival in the Middle East was its conflation between state as a territorial
entity and states as a regime of power (see Chapter One). While the international state
system contributes to preserving the state as a territorial entity, changes within that
system contribute to regime change in the late forming state. Once again, the literature
on the state in the Middle East emphasises domestic factors to account for regime
survival. This thesis contributed to that debate in two ways. First, by explicating the
variables that account for state survival in the Middle East (Chapter Four), I showed that
domestic factors—level of cultural homogeneity, regime nature, and economic
resources available—are necessary but not sufficient to explain regime survival. To
understand regime survival, we need to situate the late forming state in its regional and
international arenas of power.
To account for this effect three variables—geographical position of a state,
timing of socialisation in the state system, and regional order—were proposed. The
structure of the international and regional systems provides both opportunities and
constraints for domestic forces as they attempt to monopolise power within their states.
When a change takes place in the configuration of the international system—as the
emergence of new powers, e.g. US and the Soviet Union in 1945—new opportunities
arise for revisionists (opposition within certain states) seeking to alter the power balance
in their states. These form external enabling conditions for regime change or instability
in the form of civil wars where regime change fails to take place.
The effect of these systemic changes on domestic structures of power depends
on the level of monopolisation established before these changes take place and the
nature of the social field. In the case of Saudi Arabia, we observe that systemic changes
have benefited the monarchy by increasing its leverage against first the British and, with
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the rise of Nasser and the Soviet Union, the kingdom became more pivotal for the US
and the West in general. In Iraq, given the external engineering of the state and regime
there and the rise of internal opposition as we saw above, change in international
configuration of power provided new opportunities for revisionists to alter the domestic
power balance. Attempts for regime change failed during WWII, while in 1958 with the
increase in Nasserite and Soviet influence in the Middle East, change became possible.
Iraq’s domestic fragmentation and geopolitical position made it very vulnerable
to systemic effects. This not only created dilemmas regarding foreign behaviour but also
caused civil war first between Baathists and Communists after the 1963 coup and later
between the Baathist regime and the Kurds on one hand and the regime and Shiite
movement on the other hand. The Islamic Revolution in Iran and the opportunities it
provided for domestic opposition in Iraq amplified Iraqi domestic struggles. Once again,
the maintenance of the regional balance of power contributed to keeping the Iraqi
regime intact against its internal enemies and Iranian incursion. Change in the regional
balance of power in 1990, led first to the contraction of the Iraqi regime and paved the
way for invasion in 2003.
Oil income and the cultural composition of a state are crucial to inform us of the
conditions for establishing the monopoly mechanism, regime strength or the level to
which a state is vulnerable to systemic effects. These, however, are not sufficient to
explain regime survivability or collapse. Does this mean that there is a causal
relationship between the international system and state survival or collapse in the
Middle East? However, does it mean that the state in the Middle East will continue to be
shaped by changes in the international system? One main argument presented in section
3.4. above regards the history and memory of political entrepreneurs engaged in
struggles within social fields. States develop by increasing political incorporation,
which sets the basis for the emergence of a strong state.
The convergence of early state formation within the anarchic nature of the
international system made the state in the Middle East highly vulnerable to the latter.
However, political struggles taking place in the form of monopoly formation within
states and the limits placed by the international system on these struggles will see
political entrepreneurs attempting to avoid pitfalls of the past to secure their survival.
This will vary from one case to the other. The more fragmented (Iraq, Sudan, Lebanon,
Syria) a state is—after a long history of political struggles—the higher the need would
be to design institutions to incorporate different factions to form the basis for stability.
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In cases like Saudi Arabia (and other Gulf states), as discussed above, political
incorporation will be slower and will be determined by the extent to which new socio-
economic forces emerge and are able to politicise. Theoretically, the higher the political
incorporation the less a state will be vulnerable to systemic changes. Political
incorporation here does not only mean including different factions in state institutions
but it also means incorporating their foreign orientations, hence rationalising and
unifying a states foreign behaviour.
Widening the Scope: Theory, Method, and Further
Research
In this thesis, I aimed to bridge theory and history to account for the complexities of
Middle East politics. I argued for the need to establish ‘middle-range theories’ that
bridge generic frameworks and history to establish a ‘bounded theory’. The generic
framework provides us with the intellectual background to facilitate the reading of
history in empirical cases. State formation processes, this thesis hoped to show, provide
us with a strong ground to theorise Middle East politics. Further, studying state
formation helps us bridge the gap between different fields within Political Science. By
being clear about our understanding of the state as a concept and as a process, by
situating the state in the Middle East in time and place, and by accounting for variation
in the cases, this thesis provides a framework on which further research can be
established.
Research can be advanced in two ways. First, research can be developed by
widening the scope of the theory supplied here to examine other cases. Potential cases
could include Jordan (monarchy but poor), Lebanon (culturally heterogeneous with no
oil income), Syria (culturally heterogeneous, not oil-rich, and stable) or Yemen (tribal,
with no oil income). The examination would involve searching into the factors that keep
these domestically diverse states intact in some periods and fragmented in others. Some
research questions are in order. Why although culturally heterogeneous is Syria stable?
On the other hand, how can we explain state survival in Jordan, while the state there
lacks the economic resources needed for that outcome? If it is about it domestic
sectarian divisions, why is Lebanon stable in one period and fragmented in another? On
the other hand, how do we explain the civil war that took place between Hamas and
Fateh (both Sunni Muslim) in the occupied territories? If the theory presented here is
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right, these questions should take us to the regional balance of power and the inherent
security in it and how factions in the late forming states respond to that structure as they
struggle for power domestically.
A second way to advance this research is to examine other dimensions of the
multi-dimensional state formation process. For example, why was the civil war taking
place in Iraq in 1963 ideological in nature and the current one sectarian? How are
political identities formed and under what conditions? How does the discourse of
political entrepreneurs shape these social boundaries and what effect does this have on
state formation? Does culture override material structures? Is Syria’s regime’s ideology
a mere façade disguising sectarian tension or is Arab nationalism a strong identity in
Syria? How and when would state institutions become independent entities in the state
formation process? Under what conditions would Saudi power diffuse to other social
forces and how would this affect state institution there? The above research challenged
the clear-cut relationship between oil-income and state strength in fragmented Iraq. If
the above observations on Iraq are right, what can we expect the oil-income to produce
in the case of Sudan? Further, how does the geopolitical position of a state affect its
prospects for democratic transition?
The Middle East provides an important intellectual repertoire to study the state
and state formation, to provide fruitful theoretical frameworks that can be extended to
other area studies (Central Asia, Africa, Southeast Asia), and to develop appropriate
methodological tools that are transferrable to other social science fields. Studying state
formation comparatively by examining the history of the region through precise
theoretical frameworks would form strong foundation to achieve this intellectual
agenda. Disaggregating ‘political culture’ as a sociological concept while avoiding a
reductionist political economy approaches would constitute a good start in that
direction. Dilemmas of late state formation are far more complicated to be reduced to
one factor or one level of analysis as this thesis has shown. By arguing that the
determining factor of state survival in the Middle East is found in the structure of the
international system, this thesis has both answered some questions and raised many
more. Middle East Studies have so far suffered from too much polemic and too little
political analysis or science. This formula must be reversed, not only for the benefit of
intellectual inquiry but also for the good of the peoples of the region.
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